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Coaches play a crucial yet complex role in sport, including selecting players for 
games - a key decision many coaches regularly make. Despite this, little is known about why 
or how coaches make team selection decisions. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to 
investigate rugby union coaches’ team selection decisions, with specific reference to the cues 
(pieces of information) they use. Chapter 1 provides the context and rationale for this thesis. 
Chapter 2 comprises a systematic review which reveals the only study that has investigated 
coaches’ team selection decisions directly (by asking coaches), and the 15 studies that 
examined the differences between selected and non-selected players after selection had 
occurred. Given the small number of studies found in the systematic review, Chapter 3 
contains a narrative literature review which summarises the cues that could influence 
coaches’ judgments and decisions made on their athletes while viewing them. Through a 
longitudinal interview study, Chapter 4 portrays the large number of diverse cues six rugby 
union coaches reported using to make team selection decisions and how this information 
changed dramatically from pre-season to post-season interviews. In Chapter 5, a case study of 
five rugby union coaches working within the same coaching team revealed the breadth and 
variety of the cues the coaches reportedly used to make team selection decisions, the 
processes these coaches went through (“the best or the rest” selection strategy), and how the 
power relationships among the coaching team impacted their selection decisions. This study 
also found through visual and audio observations of the head coach that most selection cues 
were only stated in one training session, suggesting an absence of a clear, long-term selection 
strategy. Chapter 6 provides coaches with a practical overview of the key results of this thesis 
and the implications for their coaching practices. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by 
summarising the key findings and making several future recommendations for researchers 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Context and Rationale 
Rugby union is the most popular full-contact team sport in the world (Fuller, Taylor, 
& Raftery, 2015; Kerr et al., 2008). It is a possession-orientated (Lamb & Croft, 2016), high-
intensity collision sport (Lombard, Durandt, Masimla, Green, & Lambert, 2015) with the aim 
of scoring the greatest number of points, which is done by scoring a try or a goal kick 
(referred to as penalty during play or a conversion immediately after a try). Two teams of 
fifteen players, made up of eight forwards (who tend to be tall and heavy; Durandt et al., 
2006; Fuller, Taylor, Brooks, & Kemp, 2013) and seven backs (who are usually fast; 
Cunniffe, Proctor, Baker, & Davies, 2009; Quarrie & Hopkins, 2007), compete over two 40-
minute halves to gain possession and territory (Duthie, Pyne, & Hooper, 2006; Lamb & 
Croft, 2016; Lombard et al., 2015). To play rugby union, players require a number of specific 
anthropometric, physiological, perceptual-cognitive, and psychological characteristics and 
sport-specific skills (Andrew, Grobbelaar, & Potgieter, 2007; Duthie et al., 2006; Faubert & 
Sidebottom, 2012). 
The coach plays a crucial but complex role in sport (Gilbert & Trudel, 2004b; Nash, 
Sproule, & Horton, 2008). This includes (but is not limited to) teacher, organiser, competitor, 
learner, friend, and mentor (Short & Short, 2005). A key decision that coaches must regularly 
make is the selection of individuals to a team (Côté, Young, North, & Duffy, 2007; Couturier, 
2009), a complex multi-criteria problem in which coaches must consider a large amount of 
information (Tavana, Azizi, Azizi, & Behzadian, 2013) to form judgments that lead to team 
selection decisions. Sport participation is associated with improved psychosocial functioning 
and emotional wellbeing, vitality, enjoyment, life satisfaction, reduced stress and distress, and 
a sense of community (Eime, Young, Harvey, Charity, & Payne, 2013) while selection for 
teams can lead players into the elite developmental trajectory (Côté et al., 2007) and give 
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them an increased probability of becoming a successful professional senior player (Güllich, 
2014). Those who are repeatedly selected also maintain or improve physical and skill 
performances during a season (Caterisano, Patrick, Edenfield, & Batson, 1997; Gonzalez et 
al., 2013; Gonzalez, Hoffman, Scallin-Perez, Stout, & Fragala, 2012; Scanlan, Tucket, & 
Dalbo, 2015), while those not selected can experience detraining (Caterisano et al., 1997), 
stress (Woods & Thatcher, 2009), and a loss of identity (Neely, McHugh, Dunn, & Holt, 
2017). Despite the crucial impact of player selection, little is known about, for example, what 
information coaches use or the processes they go through when making selection decisions. 
Furthermore, although we know coaches have a wealth of information available to them 
when making decisions in other contexts (e.g., within talent development programmes; 
Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, & Philippaerts, 2008), coaches have been found to use instinct 
and sight to judge their athlete’s physical attributes (Fiander, Jones, & Parker, 2013). There is 
also evidence that coaches in the same team lack consistency when evaluating the same 
athletes (e.g., Black & Holt, 2009). Taken together, and applied to team selection decisions, 
coaches may then be making idiosyncratic team selection decisions based on instinct and not 
on all the available information. Our understanding of coaches’ team selection decisions is, 
however, poor. As coaching is still a developing field (Cushion, Harvey, Muir, & Nelson, 
2012), it requires descriptive research to accumulate knowledge and develop an 
understanding of what coaches actually do (Gilbert & Trudel, 2004b; Potrac, Jones, & 
Cushion, 2007). Given that selecting players for a team are vital decisions coaches must 
regularly make (Côté et al., 2007; Couturier, 2009) and our current lack of knowledge on the 
subject, the need to further our understanding of team selection decisions is clear. The 
purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to investigate coaches’ team selection decisions, with 




1.2: Concepts, Definitions, and Theories 
When making a judgment or decision on another human, people use cues (pieces of 
information) that arise from the individual they are viewing and the environment they are in. 
Even after a glance (i.e., 50ms) at an individual’s face (cue), people judge others (e.g., their 
trustworthiness; Freeman, Stolier, Ingbretsen, & Hehman, 2014). This process occurs in 
everyday situations in both obvious and more subtle ways. For example, dentists (e.g., 
Brocklehurst, Baker, & Speight, 2010), therapists (e.g., Nakash & Alegria, 2013), and doctors 
(e.g., Kim, Kols, Prammawat, & Rinehart, 2005) utilise cues when diagnosing their patients 
based on judgments of their symptoms. These judgments subsequently inform treatment 
decisions. As another example, when focusing on sex and seating position as cues, if a man is 
sat at the head of a table (either in a mixed-sex or single-sex group) they are considered to be 
a leader (judgement), whereas a woman sat in the same place is ignored (Porter, Geis, & 
Jennings, 1983). People, therefore, regularly use cues obtained from viewing and interacting 
with others to help make sense of complex and demanding social environments (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000).  
There are, however, issues when it comes to defining what is (and is not) a cue (Ernst 
& Bülthoff, 2004; Martin, 2016; Lim et al., 2005; Rothkopf, Weisswange, & Triesch, 2010). 
Some have even suggested that the term cue, rather than defined, is treated as implicitly 
understood (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Martin, 2016). Although it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to argue a precise definition of a cue, it is still necessary to explain what is meant when 
this term is used throughout this thesis. A cue is defined as a single piece of information 
within an environment that holds meaning and is used to form a judgment (Cooksey, 1996; 
Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 
2013). Cues are, therefore, the link between the decision maker and the environment, 
allowing them to make sense of the world. 
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A judgment is defined as an assessment between alternatives that involves the 
integration of different cues to arrive at an overall evaluation (Dowie, 1993; Maule, 2001) 
whereas a decision is defined as a selection of one among several choices (Dowie, 1993; 
Newell & Shanks, 2014). A demonstration of these two distinct but closely related concepts 
is a volleyball coach evaluating players’ passing and serving techniques (judgment based on 
cues) and subsequently selecting a subset of players for a training squad (decision; Gabbett, 
Georgieff, & Domrow, 2007). What both these processes rely on are cues. This notion is 
represented in the Lens Model (see Figure 1; Brunswik, 1952) which begins with the stimulus 
in the environment (e.g., the individual being viewed) on the left side of the model (the 
criterion). There are imperfect (or fallible) cues (in the centre of the model) that are related to 
the individual (cue validity) with different importance (or weight; cue utilisation) attached to 
them which are then used to make a judgment (displayed on the right side of the model). 
Judgments subsequently form key components (e.g., judgment of probability; Manktelow, 
2012) of the decision-making process (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Cues can be fallible in 
the accuracy of the information (i.e., ecological reliability) or the accuracy of the cue itself 
(i.e., ecological validity; Hammond, 1996). If, for example, an individual knows that wealth 
is an important cue that some people look for when selecting a partner, they may try to 
deceive others by displaying obvious signs of affluence. The cue is valid for those looking for 
a partner (ecological validity) yet the information is unreliable (ecological reliability). 
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Figure 1. Brunswik’s Lens Model (Brunswik, 1952). 
Several researchers have attempted to explain how people use cues in their decision 
strategies. Rational models, for example, assume that people employ compensatory 
procedures that consider all available cues and their utility to each alternative (Payne & 
Bettman, 2001), while heuristic models put forward that people apply simple rules that 
regularly rely on a subset of available cues (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Furthermore, as it 
was observed that people use different decision strategies for the same multiple-cue tasks 
(Bryant, 2014), several proposals were put forward to explain how people select a decision 
strategy. For example, the Contingency Model assumes that strategy selections are based on 
an implicit cost-benefit trade off (Beach & Mitchell, 1978), while the Strategy Selection 
Learning model suggests an effort-accuracy trade off with a learning mechanism (Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006). 
Researchers in sport began their investigations of the impact of cues on coaches’ 
judgments and decisions by examining whether impression cues (i.e., information used to 
form expectations; Solomon & Rhea, 2008) impacted coaches’ expectancy judgments of their 
Cue 
utilisation 







athletes - and subsequent behaviour towards their athletes (e.g., Horn, 1984; Martinek, 
Crowe, & Rejeski, 1982; Rejeski, Darracott, & Hutslar, 1979; Sinclair & Vealy, 1989). These 
and successive researchers (e.g., Becker & Solomon, 2005; Solomon, 1993; 2001; 2002; 
2003; 2010; Solomon & Buscombe, 2013; Solomon, DiMarco, Ohlson, & Reece, 1998; 
Solomon, Golden, Ciapponi, & Martin, 1998; Solomon & Kosmitzki, 1996; Solomon & 
Rhea, 2008; Solomon et al., 1996) used the expectancy theory and self-fulfilling prophecy as 
a framework to explain this process. Expectancy theorists contend that (1) an individual must 
hold a false belief about a target; (2) the individual must treat the target in a manner that is 
consistent with the false belief, and (3) the target must confirm the original false belief 
(Merton, 1948; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). With relevance to coaching, this process is 
portrayed as a four-step cyclical model (Horn, Lox, & Labrador, 2010; Martinek, 1981; 
Solomon, 2001) described by Becker and Solomon (2005; see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The 4-step expectancy cycle from Becker and Solomon (2005) which is based on 
work by Martinek (1981), Solomon (2001), and Horn et al. (2010). 
Step one is where the coach develops an expectation for an athlete’s performance 
based on personal (e.g., sex, race, or body size), performance (e.g., speed, agility, or game 
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statistics), and psychological (e.g., confidence, anxiety, or motivation) impression cues. In 
step two, the coach’s initial expectations for the athlete’s performance influences coaching 
behaviours and treatment towards the athlete. In step three, the athlete perceives differences 
in their coach’s treatment, which provides them with information regarding their own level of 
competence, further impacting the athlete’s performance. Finally, in step four, an athlete’s 
performance conforms to the coach’s original expectation, thus producing the four-step 
expectancy cycle and reinforcing the notion that the coach has accurately predicted the 
athlete’s ability. 
More recently, researchers have moved away from using the framework of 
expectancy theory and the self-fulfilling prophecy and have instead focussed on examining 
how specific cues can influences a variety of coaches’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Berri & 
Schmidt, 2002; Gabbett et al., 2007; Larkin and O’Conner, 2017; Young, 2008). This may be 
because most research in this area focused on coaches’ reliance on impressions of physical 
ability to assess athlete achievement and on feedback patterns (Solomon & Rhea, 2008). 
Somewhat more damming, though, is the review conducted by Jussim and Harber (2005) 
which examined 35 years of empirical research on self-fulfilling prophecies. The authors 
(who focussed on teacher expectations rather than coaches) concluded that while self-
fulfilling prophecies in the classroom do occur, these effects are typically small and do not 
accumulate greatly across perceivers or over time (they are more likely to dissipate than 
accumulate). Also, teacher expectations may predict student outcomes of intelligence simply 
because these expectations are accurate, not because they are self-fulfilling. What this review 
demonstrated was that even after over three decades of research, the true effects of self-





Coaches must regularly make team selection decisions (Côté, 2007; Couturier, 2009), 
a key decision that has implications for players beyond who will and will not play in an 
upcoming game (Caterisano et al., 1997; Côté et al., 2007; Eime et al., 2013 Gonzalez et al., 
2013; Gonzalez et al., 2012; Güllich, 2014; Neely et al., 2017; Scanlan et al., 2015; Woods & 
Thatcher, 2009). Given that we know individuals use cues to make decisions on others, the 
question becomes, do we know which cues coaches use to make team selection decisions? To 
answer this, it is necessary to systematically review all research to date that has investigated 
coaches’ team selection decisions.  
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Chapter 2: Why are Some Players Selected and Others Not? A Systematic Review 
2.1: Introduction 
Team selection is one of the most crucial decisions a coach must make (Côté et al., 
2007; Couturier, 2009). To make these decisions, coaches may use all (Payne & Bettman, 
2001), or a subset of (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010), available cues (i.e., a single piece of 
information within an environment that holds meaning and is used to form a judgment; 
Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013). 
Whilst there are studies available that highlight the cues used in other judgments and decision 
tasks performed by coaches (e.g., judging athlete achievement; Solomon & Rhea, 2008), it is 
not known which cues inform coaches’ team selection decisions.  
One area that has been the subject of much investigation, and could have parallels 
with team selection decisions, is the identification and selection of talented players for 
development pathways (Williams & Reilly, 2000). The decision to select a player for 
inclusion into talent development programmes is (usually) made by the coach (Wiseman, 
Bracken, Horton, & Weir, 2014), who can have a preconceived image of the ideal player 
(Williams & Reilly, 2000). This image relates to a player’s anthropometric, physiological, 
perceptual-cognitive, psychological, and skill characteristics (O’Connor, Larkin, & Williams, 
2016; Vaeyens et al., 2006). Specifically, it has been discovered, for example, that players 
selected (compared to those not selected) for development programmes are, among others, 
taller (Williams & Reilly, 2000), older (Gil et al., 2014), have less body fat (Williams & 
Reilly, 2000), perform better in physical tests, and possess greater technical skills (Vaeyens et 
al., 2006). The focus of these studies was, however, talent identification (i.e., the process of 
recognizing current participants with the potential to become elite players; Williams & 
Reilly, 2000) and not team selection. As a result, it is difficult to know whether the cues 
coaches used to identify talent are the same as those they use to select teams. The purpose of 
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this systematic review, therefore, is to present all research that investigated the cues used by 
coaches to make team selection decisions and the differences between selected and non-
selected players. 
2.2: Method 
 A systematic review was chosen as the most appropriate method to achieve the aim of 
this study because it is a means of presenting the current state of knowledge about a subject 
while also highlighting knowledge gaps and providing suggestions for future research and 
practical interventions (Campo, Mellalieu, Ferrand, Martinent, & Rosnet, 2012; Mulrow, 
Cook, & Davidoff, 1997; Murlow, 1995). To protect data from bias and in the interest of 
transparency, guidelines set out by PRISMA (Liberati et al., 2009) and Weed (1997) were 
followed. That is, to first state the purpose of the review, conduct a literature search, evaluate 
the quality of the research identified, summarize the evidence, and draw conclusions. Both 
these guidelines have been adopted in previous sport- and coaching-based systematic reviews 
(e.g., Campo et al., 2012; Harwood, Keegan, Smith, & Raine, 2015). 
2.2.1: Inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
Studies were included in this review if they provided quantitative and/or qualitative 
data on (1) the cues used in team selection decisions as outlined by coaches, or (2) the 
characteristics that discriminated between selected and non-selected players (or athletes) for a 
game or competition after selection had occurred. In accordance with previous 
recommendations on conducting systematic reviews (Knipschild, 1995), studies were 
excluded if they were not full articles (i.e., abstracts, conference proceedings, commentaries, 
responses, or reviews), not published in peer-reviewed journals, or were not in English. A 
time period was not used as an inclusion/exclusion criterion as (to the author’s knowledge) 





The electronic databases used for the literature search were SPORTDiscus and Web 
of Science. Searches were limited to sport specific journals (e.g., Psychology of Sport and 
Exercise, Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, Sport Psychologist, International Journal 
of Sport Psychology, Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, Research Quarterly for Exercise 
and Sport, Journal of Sport Sciences, and European Journal of Sport Science) to avoid 
confusion with team selection in other, unrelated fields (e.g., organizational psychology; 
Williams, Parker, & Turner, 2010). Further searches were made by reviewing article 
reference lists of the studies included in the review. To decide which keywords would be 
used to search for relevant literature, the author performed a general literature search on the 
topic in question. A list of keyword terms was then created by examining the titles, abstracts, 
headings, sub-headings, and keywords from the studies found. The final list of keywords was 
team (player) selection, team formation, team (player) selection process, team formation 
process, selection (deselection) decisions, coach selections (deselections), deselection, sport, 
team (multi-player, individual, youth) sport, player, athlete, and talent identification. Original 
searches were made in February 2017 and additional searches were made in January 2018. 
Both searches were identical, apart from a time period constraint was implemented on the 
second search which began from the end of the first search (i.e., February 2017) to avoid 
capturing duplicates. 
2.2.3: Procedure. 
The key words were used in a predetermined search strategy in all electronic 
databases, which generated an initial list of studies (for PRISMA flow diagram, see Figure 3). 
Information about each study (i.e., authors, title, source, abstract, publication year, volume, 
issue, start and end page and doi) was then extracted into a Microsoft Excel© spreadsheet to 
make data analysis more manageable and systematic. Once any duplicates were removed, 
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sifting was carried out using techniques previously utilized by Nicholls and Polman (2007; 
for further explanation, see Lloyd Jones, 2004; Meade & Richardson, 1997). More 
specifically, studies were first reviewed by title, then abstract, and then by full text, with 
those not meeting the inclusion/exclusion criteria being removed at each stage. Further 
searches of study reference lists were also completed. 
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A total of 16 studies were included in this review. The studies were published 
between 1987 and 2017, with five studies being published between 1987 and 1999 and the 
remaining 11 between 2005 and 2017. There was one study (i.e., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) 
that met the first inclusion criterion (i.e., studies that provided quantitative and/or qualitative 
data on the cues used in team selection decisions as outlined by coaches). Johansson and 
Fahlén (2017) recruited participants who were coaching football (n=8) and alpine skiing 
(n=6). Participants were coaching at either the elite national level (n=7; all alpine ski coaches 
and one football coach were at national level) or elite club level (n=7) in women’s teams 
(n=7), men’s teams (n=5), or mixed teams (n=2). No sex or age information was provided for 
the participants in this study.  
The remaining 15 studies met the second inclusion criteria (i.e., studies that examined 
characteristics that discriminated between selected and non-selected players for a game or 
competition after selection had occurred). In these studies, participants represented players 
(or athletes) from seven sports competing at different levels (e.g., junior, semi-professional, 
professional, sub-elite, elite, high-school, and university; one study did not state competition 
level), including rugby league (n=5), American football (n=3), volleyball (n=2), Australian 
rules football (n=2), football (n=1), lacrosse (n=1), and rowing (n=1). The number of 
participants in these studies ranged from 10 to 88 (M=48.33, SD=26.70). Both male (n=3) 
and female (n=4) participants were included (8 studies did not explicitly state participant sex) 
and the ages of the participants ranged from 10 to 24 years old (M=18.94, SD=3.41; one 
study only stated the age range of participants and another did not state the participants’ 
ages). 
 Johansson and Fahlén (2017) reported that coaches used a variety of cues (N=47; see 
Table 1) to make team selection decisions, including player cues, coach cues, cues from other 
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sources, and situational cues. Ten characteristics were found to separate selected and non-
selected players (see Table 2) that all related to the players (or athletes) themselves, including 
their appearance, performances, and situations. The number of characteristics found to not 
discriminate between selected and non-selected players, however, far outweighed the 
characteristics that did (see Table 3). Furthermore, one study found no differences between 
selected and non-selected players. Specifically, Hoffman et al. (2009) found no 
anthropometric, strength, power, speed, or agility differences between selected and non-





Summary of Johansson and Fahlén (2017) study which provided data on the cues used in team selection decisions as outlined by coaches 
Author(s) Year Method Level Sport(s) Sample Sex Age(s) (mean ± s) Cues used in team selection decisions as outlined by coaches 
Johansson 
& Fahlén 
2017 Interviews Elite Football; 
alpine skiing 
14 -  -  Age; attitude; work together as a team; personality; player’s capacity; 
abilities of players; potential; current and past performances; previous 
results; current form; predictions of future performances; ranking lists; skills; 
technique; behaviour; career impact on athlete; injuries; experience; price of 
player; potential selling of player 
Amount of time spent with athlete; coaches’ intuition; coaches experience of 
analysing athletes; experience of selection processes; coaches’ knowledge of 
sport; coaches’ knowledge of athletes; coaches’ goals; coaches’ winning 
mentality; game plan; feelings 
Other players; team goals; other coaches; federation boards; federation goals; 
club boards; club goals; media; agents; general public; sponsors; parents 
Opponents; position; rules; quotas; number of athletes 





Summary of studies included in this review that examined the differences between selected and non-selected players (or athletes) after selection 
had occurred 
Author(s) Year Data collected Method of 
analysis 
Level Sport(s) Sample Sex Age(s) 
(mean ± s) 
Differences in selected and non-selected players 
(athletes) 










34 Male 23.3 (4.0) Age; playing experience; 1RM bench press; 1RM 
squat; 1RM bench press/body mass; 1RM squat/body 
mass 
(Forwards: 1RM bench press; 1RM squat; 1RM bench 
















59 - 19.7 (1.0) One repetition squat; vertical jump power; static 














Volleyball 10 Female 19.6 (0.6) 36.6-m sprint; lower back-hip-hamstring flexibility; 
one repetition bench press, military press, power clean 
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Author(s) Year Data collected Method of 
analysis 
Level Sport(s) Sample Sex Age(s) 
(mean ± s) 
Differences in selected and non-selected players 
(athletes) 








88 - 13.2 (0.6), 
15.1 (0.6), 
16.5 (0.3) 
Under 14: Playing experience; maximal aerobic power 
Under 16: 10-m sprint; 20-m sprint; 40-m sprint; 0-10-
m velocity; 10-20-m velocity; 20-40-m velocity 
Under 18: Playing experience 
















86 - 23.3 (3.8) 10-m sprint; 40-m sprint; maximum velocity 
Gabbett, Kelly, 











64 - 16.0 (0.2), 
15.9 (0.6) 
Elite: Height; weight 








32 - 24.0 (3.0) Playing experience; vertical jump; three reputation 
squat and chin-up; body-mass maximum repetition 




Author(s) Year Data collected Method of 
analysis 
Level Sport(s) Sample Sex Age(s) 
(mean ± s) 
Differences in selected and non-selected players 
(athletes) 
Gravina, Gil, Ruiz, 








- Football 66 Male 10-14 
years 













Lacrosse 22 Female 19.2 (1.0) No differences found 


























20 - 21.7 (2.4) Repeated sprint-times 
20 
 
Author(s) Year Data collected Method of 
analysis 
Level Sport(s) Sample Sex Age(s) 
(mean ± s) 
Differences in selected and non-selected players 
(athletes) 








70 - - Bench press; power clean; 10-yard dash; vertical jump 









78 Male 19.9 (1.4), 
19.9 (1.6), 
19.9 (1.2) 
Seated medicine ball puts; one repetition bench press; 







ANOVA High-school Volleyball 50 Female 14.1 (0.6), 
15.7 (0.6), 
16.0 (0.6) 














34 - 22.7 (3.4) Age; playing experience; prolonged high-intensity, 
intermittent running; countermovement jump; 10-m 
time; flying 30-m time; right hamstring flexibility 





Player qualities investigated but found not to be significantly different between selected and non-selected players 
Author(s) Year Player qualities not significantly different between selected and non-selected players 
Baker 2017 Body mass; height  
(Forwards: Height) 




O’Bryant, Poe, & 
Kent 
1993 Age; body mass; height; fat %; relative strength; vertical jump power index; static vertical jump power 
index; vertical jump takeoff velocity; static vertical jump takeoff velocity; reps at 70%; reps at 90%; total 




Gordon, Hoffman, & 
Maresh 
1991 Age; body weight; height; relative fat; fat-free mass; somatotype; isometric peak force; isometric mean 
force; vertical jump; running vertical jump; 90% max vertical jump endurance; 9.1m sprint; agility T-test; 
shoulder extension; dorsiflextion; 1 repetition maximum squat; squat/fat-free mass; 2-mile run; sit-ups; 
isokinetic strength 
Gabbett 2009 Under 14s: Age; height; body mass; sum of skinfold; 10-m sprint; 20-m sprint; 40-m, sprint; 40-m sprint; 0-
10-m velocity; 10-20-m velocity; 20-40-m velocity; change of direction speed; vertical jump 
Under 16s: Age; playing experience; height; body mass; sum of skinfolds; change of direction speed; 
vertical jump; shuttle level; total distance; predicted VO2 max 
Under 18s: Age; height; body mass; sum of skinfolds; 10-m sprint; 20-m sprint; 40-m sprint; 40-m sprint; 0-
10-m velocity; 10-20-m velocity; 20-40-m velocity; change of direction speed; vertical jump; shuttle level; 
total distance; predicted VO2 max 
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Author(s) Year Player qualities not significantly different between selected and non-selected players 
Gabbett, Jenkins, & 
Abernethy 
2011 Body mass; height; change of direction speed; repeated-sprint ability; prolonged high-intensity intermittent 
running ability; single-task draw and pass; decision accuracy; decision time; pattern recall; pattern 
prediction 
Gabbett, Kelly, 
Ralph, & Driscoll 
2009 Elite: Age; playing experience; sum of skinfolds; 10-m sprint time; 20-m sprint time; 40-m sprint time; 0-
10-m velocity; 10-20-m velocity; 20-40-m velocity; change of direction speed; vertical jump height; shuttle 
level; total distance; estimated VO2 max 
Sub-elite: Age; playing experience; body mass; height; sum of skinfolds; 10-m sprint time; 20-m sprint 
time; 40-m sprint time; 0-10-m velocity; 10-20-m velocity; 20-40-m velocity; change of direction speed; 
vertical jump height; shuttle level; total distance; estimated VO2 max 
Gabbett & Seibold 2013 Age; body mass; 3RM bench press 
Gravina, Gil, Ruiz, 
Zubero, Gil, & 
Irazusta 
2008 Height; weight; BMI; % fat; % bone; % muscle; skinfold measurements (i.e., triceps, subscapular, 
abdominal, supraspinal, thigh, medial calf); sum of skinfold measurements; right strength exerted; left 
strength exerted; squat jump; countermovement jump; drop jump; absolute VO2 max; relative VO2 max 
Hoffman, Ratamess, 
Neese, Ross, Kang, 
Magrelli, & 
Faigenbaum 
2009 Height; body mass; 1RM bench press; 1RM squat; vertical jump; peak power (Wingate anaerobic power 
test); mean power (Wingate anaerobic power test); fatigue rate; peak power (sprint test); mean power (sprint 
test); VO2 max; 40-yd sprint; T-drill; pro-agility 
Lawton, Cronin, & 
McGuigan 
2013 Height; seated height; body mass; 8-site skinfold sum; arm span; 2000-m ergometer time 
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2014 Sum of skinfolds; 3-km time trial; 10-m sprint; 20-m sprint; 30-m sprint; 20- to 40-m speed 
Mayhew, Wolfe, & 
McCormick 
1987 1RM leg press; five-yard shuttle run; 40-yard dash; average repeated 350-yard runs; average heart rate 
recovery 
Schmidt 1999 Sit and reach; sit-ups; dips; 300-yard shuttle; vertical jump; pull-ups (it is not clear if age, height, weight, 
and body fat were significantly different for starters and non-starters) 
Thissen-Milder & 
Mayhew 
1991 Age; height; weight; sum skinfolds (i.e., triceps, subscapular, abdominal, suprailiac, anterior thigh); % fat; 
shoulder flexibility; sit-and-reach flexibility; vertical jump; anaerobic power 
Young, Newton, 
Doyle, Chapman, 
Cormack, Stewart, & 
Dawson 
2005 Height; body mass; sum of skinfolds; isokinetic strength; 3RM leg press; 3RM chin-ups; 3RM bench press; 
vertical jump; predicted VO2 max; left hamstring flexibility 
Note. RM = Repetition maximum. 
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2.3.1: Cues outlined by coaches (inclusion criteria one). 
The results in this section describing the cues used in team selection decisions as 
outlined by coaches themselves are all from the study conducted by Johansson and Fahlén 
(2017). It is worth noting that the results presented here are based on “selections to a 
team/squad for a season and selections to specific games or competitions” (p.473). As the 
authors do not distinguish between these two types of selection decisions in their study, every 
cue has been reported. Consequently, these results (and the subsequent discussion) should be 
interpreted with this in mind. Cues have been grouped (by the author) into larger categories 
that relate to the players themselves, the coaches, other sources, and the situation. 
2.3.1.1: Player cues. 
Football coaches stated that they balanced players differing in skills, experience, and 
age when making selection decisions. Furthermore, these coaches also wanted players who 
worked best as a team and not simply the best players. Both football and alpine skiing 
coaches placed importance on the athletes’ behaviour and personality (for football coaches, 
especially personality), while alpine skiing coaches also selected skiers for their attitude and 
considered the impact selection could have on their athletes’ careers. Football coaches 
described taking the abilities (or “capacity”) of their players and their skills into consideration 
when making selection decisions. A mix of current and past performances and predictions of 
future performances formed the basis of selections for both football and alpine skiing 
coaches. There was also an emphasis (especially for alpine skiing coaches) on previous 
results. There were some alpine skiing coaches who said that using ranking lists was very 
important, while others reported basing their selection decisions on skiers’ potential and 
technique. A player’s current form, injuries, price, and whether that player is to be sold were 
considered important selection cues by football coaches.
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2.3.1.2: Coach cues. 
The experience of analysing athletes, the selection processes, and the knowledge 
coaches felt they had about their sport and their athletes contributed to selection decisions. 
Some football coaches stated that their game plan drove selection by finding players with the 
relevant skills to meet the demands of the game plan, although others claimed that the 
players’ abilities would shape their game plan. One football coach, however, based selections 
simply on their intuition (or “gut feeling”). The amount of time spent with their players and 
their goals, winning mentality, and feelings also influenced coaches’ team selection 
decisions. 
2.3.1.3: Cues from other sources. 
For some coaches (it is unclear from which sport), their federation boards decided 
upon and defined selection criteria. In these cases, coaches would follow these criteria (which 
were not detailed). Coaches from both sports were also impacted by their fellow coaches, 
their federation or club and team goals. Furthermore, football coaches described taking other 
players into account when making selection decisions because they wanted to balance players 
with different attributes and combine formations of players. These coaches also said that their 
club boards, the media, agents, the general public, sponsors, and parents can have an impact 
on their selection decisions (though it is unclear how these sources influenced team selection 
decisions). 
2.3.1.4: Situational cues. 
Football coaches indicated they would take the playing position (and its demands) 
into consideration when making selection decisions. They also believed opponents are an 
important factor. Rules affected team selection decisions, such as the pre-determined quotas 
(which depend on the rankings of each country’s skiers and whether the country is hosting 
the world cup) that inform alpine skiing coaches as to how many skiers they can select for 
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their teams. The number of athletes available for selection also affected team selection 
decisions. 
2.3.2: Differences between selected and non-selected athletes (inclusion criteria 
two). 
Results in this section are from the remaining 15 studies found in this review. These 
studies all examined the difference between selected and non-selected players (or athletes) for 
a game or competition after selection had occurred. 
2.3.2.1: Player characteristics. 
Presented below are the player characteristics (i.e., age, height, weight, strength, 
speed, agility, aerobic fitness, flexibility, skills, and playing experience) that differentiated 
selected and non-selected players (or athletes). 
2.3.2.1.1: Age. 
Age was found in two studies (out of 10, or 20%) to discriminate between players 
selected for a game and those who were not (Baker, 2017; Young et al., 2005). Baker (2017) 
reported, however, that only selected rugby league forwards were significantly older than 
non-selected rugby league forwards (there were no significant differences in selected and 
non-selected rugby league backs, although the age data approached significance). Selected 
players were older by an average (across both studies) of 5.0 years. 
2.3.2.1.2: Height. 
One study (out of 12, or 8%) reported that selected elite (but not sub-elite) rugby 
league players tended to be taller than elite rugby league players not selected (Gabbett, Kelly, 




Two studies (out of 5, or 40%) reported that those selected for games were heavier 
than those not selected. For example, junior elite rugby league (Gabbett et al., 2009) and 
adult elite rugby league forwards (but not backs; Baker, 2017) were significantly heavier than 
non-selected forwards.  Selected players were, on average, 6.8 kilograms heavier than non-
selected players. 
2.3.2.1.4: Strength. 
Eight studies (out of 13, or 62%) found that characteristics relating to a players’ 
upper- and lower-body strength and power were found to distinguish between selected and 
non-selected players (or athletes; Baker, 2017; Barker et al., 1993; Fry et al., 1991; Gabbett & 
Seibold, 2013; Lawton, Cronin, & McGuigan, 2013; Mayhew, Wolfe, & McCormick, 1987; 
Schmidt, 1999; Young et al., 2005). Every study reported that selected players were stronger 
and more powerful than non-selected players. Upper-body strength and power were measured 
through a one repetition bench press (Baker, 2017; Fry et al., 1991; Mayhew et al., 1987; 
Schmidt, 1999), body-mass maximum repetition bench press (Gabbett & Seibold, 2013), 
military press, power clean (Fry et al., 1991; Mayhew et al., 1987), three repetition chin-ups 
(Gabbett & Seibold, 2013), and seated medicine ball puts (Schmidt, 1999). One (Baker, 2017; 
Barker et al., 1993) and three (Gabbett & Seibold, 2013) repetition squats, leg press (Lawton 
et al., 2013; Schmidt, 1999), and vertical (Barker et al., 1993; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; 
Mayhew et al., 1987) and countermovement (Young et al., 2005) jumps were all measures of 
lower-body strength and power. 
2.3.2.1.5: Speed. 
Selected players, according to seven studies (out of 10, or 70%; Fry et al., 1991; 
Gabbet, 2009; Gabbett, Jenkins, & Abernethy, 2011; Gravina et al., 2008; Le Rossignol, 
Gabbett, Comerford, & Stanton, 2014; Mayhew et al., 1987; Young et al., 2005), were faster 
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than non-selected players in short sprints (e.g., 10- and 40-metres; Gabbett et al., 2011) and 
repeated sprint times (e.g., Le Rossignol et al., 2014). 
2.3.2.1.6: Agility. 
In the only study to report on differences in agility (out of 3, or 33%), Thissen-Milder 
and Mayhew (1991) found that selected players were more agile (measured as a player’s 
ability to change direction in a maze of cones) than non-selected players.  
2.3.2.1.7: Aerobic fitness. 
Three studies (out of 9, or 33%; Gabbett, 2009; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; Young et 
al., 2005) reported that endurance related performances differentiated selected and non-
selected players. Specifically, it was found that selected players had greater estimated 
maximal aerobic power (Gabbett, 2009) and performed better in a prolonged high-intensity, 
intermittent running test (Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; Young et al., 2005) than non-selected 
players. 
2.3.2.1.8: Flexibility. 
Selected players (in 2 of 4 studies, or 50%), compared to those not selected, were 
found to have greater lower back-hip-hamstring (Fry et al., 1991) and right (but not left) 
hamstring flexibility (Young et al., 2005). 
2.3.2.1.9: Skills. 
One study (out of 2, or 50%; Thissen-Milder & Mayhew, 1991) reported that skills 
specific to the sport being played discriminated between selected and non-selected players. 
More specifically, selected high-school volleyball players had better ball-handling skills (i.e., 




2.3.2.1.10: Playing experience. 
Four studies (out of 5, or 80%; Baker, 2017; Gabbett, 2009; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; 
Young et al., 2005) found that selected players had more playing experience than non-
selected players. These studies reported that selected players had been playing for longer 
(e.g., Gabbett, 2009) or had played more games (e.g., Young et al., 2005) than non-selected 
players. Baker (2017), however, assumed that because selected players were older than non-
selected players, they were also more experienced (rather than collecting data directly related 
to playing experience). 
2.4: Discussion 
This systematic review sought to present all research that investigated the cues used in 
team selection decisions as outlined by the coaches themselves and the differences between 
selected and non-selected players (or athletes) after selection had occurred. One study (i.e., 
Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) was found that required coaches to outline which cues they use in 
team selection decisions, in which player cues, coach cues, cues from other sources, and 
situational cues were identified. The remaining studies included in this review examined the 
differences between selected and non-selected players (or athletes) after selection had 
occurred. Whilst one study found no differences (i.e., Hoffman et al., 2009), the other studies 
reported that selected players were older, taller, heavier, stronger, faster, more agile, fitter, 
more flexible, performed skills to a higher level, and had more playing experience than non-
selected players. It is worth noting, however, that in every one of these studies the number of 
characteristics found to not discriminate between selected and non-selected players were far 
greater than the characteristics that did (see Table 3). Although some of the differences 
between selected and non-selected players almost reached significance (e.g., age of rugby 
league backs; Baker, 2017) and a low number of non-significant results do not necessarily 
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mean there is no relation between variables (Liberati et al., 2009), the results discussed below 
must be interpreted with caution. 
Most of the characteristics that discriminated between selected and non-selected 
players related to physical appearance (i.e., height and weight) and the performance of 
physical tasks (i.e., strength, speed, agility, aerobic fitness, and flexibility). This finding is not 
surprising given the high physical demands required to play rugby league (e.g., Till, Darrall-
Jones, Weakley, Roe, & Jones, 2017), American football (e.g., Yamashita, Asakura, Ito, 
Yamada, & Yamada, 2017), volleyball (e.g., Milić et al., 2017), Australian rules football 
(e.g., Harrison & Johnston, 2017), football (e.g., Mallo, Mena, Nevado, & Paredes, 2015), 
lacrosse (e.g., Polley, Cormack, Gabbett, & Polglaze, 2015), and rowing (e.g., Thornton et 
al., 2017). It is, therefore, intuitive that players (or athletes) who are selected to play in these 
sports possess greater levels of physical characteristics. When coaches were asked, however, 
they did not state that they used any physical characteristics to select their teams (Johansson 
& Fahlén, 2017). Although this is a finding from one study so further research is needed to 
investigate whether coaches intentionally select players based on their physical 
characteristics. 
Players’ strength was found by the highest number of studies (eight studies; i.e., 
Baker, 2017; Barker et al., 1993; Fry et al., 1991; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; Lawton et al., 
2013; Mayhew et al., 1987; Schmidt, 1999; Young et al., 2005) to distinguish between 
selected and non-selected players. Despite this, questions remain as to whether coaches 
actually selected players based on their strength, especially as we know coaches may not be 
interested in strength training (Reade, Rodgers, & Hall, 2008). Given that muscle size is a 
major determinant of muscle strength (Akagi et al., 2011), and that coaches do rely on “sight” 
when judging and making selection decisions (Fiander et al., 2013; Johansson & Fahlén, 
2017), it is reasonable to assume that coaches may base their selection decisions (or part of 
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their selection decisions) on size rather than strength. Seven studies (i.e., Fry et al., 1991; 
Gabbet, 2009; Gabbett et al., 2011; Gravina et al., 2008; Le Rossignol et al., 2014; Mayhew 
et al., 1987; Young et al., 2005) also reported that selected players were faster than non-
selected players. According to Johansson and Fahlén, (2017), however, coaches (or at least 
the coaches they asked) do not base their selection decisions on a player’s strength or speed. 
The reason for this may be that coaches do not use this information when making selection 
decisions, or coaches could be omitting selection cues based on players’ physical qualities for 
social desirability reasons (i.e., a tendency to respond to self-report measures or interview 
questions in a way that individuals perceive to be socially acceptable, rather than to respond 
in an accurate and truthful manner; Holtgraves, 2004). Future research is required, however, 
to investigate whether coaches do use information about players’ physical qualities when 
making selection decisions. 
Results from two studies (i.e., Baker, 2017; Young et al., 2005) that examined players 
from rugby league and Australian rules football found that selected players were older than 
those not selected. Athletes from the same selection year can vary in age by up to 12 months, 
leading to significant cognitive, physical, and emotional differences between those born early 
and late in the year (Cobley, Baker, Wattie, & McKenna, 2009). This phenomenon, called the 
relative age effect (RAE), is more likely to occur in physically demanding sports (Baxter-
Jones, 1995), such as rugby league (Cobley & Till, 2017) and Australian rules football 
(Coutts, Kempton, & Vaeyens, 2014), and has been reported at both youth and adult levels 
(although there is evidence that in some cases RAEs do not exist in sport; Andronikos, 
Elumaro, Westbury, & Martindale, 2016). Given that the studies in this review reported that 
selected players were, on average, 5.0 years older than non-selected players (so not within the 
same selection year), it is difficult to state that RAEs occurred because the participants’ 
month of birth was not available. Age being used as a selection cue is supported by the notion 
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that coaches have said they select players based on their age, although it was not clear 
whether coaches selected younger or older athletes (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Older 
players being selected may have, however, been linked to playing experience. Four studies 
(i.e., Baker, 2017; Gabbett, 2009; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; Young et al., 2005) found that 
selected players had more playing experience than non-selected players and as Baker (2017) 
stated, older players have more playing experience (though this may not always be the case), 
meaning that selected players can be both older and more experienced. Coaches have also 
stated that they selected players based on their age and experience (Johansson & Fahlén, 
2017), suggesting that coaches are intentionally selecting older (this claim is a tentative one 
as it is not clear whether coaches were in fact selecting older players or simply taking age 
into account when making selection decisions) and more experienced players. 
According to one study (i.e., Thissen-Milder & Mayhew, 1991), selected volleyball 
players had greater skill levels than non-selected players. Coaches could conceivably place 
importance on the execution and display of sport-specific skills when making selection 
decisions because coaches often adopt technique-focussed coaching styles that advocate the 
rehearsal of movement templates (Partington & Cushion, 2011; Rothwell, Stone, Davids, & 
Wright, 2017). Although there has been a call to move away from these traditional, linear 
coaching pedagogies to a more holistic, non-linear approach (e.g., Potrac, Brewer, Jones, 
Armour, & Hoff, 2000), it is commonly reported that coaches still use the traditional 
approaches to coaching that emphasise the display of sport-specific skills (Vinson, Brady, 
Moreland, & Judge, 2016). It is, therefore, understandable that selected players would display 
higher levels of skills than non-selected players, especially as the coach, who is making the 
team selection decisions, may believe that a set of favourable sport-specific skills are a 
prerequisite for selection (Oorschot, Chiwaridzo, & Smits-Engelsman, 2017). According to 
Johansson and Fahlén (2017), coaches do in fact consider skills a prerequisite for selection. In 
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their study, coaches described how players would be selected if they held the necessary skills 
(or abilities) needed in relation to the demands of different positions and their game plan 
(although it should be noted that not all coaches agreed with this as some coaches stated they 
evaluated their players’ skills and then developed a game plan around them, so this might not 
be a wide-ranging practice). Coaches from this study extended this to say that past 
performances, previous results, current performances and form, and predictions of future 
performances all contributed to team selection decisions. As well as team selection decisions, 
performance related cues have also been found to influence selection decisions in different 
sporting contexts (e.g., draft selection; Woods, Joyce, & Robertson, 2016). 
Johansson and Fahlén, (2017) highlighted several other cues that coaches stated they 
used as selection cues which have not been investigated in terms of whether they are present 
in selected players and absent in non-selected players. A player’s personality and attitude 
(which can be an expression of personality; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), for example, influence 
a coaches’ selection decisions (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). This is not surprising given that 
personality has been found to be important in predicting within competition, short-term, and 
long-term performances (Gee, Marshall, & King, 2010). Some coaches described how their 
selection criteria were dictated to them by their federation boards (Johansson & Fahlén, 
2017). These were well-defined and communicated officially for both coaches and players to 
see. While some coaches saw this as a necessary step to make selections fair and justifiable, 
others preferred to be without clearly defined and decided upon selection criteria because 
they felt more flexible in their selection decisions. Intuition (or “gut feeling”), experience of 
analysing athletes, knowledge of the sport and athletes, and a game plan were all cues used to 
make team selection decisions (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Previous research in other 
contexts has suggested that individuals rely on intuition and their own judgments to make 
employee selection decisions (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014) and are even reluctant to use 
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selection decisions aids (Highhouse, 2008). Coaches expressed similar sentiments when they 
claimed their eyes were a replacement for statistics and tests (although some coaches did say 
the two complemented each other), which can lead to a number of biases in their selection 
decisions (Kirkebøen & Nordbye, 2017) because the selection process (in rugby union at 
least) relies heavily on coaches’ subjective perceptions of their athletes (Calder & Durbach, 
2015). Again, however, further research is needed to back up this claim. 
With this latter point in mind, it is important to make clear that only one study was 
found that investigated the cues used in team selection decisions as outlined by coaches. 
Given that coaching is fundamentally a decision-making process (Abraham, Collins, & 
Martindale, 2006), and that team selection is one of the most important decisions made (Côté 
et al., 2007; Couturier, 2009), it seems counterintuitive that the decision maker (i.e., the 
coach) does not prominently feature in the literature. Furthermore, as the coach is not 
featured in most of the studies described in this review, it is unclear whether the coach 
explicitly selected their players on some of the characteristics reported. Whilst, for example, 
selected players had greater estimated maximal aerobic power than non-selected players 
(Gabbett, 2009), the coach may have been unaware of this when they made their selection 
decisions. It has been demonstrated, however, that with studies that ask coaches what they 
base their selection decisions on we can begin to make these conclusions. Selected players, 
for example, are older and more experienced than non-selected players (Baker, 2017) and we 
also know that coaches do take a player’s age and experience into consideration when making 
selection decisions (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). 
2.4.1: Strengths and limitations. 
This study offers an original contribution to the coaching literature using objective, 
transparent methods (Liberati et al., 2009; Weed, 1997) to present the current state of our 
knowledge on coaches’ team selection decisions. As a result, researchers are offered a 
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consolidation of the research findings which highlight what we currently know and what we 
do not. This is a vital step towards developing an understanding of coaches’ team selection 
decisions. There are, however, limitations to this study. Whilst the author conducted an 
extensive literature search, the current search and inclusion/exclusion criteria could be 
potential sources of bias. Future researchers, therefore, should consider adopting different 
criteria (e.g., to include foreign-language studies) to search for any additional studies that 
may have been omitted unintentionally. 
2.4.2: Future directions for research. 
Given there was only one study obtained from this review that specifically examined 
coaches’ team selection decisions (i.e., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), albeit which is helpful to 
increase our understanding of these crucial decisions, the extant literature fails to fully answer 
the question of why some players are selected to play for a team whereas other are not. As 
such, the current state of our knowledge on coaches’ team selection decisions is poor. Future 
researchers are, therefore, encouraged to plug this gap by focussing their attention on asking 
coaches about why and how they select their teams. Considering the implications of a player 
not being selected for a team (e.g., detraining, stress, and a loss of identity; Caterisano et al., 
1997; Neely et al., 2017; Woods & Thatcher, 2009), the practical importance of this 
knowledge is clear. Coaching is a developing field and, as such, requires descriptive research 
to accumulate knowledge and develop an understanding of what coaches actually do (Gilbert 
& Trudel, 2004b; Potrac et al., 2007), including what informs their selection decisions. 
2.5: Conclusion 
This systematic review revealed a number of cues coaches rely on to make selection 
decisions and highlighted differences between selected and non-selected players. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated that some of the characteristics that differentiated selected from 
non-selected players (or athletes) were in fact selection cues used by coaches (i.e., age, 
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experience, and skills). There were, however, more characteristics that did not discriminate 
between selected and non-selected players than did. Furthermore, almost every study 
included in this review examined the differences between selected and non-selected players 
(or athletes) after selection had occurred. This means that only one study was found that 
asked coaches what cues they rely on to make selection decisions. Given that coaching is 
fundamentally a decision-making process, and that we know coaches use cues to make 
decisions, the number of cues reported in this study seem remarkably low. If this is the case, 






Chapter 3: What Could Influence a Coach’s Selection Decisions? A Narrative Review of 
the Literature 
3.1: Introduction 
Researchers have conducted a number of studies which have found that certain cues 
(i.e., a single piece of information within an environment that holds meaning and is used to 
form a judgment; Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von 
Helversen et al., 2013) can affect specific judgments and decisions, including cues such as 
smiling (e.g., Floyd & Erbert, 2003) and race (e.g., Rasmussen, Esgate, & Turner, 2005), 
while personality judgments (e.g., Todorov, Said, & Verosky, 2011) and political voting 
decisions (e.g., Berggren, Jordahl, & Poutvaara, 2010) are among those affected. Researchers 
in sport have also discovered that coaches are impacted by cues when making judgments and 
decisions on their athletes. Solomon and Rhea (2008), for example, found that when making 
judgments of athlete achievement, coaches relied on a number of cues (e.g., speed, body size, 
tactical knowledge) that related to six dimensions (i.e., personality, performance, personal, 
cognitive, mistakes, and knowledge from others). Furthermore, while determining perceived 
player value, Berri and Schmidt (2002) found that basketball coaches almost exclusively rely 
on points scored. Although this type of single-cue decision making is common in human 
judgment (e.g., the ‘take-the-best’ heuristic; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999), a coach making game-time decisions, according to Young (2008), cannot rely 
on a single statistical category. Young (2008) subsequently discovered that basketball 
coaches depend on several cues to make game-time decisions (e.g., points, steals, assists). 
Larkin and O’Conner (2017) attempted to understand which attributes youth sport 
coaches and recruiters perceived as important when identifying skilled youth athletes (i.e., 
under 13 years) in football. The attributes considered important were grouped as technical 
(e.g., striking the ball), tactical (e.g., decision-making ability), and psychological (e.g., 
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positive attitude). While this study asked coaches (through interviews and questionnaires) 
which cues they considered important when identifying talented athletes, Gabbett et al. 
(2007) aimed to predict selection into a training squad by measuring physiological, 
anthropometric, and skill test results of selected and non-selected volleyball players. The 
authors stated that athletes are selected for training squads because of “subjective coaching 
opinions of their movement coordination in game-specific tasks” (Gabbett et al., 2007, p. 
1338). The results demonstrated that coaches relied on subjective evaluations of passing and 
serving techniques (skills), not physiological and anthropometric cues, to select their athletes. 
Selection cues may also arise from individuals other than the players. Head coaches can have 
several coaches (e.g., assistant coaches) all contributing to team selection decisions (Calder & 
Durbach, 2015; Lemyre, Trudel, & Durand-Bush, 2007), for example, meaning cues from 
these other coaches could influence head coaches’ team selection decisions.  Taken together, 
what these studies demonstrate is that coaches use a diverse number of cues, in different 
contexts, to make certain judgments and decisions on their athletes. 
Given that selecting athletes for competitive teams is a crucial decision made by 
coaches (Côté et al., 2007; Couturier, 2009), a clear understanding of what may influence 
these decisions (e.g., cues from the players, the environment, and others) is needed. The 
number of studies available that have focussed on team selection decisions (i.e., Johansson & 
Fahlén, 2017), however, is small. The aim of this narrative literature review, therefore, is to 
draw on sport-based and non-sport-based research to highlight the cues that may influence 
coaches’ judgments and decisions. Narrative literature reviews are comprehensive syntheses 
of previously published information that present a broad perspective on a topic (Green, 
Johnson, & Adams, 2006). This will enable a clearer picture to be made regarding the cues 
that could impact a coach’s team selection decisions and create a systematic pool of cues so 
that further investigations can be done into these specific cues. For example, facial elongation 
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impacts judgments of height (Re et al., 2013; which can subsequently affect the selection of 
people into leadership positions; Judge & Cable, 2004) and facial maturity is thought to 
impact who is selected for a job (Zebrowitz, Tenenbaum, & Goldstein, 1991).  
Studies were included in this review if they provided evidence of a cue (or cues) 
influencing (a) a coach’s judgments or decisions on their athletes and (b) non-coaching 
related selection behaviour. It is worth noting that this review is a summary of the literature, 
not an exhaustive list of every study. Also, when a judge or decision maker is mentioned, this 
refers to the individual(s) utilising the cues to subsequently make the judgment or decision. 
The target refers to the individual being judged or decided upon. The results are presented as 
individual (or groups of related) cues that have been found to have an impact on either 
coaches’ or other individuals’ judgments and decisions. 
3.2: Player Cues 
Presented below are the player cues (i.e., faces, head, height, somatotype, gender/sex, 
race/ethnicity, age, behaviour, nonverbal behaviour, and clothing) that could have an impact 
on coaches’ team selection decisions. 
3.2.1: Faces. 
One of the most fundamental recognition abilities humans possess is (with the 
possible exception of words; Kanwisher, 2000) an innate ability to discriminate among 
human faces (Bailenson, Garland, Iyengar, & Yee, 2006; Farah, 1996; Goldstein & Chance, 
1970). Faces can be processed faster and more efficiently than any other class of objects (e.g., 
chairs, pens, and coats; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Kanwisher, 2000) within 
specialised areas in the brain (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Ebenhardt, 2001; Kanwisher & 
Yovel, 2006; Lieberman, Hairir, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005; Phelps et al., 
2000). Traditionally viewed as static objects, human faces are now seen as dynamic. So 
rather than displaying one single “face,” we, for example, move our eyebrows, laugh, and 
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nod our heads during exchanges (Knappmeyer, Thornton, & Bülthoff, 2003). Researchers 
have found that people are able to accurately perceive information about others from very 
limited facial information, including: appearance (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 
1991; Kleiman & Rule, 2012), symmetry (e.g., Penton-Voak et al., 2001), width (e.g., 
Todorov et al., 2011), elongation (e.g., Re et al., 2013), attractiveness (e.g., Little, Burriss, 
Jones, & Roberts, 2007), maturity (e.g., Rafaële & Testé, 2006), dominance (e.g., Little, 
Apicella, & Marlowe, 2007), similarity (e.g., Bailenson et al., 2006), gaze direction (e.g., 
Vertegaal, Slagter, van der Veer, & Nijholt, 2001), smiling (e.g., Naumann, Vazire, 
Rentfrom, & Gosling, 2009), expressions (e.g., Fecica & Stolz, 2008), and motion (e.g., 
Ambadar, Schooler, & Cohn, 2005). Aspects of a person’s life, like their sexual orientation 
(Rule & Ambady, 2008), political affiliations (Rule & Ambady, 2010; Samochowiec, Wanke, 
& Fiedler, 2010), and their religious beliefs (Rule, Garrett, & Ambadt, 2010) can be judged 
solely from their face at levels significantly greater than chance (Kleiman & Rule, 2012). 
3.2.2: Head. 
It is thought that head movements can influence the judgments and decisions people 
make on one another. Warnecke, Masters, and Kempter (1992), for example, reported that 
when judging political leaders, adults (both male and female) were influenced by four head 
movements. The head movements associated with positive judgments were thought to have 
signalled reassurance or dominance, while head movements related to negative judgments 
signalled warmth and loving maternal behaviour (characteristics deemed not appropriate in a 
political leader). In other contexts, however, it is unclear whether these head movements 
would have the same effect. 
3.2.3: Height. 
There is an argument that humans automatically associate perceptions of height with 
dominance (van Quaquebeke & Giessner, 2010) that extends cross culturally (Fiske, 1992). 
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More specifically, humans tend to create mental representations that embody abstract 
concepts (such as dominance) in modal information about space and the body (such as height; 
Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Kraut-Gruber, & 
Ric, 2005). For example, when people think about power (a related concept) they 
automatically interpret up, above, and large, whereas down, below, and small are 
interpretations for powerless (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). So engrained is this link between 
dominance and height that decisions about whether to fight or flight is often determined by 
height comparison (Archer, 1988; Parker, 1974).  
Evidence suggests that in an ambiguous decision situation where a foul was 
committed in football and a referee must judge who the aggressor and innocent party is, 
blame is attributed to the tallest target (van Quaquebeke & Giessner, 2010). Interestingly, the 
decisions reviewed as part of this study were decisions made by professional referees. What 
this implies is a group of individuals (albeit a small group out of a larger population) who are 
paid to make unbiased decisions are influenced by the height of an athlete. However, it has 
since been found that taller men react more aggressively in sports (Webster & Xu, 2011), 
meaning referees may be less biased than first thought. While referees may be unconsciously 
“paying attention” to the height of athletes, it seems athletes and others are also paying 
attention to the height of referees. In their study, Stulp, Bunnk, Verhulst, and Pollet (2012) 
found that referees were taller than their assistants, more authoritative (measured by 
controlling the game), and judged as more competent (measured by which games they were 
assigned and the teams rankings) than smaller referees, thereby reinforcing the notion that 
height and authority are positively related. 
3.2.4: Somatotype. 
To be accepted as a competent professional in your field, research indicates that you 
should “look the part.” One way of achieving this is to have the appropriate somatotype (e.g., 
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Hash, Munna, Vogel, & Bason, 2003). Lovell, Parker, Brady, Cotterill, and Howatson (2011), 
for example, found that female sports psychology consultants were judged as more effective 
and desirable (in terms of working with them) by athletes if they were nonobese (rather than 
obese). This trend of perceived effectiveness has previously been documented between 
athletes and their sports psychology consultants (Lubker, Watson II, Geer, & Watson, 2008) 
and performance enhancement consultants (Lubker, Watson II, Geer, & Watson, 2005), and 
between patients and their doctors (Hash et al., 2003). While the underlying theme of these 
studies may be that the participants are all in “healthy” professions (and therefore a nonobese 
physique may be synonymous with those professions in the minds of those making 
judgments), some have found a similar trend in other areas. Richardson, Hastdorf, Goodman, 
and Dornbusch (1961), for example, found that children are less likely to be the friend of a 
drawing of an obese person (compared with a nonobese person). Additionally, DeJong (1980) 
reported that unless an obese female could offer a medical excuse for her obesity, or cite 
recent weight loss, she was given a less positive evaluation and was less liked (especially by 
women). 
3.2.5: Gender/sex. 
Gender, or sex, have been found to have an impact on several judgments (the terms 
used below are consistent with how the authors of each study have used them, though they 
are distinct concepts; Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015). Souchon, Livingston, and Maio 
(2013), for example, found that handball referees held biases against female handball players 
as they sanctioned them more frequently than male players (in the same game situations). 
When questioned, the male handball referees stated negative gender stereotypes (e.g., female 
players are less competent than male players) which may have accounted for the different 
interpretations of the same sporting situations. Furthermore, Tracy and Beall (2011) found 
stark differences of sexual attractiveness between men and women showing different 
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emotional expressions. Happiness was the most attractive female emotional expression, 
whereas it was the least attractive emotion expression in men. The same, but opposite, pattern 
was found for expressions of pride (i.e., attractive for men but unattractive for women). 
Additionally, these sex-specific patterns largely held across target ethnicity, participant age, 
and study design (i.e., judging a single target or multiple targets), further emphasizing the 
role sex as a cue has in the judgment of sexual attractiveness. Porter et al. (1983) also 
discovered that women are also unlikely to be perceived as leaders by men or women, while 
Butler and Geis (1990) revealed that both male and female participants gave gender 
stereotypical judgments of male and female leaders (i.e., female leaders have more warmth 
and sensitivity while male leaders have more ability, skills, and intelligence). Furthermore, in 
this latter study it was reported that female leaders, who offered the same suggestions and 
arguments as male leaders, received more negative affect responses and fewer positive 
responses (men received less negative affect responses and at least as many positive as 
negative responses). 
3.2.6: Race/ethnicity. 
Though the terms race and ethnicity can overlap, they are two distinct concepts 
(Aspinall, 2007). They are, however, used interchangeably. For example, Ratcliff et al. 
(2008) stated that a target’s race is African American whereas Letzring (2010) used the term 
ethnicity to describe African American targets. It is beyond the scope of this review to 
discuss the appropriateness of these terms, so both terms are used below as per the original 
studies respectively. Stereotypes (i.e., the sum of beliefs, knowledge, and expectations that 
individuals develop toward members of social categories; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994) are 
said to be an important form of social categorising often used to establish behavioural norms 
(Blair, 2002; Ruble, Cohen, & Ruble, 1984). One area that has racial stereotypes is sport. 
Probably the most perverse racial stereotype is the view that Black individuals of African 
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ancestry are inherently superior in physical ability (Rasmussen et al., 2005). To demonstrate 
this, in North America an African American individual was (over 20 years ago) roughly 15 
times more likely to reach the NFL and 28 times more likely to reach the NBA than a random 
non-Black individual (Sailer, 1996). Furthermore, in Britain when Black residents 
represented about 2% of the total population (roughly 20 years ago), they corresponded to at 
least 50% of First Division basketball players, boxing champions, and the British athletic 
squad, and one in five professional soccer players (Cashmore, 1998; Jarvie, 1991; Owen, 
1994). Also, in five consecutive Olympic Games (between Los Angeles and Sydney) all 40 
finalists in the men’s 100 meters were Black, yet the same population had extremely limited 
success in swimming (Entine, 2000). A consequence of this stereotype is that it may be 
internalised by Black individuals, which, in turn, can influence participation in certain sports 
(e.g., basketball, boxing, sprinting; Harrison, Lee, & Belcher, 1999). Even if a Black athlete 
has taken a path in sport that does not conform to the stereotype (i.e., chosen a different 
sport), they are still likely to encounter a coach that does. Coaches, for example, may assign 
athletes to playing positions in team sports because of their racial attributes (e.g., speed and 
power) and not their actual achieved performance (Bopp & Sagas, 2014; Leonard, 1987; Loy 
& McElvogue, 1970). Black athletes, therefore, may end up filling positions that require 
physical prowess and White athletes may find themselves in “thinking” positions. Within the 
UK, this trend has been found in football (Norris & Jones, 1998), rugby union (Jarvie, 1991), 
and rugby league (Long, Carrington, & Spracklen, 1997). 
3.2.7: Age. 
It has been discovered that ageism (i.e., the discrimination against individuals based 
on their age; Angus & Reeve, 2006) exists (Hummert, 1999; Kite, Stockdale, Whitley, & 
Johnson, 2005; Kite & Wagner, 2002; McTavish, 1971) with views about ageing being 
multidimensional, with both positive and negative elements. For example, the largest bias 
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against older adults (75 and onwards) was seen when stereotypic beliefs about attractiveness 
were judged (and to a lesser extent competence; Kite et al., 2005). Furthermore, research 
shows that women experience more age discrimination that men (Duncan & Loretto, 2004), 
which may be because women are not only judged by their age and gender, but also their 
looks (or “lookism”; Granleese & Sayer, 2005). 
3.2.8: Behaviour. 
 It has been known for some time that a person’s behaviour can influence how others 
judge and make decisions on them. Over four decades ago, for example, Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) asked people to make a judgment on an instructor. When the instructor behaved in a 
warm and friendly manner, they were judged as appealing. If, however, they behaved cold 
and distant they were perceived as irritating. Later, DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter (1985) 
found that our behaviour (in this case, sincerity) influences how a person judges the 
truthfulness of a message. The authors discovered that when someone is highly motivated to 
lie successfully, their lie becomes easily detectable when someone is watching them 
(compared to just hearing them). The reason may be because a person’s behaviour is hard to 
control, even when motivated to do so. An untruthful message, therefore, is detectable by its 
lack of sincerity. Our behaviour in certain environments can also have consequences. How 
someone behaves at work, for example, can affect the evaluations given, and rewards 
recommended, by superiors (e.g., Allen & Rush, 1998). If someone displays behaviours that 
are constructive, cooperative, and neither mandatory or contractually compensated for 
(Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983), they can be given better overall evaluations and have better 
rewards recommended by superiors. This may be due to the triggering of positive affect when 
these behaviours are witnessed, which can influence superiors’ overall evaluation of a worker 




3.2.9: Nonverbal behaviour. 
Nonverbal behaviours, such as body language, play a fundamental role in expressing 
our affective states, attitudes, and social dynamics (D’Mello & Graesser, 2009). Some, for 
example, have even concluded that body expressions are as powerful as facial expressions in 
conveying emotions (Argyle, 1988; Bull, 1987; Coulson, 2004; Ekman & Friesen, 1974; 
McClenney & Neiss, 1989; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005; Van den Stock, 
Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). Unfortunately, however, research into the impact of body 
language on judgments and decision making is scarce (Hinzman & Kelly, 2013; Van den 
Stock et al., 2007). Studies do suggest, however, that body language does in fact have an 
impact. Emotional body language (i.e., emotional expressions of the whole body; de Gelder, 
2006), for example, is reported to reduce the ability to identify emotional faces when they 
were incongruent (e.g., Meeren et al., 2005). Hinzman and Kelly (2013) found this when they 
asked participants to identify individuals’ race by looking at their faces and emotional body 
language. Out-group faces were processed faster with angry (vs. happy) emotional body 
language (while the opposite effect was found for in-group faces).  
3.2.10: Clothing. 
According to Knapp (1978), we use clothing to judge others, especially in the absence 
of different information about the person during the first encounter (Harris et al., 1983; 
Howlett, Pine, Orakçioğlu, & Fletcher, 2013). This is a phenomenon found in sport, where a 
person’s clothing influences the way in which they are judged. For example, athlete 
participants who viewed target athletes in sport-specific clothing (compared to general 
clothing) displaying positive (compared with negative) nonverbal behaviour gave more 
favourable first impression ratings, episodic (i.e., judgments made about the states of a person 
at that moment in time) and dispositional (i.e., judgments about the enduring characteristics 
of an individual; Warr & Knapper, 1968) judgments, performance ratings, and were less 
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confident about winning (Buscombe, Greenlees, Holder, Thelwell, & Rimmer, 2006; Furley, 
Dicks, & Memmert, 2012; Greenlees, Bradley, Holder, & Thelwell, 2005; Greenlees, 
Buscombe, Thelwell, Holder, & Rimmer, 2005). 
The colour of clothing may also have an impact on our judgments and decisions. 
Frank and Gilovich (1988), for example, examined the effect athletes’ clothing can have on 
referees’ (and individuals acting as referees) decisions. The authors asked both experienced 
referees and knowledgeable fans to view two identical videotapes of an American football 
play, the only difference being that in one videotape the defensive team (who acted 
aggressively in both videotapes) wore white and in the other, wore black. As expected, the 
team who wore black were penalised more often and treated more harshly by both fans and 
(somewhat more surprisingly as they are arguably the epitome of objectivity) referees. 
3.3: Environmental Cues 
Presented below is an environmental cue (i.e., weather) that could have an impact on 
coaches’ team selection decisions. 
3.3.1: Weather. 
Investigating the impact weather had on university admissions reviewers’ 
recommendations, Simonsohn (2007) discovered that applicants’ academic attributes were 
weighted more heavily by university admission reviewers on cloudier days while non-
academic attributes (e.g., leadership) were given more weight on sunnier days. By using real 
university admissions officers, the findings have a very real implication in practice as an 
applicant’s probability of being admitted increased by 11.9% if the application was read 
under optimal, rather than the worst possible, cloud cover. In other words, someone’s 
academic future can be in the hands of something as irrelevant and unrelated as the weather. 
It is not just cloudiness that can affect people’s decision making as Rind (1996) and 
Strohmetz (2001) found that sunshine increases tipping and Guéguen and Stefan (2013) 
48 
 
reported that drivers (both male and female) are more likely to pick up hitchhikers on sunny 
days as opposed to cloudy days. 
3.4: Cues from Other Coaches 
Sports teams tend to have several individuals (e.g., assistant coaches or selectors) all 
contributing to team selection decisions, with a head coach (usually) making the final 
decisions (Calder & Durbach, 2015; Lemyre et al., 2007). Members of a team communicating 
with each other has been found to improve the decision-making performances of the team 
(Ceschi, Dorofeeva, & Sartori, 2014), so it is unsurprising that head coaches value 
interactions with their coaching staff (Gilbert & Trudel, 2001; Lemyre et al., 2007). 
Additionally, for groups to make optimal decisions, individuals must cooperatively and 
effectively share information among their members (Toma & Butera, 2009). It could be 
assumed, therefore, that when making team selection decisions head coaches would use cues 
gained from their assistant coaches (or individuals that assist with team selection decisions). 
When it is considered that these cues are likely to simply be the individual subjective 
opinions of each coach (Calder & Durbach, 2015), however, then the consistency of this 
information could be problematic. This was an issue reported by Black and Holt (2009) when 
they revealed that ski coaches within the same ski club applied an objective athlete 
assessment tool idiosyncratically, meaning coaches within the same team were lacking in 
consistency when making decisions on the same athletes.  
Nonetheless, whilst not the specific focus of the current research, the nature of group 
dynamics and related topics, such as group structure, group composition, and conflict in 
groups (Kerr & Tindale, 2004) are important considerations for those researching team 
selection within coaching teams in the future. For example, it is known that the evaluation 
and selection of players in rugby union is prone to coaches’ biases because of differences in 
perceptual subjectivity about how a player actually performed and preferential subjectivity 
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about what performance aspects are important (Calder & Durbach, 2015). How a group of 
coaches making a single selection decision combine their preferences to come to an overall 
agreement (or the least objectionable agreement), therefore, would be an important research 
topic. 
3.5: Conclusion 
This study presents examples of research that indicates the effect individual cues can 
have on judgments and decisions on people. As such, this narrative literature review offers a 
pool of cues that could influence coaches’ judgments and decisions made on their athletes 
while viewing them. What this review demonstrates is the number and diversity of possible 
cues that can influence coaches’ decisions. Researchers have already investigated how cues 
can impact coaches’ decisions in different sports (e.g., basketball; Young, 2008) and 
environments (e.g., games; Berri & Schmidt, 2002). Some did this by asking coaches directly 
(e.g., Larkin & O’Conner, 2017), while others focused on decision outcomes after the 
decisions had been made (e.g., Gabbett et al., 2007). Given that coaching is a decision-
making process (Abraham et al., 2006) and that coaches are responsible for several crucial 
decisions, including team selection (Côté et al., 2007; Couturier, 2009; Woods & Thatcher, 
2009), it is necessary to understand what can influence these decisions. When there is also a 
lack of consistency among coaches regarding the decisions made on their athletes (Black & 
Holt, 2009), the need to understand what affects these decisions becomes further evident. 
There are, however, only a handful of studies that have investigated how cues can influence 
coaches (e.g., Larkin & O’Conner, 2017) and only one that has specifically looked at 
coaches’ team selection decisions (i.e., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). In comparison to other 
professional domains and academic disciplines (e.g., medicine), empirical research into 
coaches’ decision making is somewhat lacking (Gilbert & Trudel, 2004a; Vergeer & Lyle, 
2009). If coaches are responsible for deciding, among other things, who will and will not play 
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in an upcoming game (which has implications for players far beyond these decisions), then 
knowing what influences these decisions is crucial for both the transparency and players’ and 
coaches’ understanding of the coaching process. With this in mind, what cues do influence 
coaches’ team selection decisions?  
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Chapter 4: A Longitudinal (Pre-Post Season) Investigation of UK Rugby Union 
Coaches’ Team Selection Decisions 
4.1: Introduction 
It is now known that there are many diverse cues (i.e., a single piece of information 
within an environment that holds meaning and is used to form a judgment; Cooksey, 1996; 
Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013) that people draw 
upon to make judgments and decisions on others (see Chapter 3, p. 37). In contrast, almost 
nothing is known about which (or how many) cues sports coaches use when making team 
selection decisions (see Chapter 2, p. 9). This is surprising given the decision-making nature 
of coaching (Abraham et al., 2006), the potential for a range of different biases in selection 
decisions (Calder & Durbach, 2015), and the consequences of team selection on athletes, 
which can be both positive (e.g., improved psychosocial functioning and emotional 
wellbeing, vitality, enjoyment, life satisfaction, reduced stress and distress, a sense of 
community, an increased probability of joining an elite developmental trajectory and 
becoming a successful professional senior player, and the maintenance and improvement of 
physical and skill performances during a season; Caterisano et al., 1997; Côté et al., 2007; 
Eime et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2012; Güllich, 2014; Scanlan et al., 
2015) or negative (e.g., detraining, stress, and a loss of identity; Caterisano et al., 1997; Neely 
et al., 2017; Woods & Thatcher, 2009). 
In the only study available that asked coaches about the selection process, Johansson 
and Fahlén (2017) revealed that coaches claim to use a variety of cues to make team selection 
decisions. How a player behaves and their personality, for example, were important selection 
cues among other player cues (e.g., age, skills, experience), coach cues (e.g., intuition, 
knowledge, game plan), cues from other sources (e.g., other coaches, federation boards, 
parents), and situational cues (e.g., opponents, position, rules). Whilst this study represents an 
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important step towards understanding coaches’ team selection decisions, investigating the 
cues used in team selection decisions was only one aspect of the study purpose and it is not 
clear whether coaches actually used the selection criteria they reported using. This latter point 
is particularly important given the low correlation between coaches observed and self-
reported behaviour found in other studies (e.g., Curtis, Smith, & Smoll, 1979). 
Several studies have also highlighted the differences between selected and non-
selected players (or athletes) after selection had occurred. All but one (i.e., Hoffman et al., 
2009) of these studies found that selected players were older, taller, heavier, stronger, faster, 
more agile, fitter, more flexible, performed skills to a higher level, and had more playing 
experience than non-selected players (or athletes; Baker, 2017; Barker et al., 1993; Fry et al., 
1991; Gabbett, 2009; Gabbett et al., 2011; Gabbett et al., 2009; Gabbett & Seibold, 2013; 
Gravina et al., 2008; Lawton et al., 2013; Le Rossignol et al., 2014; Mayhew et al., 1987; 
Schmidt, 1999; Thissen-Milder & Mayhew, 1991; Young et al., 2005). Taken together, these 
studies indicate that coaches do use age, skill, and experience cues when selecting players, as 
reported by Johansson and Fahlén (2017), because selected players are older, more skilled, 
and have more playing experience than non-selected players. The knowledge available on the 
selection cues used by coaches is helpful, but it seems counterintuitive to assume that rugby 
union coaches either do exactly what they say they do, or only use a small number of 
selection cues (i.e., age, skill, and experience) in a sport that requires a number of 
anthropometric, physiological, perceptual-cognitive, psychological, and skill characteristics 
(O’Connor et al., 2016; Vaeyens et al., 2006). This study, therefore, aims to discover (a) the 
cues rugby union coaches use to make team selection decisions and (b) whether the cues 







A purposive sampling strategy (Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003) was used to select 
information-rich participants who were making (at the time of the interviews) team selection 
decisions. Participants (a) coached rugby union, (b) made, or had the final say in, team 
selection decisions, (c) worked within a performance sport environment (i.e., contexts where 
athletes concentrate on competition rather than participation; Lyle, 1999), (d) held a 
minimum Level Two formal coaching qualification (the minimum level where coaches are 
responsible for team selection decisions; Sports Coach UK, 2007, now titled UK Coaching), 
and (e) had a minimum of five years coaching experience (or medium experienced coaches, 
to allow for stabilisation in their professional development; Burden, 1990; Santos, Mesquite, 
Graca, & Rosado, 2010). 
Six male, White rugby union head coaches participated in both pre-season and post-
season (i.e., August/September and May/June, respectively) interviews (it is worth noting that 
nine coaches were originally recruited to participate in this study but three could not commit 
to a post-season interview, so their pre-season interview data was removed from the overall 
data set to adhere to the longitudinal design of this study). Ages ranged from 30 to 51 
(M=38.83, SD=8.66) and all but one participant was British (one was South African). 
Participants’ coaching experience ranged from 7 to 12 years (M=10.67, SD=3.87) and all held 
a minimum Level Two Rugby Football Union (RFU) coaching qualification (one participant 
held Level Three and another was undertaking Level Three). One participant was still playing 
rugby union while the remaining five classed themselves as ex-players. Participants were 
actively coaching a variety of age groups, including: men’s seniors (18 years old and 
upwards; n=2), men’s colts (between 16 and 18 years old; n=3), and boys under-13s (n=1). 
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All teams were classed as amateur and working within a performance sport environment 
(Lyle, 1999). 
4.2.2: Data collection. 
 Semi-structured interviews were used to facilitate the gathering of rich and insightful 
data (Bryman, 2001; Carson, Gilmore, Perry, & Gronhaug, 2005) while encouraging well-
informed practitioners (i.e., coaches) to report on their attitudes, experiences, knowledge, and 
understanding of the topic under question (Rowley, Jones, Vassiliou, & Hanna, 2012). An 
interview guide (see Appendix A) was compiled for the pre-season interview by reading 
relevant decision-making literature (e.g., the framing of information as either positive or 
negative; Johnson-Laird, 1983) and previous research on, or similar to, team selection 
decisions (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008). The post-season interview guide (see Appendix B) 
was the same as the pre-season interview guide, but also included questions that challenged 
themes that arose from data collected during the pre-season interviews. The interviews were 
all conducted by the author and began with topical, introductory questions intended to build 
rapport and to encourage participants to begin talking (e.g., “How has your pre-season 
training been going?”). The main questions followed which allowed participants to explore 
and discuss what information they used to select teams (e.g., “Describe how you select[ed] 
your team,” “What, if any, physical aspects of a player do [did] you concentrate on when 
selecting your team?”). Participants were then invited to add anything missed during the 
interview (e.g., “Is there anything else that you would like to discuss?,” “Are there any topics 
you feel we did not cover properly?”). Probes were also used throughout each interview to 
allow participants to expand upon and clarify their responses (Patton, 2002). For example 






Following ethical approval from the Ethics Committee in the Department of 
Psychology at Middlesex University, participants were invited to take part in the study by 
email. Included in the email was a brief description of the study aims and what would be 
required of participants should they agree to take part. Interviews were then organised at a 
variety of locations (e.g., rugby union club or work office) at times and on days that suited 
participants. Before the interviews began, participants were informed of the interview 
procedure, its relevance to the study, ethical procedures (e.g., confidentiality and anonymity), 
and the process of withdrawal. Once participants had any questions answered and were aware 
of the implications of involvement in the study, informed consent was taken. Each interview 
was digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim once completed. 
4.2.4: Researcher subjectivities. 
This study was underpinned by the basic beliefs of constructivism, that is, multiple 
realities constructed through lived experiences where meaning (knowledge) is co-created 
through an interactive researcher-participant dialogue (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Hansen, 2004; 
Ponterotto, 2005; Schwandt, 1994, 2000; Sciarra, 1999). In keeping with this paradigm, 
researchers are encouraged to report their values and biases as researchers are fundamental in 
shaping and creating research outcomes (Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). As well as 
adhering to constructivism, the author has played and coached rugby union for over 15 years 
so has experienced team selection from both a player and coach perspective. Rugby union 
was chosen because of the author’s experience and knowledge of the sport and the contacts 
he has within the sport. Before this study began, the author did not have a personal 





4.2.5: Data analysis. 
Data collected from the semi-structured interviews were first subject to a thematic 
analytic process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). The steps were: (a) familiarising 
yourself with your data; (b) generating initial codes; (c) searching for themes; (d) reviewing 
themes; (e) defining and naming themes; and (f) producing the report. The author first began 
this process by reading all transcripts on several occasions to familiarise himself with the 
data. Additionally, after reading each transcript for the first time, the author also began to 
write notes in the margins of the transcripts so he could begin to comprehend passages and 
start to generate initial codes. These thoughts led to relationships between passages being 
identified, which ultimately culminated in themes being finalised once they had been 
thoroughly reviewed. Themes were critically reviewed through multiple reflective and 
challenging conversations between the author and his supervisors, who acted as “critical 
friends” (i.e., a process of critical dialogue between people in which one person voices their 
interpretations to others who listen and offer critical feedback; Smith & McGannon, 2017). 
These steps allowed for the identification, analysis, and reporting of patterns (or themes) 
within the data. Themes were identified using an inductive approach (i.e., themes identified 
were strongly linked to the data; Patton, 2002). A thematic analysis is a widely used 
qualitative analytic method within sports coaching (e.g., Donoso-Morales, Bloom, & Caron, 
2017; Readdy, Zakrajsek, & Raabe, 2016) and wider psychology (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Roulston, 2001) research (for example raw data and coding see Appendix D). 
A word frequency analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) was 
also performed to examine the differences (if any) between the cues coaches claimed they 
would use in selection decisions (pre-season) and what cues they reported actually using 
(post-season). To perform the analysis, the cues described by coaches in the pre-season 
interviews were the “words” used to calculate the total frequency across both pre-season and 
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post-season interviews. Whilst a word frequency analysis allows researchers to examine, for 
example, the occurrence of responses within data (Grbich, 2013), it should be noted that 
frequency alone does not indicate importance (Krueger, Casey, Donner, Kirsh, & Maack, 
2001). Additionally, therefore, also analysed is the extensiveness (Krueger et al., 2001) of 
coaches’ responses (i.e., how many coaches contributed to each cue) to provide insight into 
how important coaches felt each category was and the level of similarity among coaches. 
4.3: Results 
Presented below are the results from pre-season and post-season interviews (and the 
comparison between the interviews) from all six coaches (for the full list of cues, see Tables 
4 to 20). Data are presented in five categories (which emerged from the data): player cues, 
coach cues, cues from other sources, situational cues, and environmental cues. Player cues, 
which were cues related to the players themselves (e.g., the players’ appearance, 
performances, and behaviours) were spoken about most often by coaches. Coach cues are 
cues derived from the coaches themselves internally (e.g., a coach’s desires, goals, and 
knowledge) rather than from any external stimuli. Cues from other sources are cues gathered 
from external stimuli that are not the players that the selection decisions are being made on 
(e.g., other players and coaches and parents). Cues that related to the situation coaches found 
themselves in (e.g., an upcoming game, the rules, and norms) that were not related to any 
immediate external or internal stimuli (and were intangible) made up the situational cues 
category. Environmental cues were those tangible cues that were related to future 
environmental conditions (e.g., the weather and pitch). The results discussed represent the 
cues coaches both predicted they would use in team selection decisions (i.e., pre-season) and 
subsequently did report using (i.e., post-season; 110 cues) along with those only reported 
post-season (148 cues, meaning 258 cues in total). The cues coaches thought they would use 
from their pre-season interviews but did not report in their post-season interviews (103 cues) 
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are not included. The reason is this data does not provide any insight into what cues coaches 
used to select their teams. It does, however, provide information on the coaches’ ability to 
predict their selection decisions so it is discussed in the subsequent word frequency analysis. 
4.3.1: Cues. 
Presented below are the cues (i.e., player cues, coach cues, cues from other sources, 
situational cues, and environmental cues) coaches reportedly used to make team selection 
decisions. 
4.3.1.1: Player cues. 
4.3.1.1.1: Appearance cues. 
During pre-season interviews, every coach stated they would use a player’s size (i.e., 
their height, weight, or a combination of the two) when making selection decisions, with 
smaller players set to miss out on selection. One coach even admitted that “…unfortunately, 
as much as I’d love it to come down to skill a lot of it actually comes down to physical 
qualities.” This view was reflected in post-season interviews by four coaches who indicated 
that they selected the “big” players and not the “small” players (broad terms were used to 
describe the size of their players as opposed to the players’ actual height and weight). Also, in 
post-season interviews, two coaches referred to a player’s “athleticism” (i.e., the physical 
qualities that are characteristic of athletes) when making selection decisions, while two 
coaches were influenced simply by the look of a player (e.g., “young in the face”). 
Furthermore, in both pre-season and post-season interviews, four coaches (three in both pre- 





Appearance cues included in the player cues category 
Appearance cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Physical appearance      
Size 6  4  -2 
Athleticism 1  3  +2 
Young face -  1  +1 
How they look -  2  +2 
Age      
Age 4  3  -1 
Under 18 -  1  +1 
4.3.1.1.2: Psychological cues. 
A player’s attitude was reported in pre-season interviews to affect three coaches’ 
selection decisions. Although attitude was thought by one coach to have more of an effect on 
participation than selection decisions, “I have had a few players that have had bad attitudes in 
the past…not that they didn’t play but they didn’t stay around for too long.” In post-season 
interviews, all the coaches based their selection decisions on players’ attitudes. Players with 
“good” attitudes were more likely to be selected than those with a “poor” attitude. One coach 
was more specific, “It comes down to who wants to play for the club.”  
Coaches stated, in both pre-season and post-season interviews, that a player’s rugby 
knowledge (i.e., a comprehension of the game of rugby and its facets) and their 
understanding of the coach’s game plan (i.e., the specific tactics for a particular game or 
opponent) affects selection decisions. In post-season interviews, three coaches referred to a 
“rugby brain” (i.e., an intuitive understanding of the game of rugby and its facets) when 
making selection decisions and two coaches would also select players because they knew the 
moves (i.e., pre-planned passages of play). Two coaches also highlighted in pre- and post-
season interviews that confidence would influence their selection decisions, with one coach 
saying in his post-season interview that an example of this would be dropping a player from 
the A team to the B team (an easier standard of rugby) because, as he said to one player “‘I'm 
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just gunna put you down into the [B]s for a few weeks where you get some slightly easier 
games, go score a few tries’”.  All six coaches also claimed to take (and reportedly did take) a 
player’s character into account when considering them for selection. Specifically, players 
were more likely to be selected if they were reliable, enthusiastic, committed, a leader, team-
player, or a “good guy.” In post-season interviews, five coaches also suggested that players 
were more likely to be selected if they were considered tough, uncompromising, feisty, 
dogged, to have a good temperament, able to fit in with others, or committed to improving. 
Also, players who were a “…pain in the arse” were not selected, according to one coach. 
Table 5 
Psychological cues included in the player cues category 
Psychological cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Attitude      
Attitude 4  6  +2 
Who wants to play for the club -  1  +1 
Intelligence      
Rugby knowledge 1  2  +1 
Understanding of the game plan 3  3  - 
Rugby brain -  3  +3 
Knows the moves -  2  +3 
Confidence      
Confidence 2  2  - 
Character      
Tough -  1  +1 
Uncompromising -  1  +1 
Enthusiasm 1  1  - 
Pain in the arse -  1  +1 
Reliability 2  2  - 
Committed 1  1  - 
Committed to improving -  1  +1 
Leadership 2  2  - 
Team-player 3  1  -2 
Feisty -  1  +1 
Good lad 1  1  - 
Personality 4  2  -2 
Dogged -  1  +1 
Temperament -  1  +1 





4.3.1.1.3: Ability cues. 
Every coach claimed they would base their selection decisions on cues relating to a 
player’s ability. In his pre-season interview, for example, one coach stated “Ability would 
override [training] attendance and attitude.” Furthermore, when discussing the number of 
players in his squad that would be in the A team and B team based on ability, another coach 
reported “20% definitely As, 20% definitely Bs…leaving me 60% to prove…your position.” 
A different coach was more specific, “There will certainly be sort of 10 names that…will 
only be As, always and only As.” A different coach reflected on this view, “The squad almost 
picks itself at some point, you know certainly those 10, 12 guys do.” These 10 or 12 players 
were the “best” players or part of the strongest (or best) team. These players could also 
execute the game plan, “do a job,” or, as one coach stated “…make that impact in a game.” 
Five coaches repeated these same cues, and more, in their post-season interviews. Players 
were also selected, for example, because they were considered, based on their ability, as 
starters (i.e., players selected in the first 15 positions), backup or second choice (i.e., players 
selected only if the starters are unavailable), or “gap fillers” (i.e., players selected only to fill 
a position and not for any other reason). Gap fillers were selected because they can “do the 
job” the coach required. One coach even stated that he did not need to select some players, 
“The backs really picked themselves.” A player’s reputation, aptitude, potential, and ability to 





Ability cues included in the player cues category 
Ability cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Ability      
A player 3  4  +1 
Ability 6  6  - 
Very good 5  4  -1 
Second choice -  1  +1 
Best player 5  2  -3 
B player 3  2  -1 
Ability to execute the game plan 2  2  - 
Do the job -  1  +1 
Do a job 1  3  +2 
Grunt this out -  1  +1 
On the brink -  1  +1 
Impact in game 3  2  -1 
Add strength to Bs -  1  +1 
Strongest team 3  4  +1 
Starter -  2  +2 
Back up -  2  +2 
Gap filler -  1  +1 
Backs picked themselves -  1  +1 
Reputation -  1  +1 
Talent      
Aptitude 2  3  +1 
Potential      
Potential 2  1  -1 
Ability to change      
Ability to change -  1  +1 
 
4.3.1.1.4: Performance cues. 
When making selection decisions, every coach stated they would use, and reported 
using, a wide variety of information relating to their players’ performances. Gross motor 
skills, such as speed, strength, power, and agility, were referenced by coaches in both pre-
season (five coaches) and post-season (six coaches) interviews. Balance, coordination, and 
movement were also stated by one coach in his post-season interview. Five coaches said they 
would factor aerobic fitness into their selection decisions in their pre-season interviews, as 
one coach indicated “They’ve either gotta get fit or else they will be dropped.” Only two 
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coaches (and one in particular), however, placed important on aerobic fitness in their post-
season interviews.  
There were several general rugby skills coaches predicted to use, and reported using, 
to select players. These were skills that coaches perceived to be basic, and therefore 
fundamental. Coaches, for example, stated that players who can tackle, especially with good 
technique, would (and reportedly did) get selected, “You can’t carry players in a side that 
can’t tackle.” A player’s body position and running, handling, passing, and ball carrying 
skills were also cited by coaches as selection cues. In post-season interviews, coaches also 
selected players for their catching skills and tackling power and, on a broader level, versatile 
and attacking and defending skills. Players were also selected because of the positions they 
could play, “[A player] used to get selected then for certain games because he could cover 
both flank and wing.” Coaches also wanted players to possess position specific skills (i.e., 
skills that a player needs to perform in a specific position). Forwards, for example, were 
selected for their scrum and line-out skills (in his post-season interview, one coach also 
included jackling, which is the winning of the ball, by the defender's team, after a tackle and 
before a ruck has formed) and a back could be selected if they could kick (in his post-season 
interview, one coach also included sniping, which is a scrum-half running into gaps around 
the ruck). Coaches stated in their pre-season interviews, and repeated in their post-season 
interviews, that a player may get selected because of the style of rugby they play. In post-
season interviews, coaches were more specific and said they selected players because they 
were dynamic or physical rugby players or a “7s player” (i.e., a player with high levels of 
aerobic fitness, speed, and skill). Also, in his post-season interview, one coach indicated that 
he selected players once they had demonstrated they had learnt what he wanted them to learn. 
Coaches, in both pre-season and post-season interviews, stated that what they see in 
training and how a player performs would lead to their selection, as one coach explained “If I 
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see it in training, I’m more confident to select on that basis.” Some coaches, more 
specifically, would base their selections on the effort players put in during training and the 
number of tackles made. Additionally, in his post-season interview, one coach stated “I’d put 
the two…front rows against each other and they’d fight it out to see who could dominate.” 
This would subsequently inform his selection decisions. 
The tries a player scores during a game was an objective performance cue that was 
highlighted in both pre-season and post-season interviews. Several other objective 
performance cues were mentioned by one coach in his post-season interview as he had access 
to objective performance statistics. Specifically, this coach used the number of carries a 
player performed, how many tackles they made, how many tackles they missed, and the 
number of passes they completed. This coach, along with three others, also used objective 
performance cues gathered by the coaches themselves. For example, how often a player was 
offside, how many penalties they gave away, the amount of time spent on the pitch, and the 
size of an opposition player they successfully tackled. 
Every coach claimed they would select, and did report selecting, players based on 
their general game performance. As one coach stated “…we did pick on performance.” 
Coaches thought they would select (or not drop) players who were performing well while 
feeling like they had no choice but to drop players who were performing poorly, as one coach 
recalled “There was a couple of games he was awful, I had to drop him.” Another coach said 
he based his selection decisions on how players performed under pressure and how they 
handled contact. In post-season interviews, there were other specific performance cues that 
some coaches recalled using when making selection decisions. These cues included whether 
players contributed anything in open play, ran as effectively as they could, how they 
defended, if they tackled effectively, how they moved around the pitch, and how well they 
took the ball to the gain line (i.e., an imaginary line that is drawn through the middle of the 
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set piece or breakdown width wise dividing the field into two separate regions; Westgate, 
2007). 
Coaches indicated they would (and reportedly did) rely on their “tried and tested” 
players (i.e., players the coach previously selected and who performed to an acceptable level) 
when making selection decisions. In his post-season interview, one coach’s selection 





Performance cues included in the player cues category 
Performance cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison  Performance cues  Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
              
Gross motor skills       Objective game performance       
Speed 4  5  +1  Tries  1  3  +2 
Strong 3  2  -1  Performance statistics  -  1  +1 
Balanced -  1  +1  Carries  -  1  +1 
Coordinated -  1  +1  Tackles  -  1  +1 
Powerful 2  1  -1  Missed tackles  -  1  +1 
The way they move -  1  +1  Passes  -  1  +1 
Footwork 1  1  -  Offside  -  1  +1 
Aerobic fitness       Penalties  -  1  +1 
Aerobic fitness 5  2  -3  Size of tackled player  -  1  +1 
General rugby skills       Time played  -  1  +1 
Technique 1  1  -  Game performance       
Basic skills 1  2  +1  General game performance  6  5  -1 
Handling 3  3  -  Effort in games  -  1  +1 
Skill level 1  1  -  Reluctance in contact  2  1  -1 
Skills -  4  +4  The way they move around the pitch  -  1  +1 
Running ability 3  1  -2  Takes it to the line well  -  1  +1 
Run -  1  +1  Perform under pressure  2  1  -1 
Versatile skills -  1  +1  Tackling performance  -  2  +2 
Passing 3  2  -1  Defensive performance  -  1  +1 
Catching -  1  +1  Nature of performance  -  1  +1 
Defensive ability -  2  +2  No bullocking runs  -  1  +1 
Body position 2  1  -1  Game  -  1  +1 
Tackling 4  1  -3  No contribution in open play  -  1  +1 
Tackle technique 1  1  -  Pre-season friendlies  -  1  +1 
Tackling power -  1  +1  Historical game performance       
Attacking ability -  1  +1  Tried and tested  2  1  -1 
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Performance cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison  Performance cues  Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
              
Ball carrier 3  1  -2  Historical game performance  -  1  +1 
Position specific skills       Demonstrate what they’ve learnt       
Position 5  4  -1  What they’ve learnt  -  1  +1 
Scrum 2  1  -1  Must learn how to play  -  1  +1 
6 -  1  +1  Player’s style of rugby       
Kicking 1  1  -  Player’s style of rugby  1  1  - 
Positional skills 2  1  -1  Dynamic  -  1  +1 
Sniping -  1  +1  7s player  -  1  +1 
Line out 2  1  -1  Physical  -  1  +1 
Jumping in the line out 1  1  -         
Over the ball -  1  +1         
Training performances              
General training performance 5  5  -         
Training 1  2  +1         
Effort in training 2  2  -         
Tackles in training 1  1  -         
Scrum performance in training -  1  +1         
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4.3.1.1.5: Behaviour cues. 
Only one coach suggested that how a player behaves (in this case, in training) would 
affect his selection decisions, which he confirmed in his post-season interview. The 
remaining behaviour cues were only stated in post-season interviews. This included the effort 
players put in (in general), how players carried themselves, a general description of behaviour 
(e.g., “how [the players] are within the general scheme of things”), and more specific 
behaviours in training (i.e., helping others out, engaging in training, and trying to better 
themselves). Coaches suggested that communication would affect their selection decisions 
(and reported that it did), including whether players listened (in general and in training) to 
coaches, the input from players, and, specifically, their positional preferences. As one coach 
recalled “…if any of the other players came and asked and said they wanted to play a 
position, we would let them.” In their post-season interviews, coaches also outlined that how 






Behaviour cues included in the player cues category 
Behaviour cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Behaviour      
Behaviour -  1  +1 
Effort -  3  +3 
Carry themselves -  1  +1 
Behaviour in training      
Helping others out -  1  +1 
Behaviour in training 1  2  +1 
Engaging -  1  +1 
Trying to better themselves -  1  +1 
Communication      
Communication 2  1  -1 
Listening 1  1  - 
Communication with coach -  2  +2 
Player input 4  4  - 
Player position preference 2  2  - 
Communication in games      
Communication in games -  1  +1 
Communication in training      
Communication in training -  1  +1 
Listening in training 2  1  -1 
 
4.3.1.1.6: Personal cues. 
One coach stated, in both his pre-season and post-season interviews, that the school a 
player attended influenced his selection decisions. Two other coaches, more specifically, 
recalled in their post-season interviews having to take school or university exams into 
consideration when making selection decisions. One of these coaches also had to factors in 
his players’ work schedules when selecting his teams. 
Table 9 
Personal cues included in the player cues category 
Personal cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
School      
School 1  1  - 
Exams -  2  +2 
Work      
Work -  1  +1 
70 
 
4.3.1.1.7: Management cues. 
Coaches thought they would, and reportedly did have to, think about how selection 
would affect their players, “What’s gunna have the best effect on that player?” Coaches also 
suggested that “…sometimes you can use selection as a motivating tool.” In his post-season 
interview, one coach recalled using selection to reengage a player and (along with another 
coach) to develop players. 
Table 10 
Management cues included in the player cues category 
Management cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Effect on player      
Effect on player 2  2  - 
Motivation 1  2  +1 
Reengage player -  1  +1 
Player development -  2  +2 
 
4.3.1.1.8: Situational cues. 
Every coach, in both pre-season and post-season interviews, claimed that a player’s 
availability and injuries influenced their selection decisions. One coach even implied that his 
team’s season was defined by players being unavailable or injured. Usually the first cue 
sought in selection decisions, availability is more important than ability. 
It’s almost a compromise at times looking at if someone is a better player but I know 
that maybe once every four weeks they’re not gunna be available, it might be that we 
actually go and look at you know, is the player that’s probably beneath them in the 
pecking order…gunna be more reliable and consistent? 
In their post-season interviews, coaches also stated that unknown availabilities and 
late changes in availabilities also affected selection decisions. A player was deemed 
unavailable because of their (lack of) fitness, inability to travel to away games, inability to 
commit to playing games at all, or, specifically for the A team, were returning from an injury. 
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Most coaches stated in their pre-season and post-season interviews that training 
attendance would influence their selection decisions. In some cases, whether a player 
attended training would dictate selection, as one coach recalled “There were two or three kids 
that consistently were in the B team that had the ability to play at the A team, but they weren't 
training enough.” Some players, however, could not attend training, which the coaches 
considered when making selection decisions. One coach also recalled a player leaving 
training early while another remembered a player turning up late to games, which 
subsequently affected their selection decisions on those players. A different coach said that 
towards the end of the season, whoever attended the games would be selected by default 
because of low player numbers, “It reached a point where we were scrambling for players at 
such late notice, and we never really knew who would bloody turn up, so it ended up the 
selection was made in the changing room that morning.” 
How many games a player has played, how long they have played at the club, and 
how much experience they have are all cues that coaches claimed would, and reportedly did, 
affect their selection decisions. In their post-season interviews, coaches claimed to use 
several other cues to make selection decisions that related to a player’s playing history. 
Specifically, a player’s previous club, how regularly they were playing, how many games 
they had been selected as a substitute for and the total time spent as a substitute, and whether 
they had played in a position before were also reportedly used in selection decisions. Three 
coaches also had to consider a different team some of their players also played for when 
making selection decisions. Some players, for example, were representing school sides and 
were therefore not available for selection, whereas others represented county and professional 






Situational cues included in the player cues category 
Situational cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Availability      
Availability 6  6  - 
Unknown availability -  1  +1 
Late change in availability -  1  +1 
Injured 5  6  +1 
Fit -  3  +3 
Can’t travel -  1  +1 
Returning from injury -  1  +1 
Can’t commit -  1  +1 
Attendance      
Been there all season -  2  +2 
Training      
Training attendance 5  5  - 
Can’t train -  2  +2 
Leaving training early -  1  +1 
Game      
Whoever turned up -  1  +1 
Late arrival for games -  1  +1 
Player’s playing history      
Number of games played 2  4  +2 
Previous club -  1  +1 
Experience 2  2  - 
Played there before -  1  +1 
Who plays regularly -  1  +1 
Playing regular second team -  1  +1 
Number of games spent as substitute -  1  +1 
Years at the club 3  1  -2 
Time spent as substitute -  2  +2 
Another team      
Another team -  3  +3 
 
4.3.1.2: Coach cues. 
One coach suggested, in his pre-season interview, that the relationship he had with his 
players would affect his selection decisions, which a different coach stated in his post-season 
interview. Also stated in pre-season and post-season interviews to influence selection 
decisions were the styles of rugby (i.e., a general approach to how rugby is played) coaches 
wanted their players to adopt, the game plans (i.e., the specific tactics for a particular game or 
opponent) coaches wanted their players to play, the specific requirements (with regards to 
73 
 
physical attributes and/or skills) coaches wanted players to have, and, according to one coach, 
simply him wanting to see how a player was doing. In his post-season interview, one coach 
also said his philosophies impacted his selection decisions. Furthermore, one coach recalled a 
player not being selected because they were not asked whether they were available, “By the 
end of the season, the A team coach wasn't sending him the ‘are you available?’ part because 
he didn't give a toss anymore, the A team coach didn't give a toss.” Another coach also 
remembered allowing a player to be selected (by other coaches) for evidence gathering 
purposes when he stated “Sometimes you’ve got to let [a selection] go to get the information 
to then say, ‘up yours’ [to the other coaches].” 
A coach’s playing experience (e.g., what position they played) was stated in pre-
season and post-season interviews to affect selection decisions as this contributed to a 
coaches’ knowledge and expectations of the players in those same positions. One coach (in 
his post-season interview) also said that his coaching experiences helped him make selection 
decisions. In their pre-season interviews, some coaches thought their pre-conceived ideas 
about players would impact their selections, one coach for example stated “…you just know 
what they’re capable of doing.” In his post-season interview, however, this same coach (who 
was the only coach to say pre-conceived ideas affected his selections in his post-season 
interview) claimed that these same pre-conceived ideas hindered his selections, “I think 
preconceived ideas will always hinder selection…mainly because sometimes you see what 
you wanna see.” Furthermore, another coach (in his post-season interview) revealed that his 
lack of knowledge about certain positions and players affected his selection decisions by 
creating uncertainly and a lack of confidence in himself to make effective selection decisions.  
The motivations of the coach and what they wanted to achieve were reported in both 
the pre-season and post-season interviews to affect selection decisions. Some coaches, for 
example, concentrated on players’ enjoyment or winning when selecting players. 
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Furthermore, coaches said in their post-season interviews that their beliefs about what their 
players wanted impacted their selection decisions. One coach believed that his players needed 
a win, for example, so his selection decisions were different than another coach who believed 
that some players were not happy being a substitute. One coach even suggested that the way 
he viewed himself changed how he selected players, “I viewed myself as a player helping 
them out, so I was just talking to them like I would other guys in [my playing] squad.” 
Table 12 
Coach cues 
Coach cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Coach-player relationship      
Coach-player relationship 1  1  - 
Desires      
Coach didn’t give a toss -  1  +1 
See what they’re up to 1  1  - 
Style of rugby 4  4  - 
Game plan 4  4  - 
Coach’s requirements 1  4  +3 
Evidence gathering -  1  +1 
Philosophy      
Coach’s philosophy -  1  +1 
Experience      
Coach’s playing experience 1  2  +1 
Previous coaching experiences -  1  +1 
Goals      
What the coach wants to achieve 3  2  -1 
What they want -  4  +4 
Coach’s winning mentality 3  3  - 
Knowledge      
Coach’s knowledge -  1  +1 
Preconceived ideas 3  1  -2 
Never seen them before -  1  +1 
Self-concept      
How coach views himself -  1  +1 
 
4.3.1.3: Cues from other sources. 
4.3.1.3.1: Other players. 
Coaches thought they would, and reportedly did, take the other players within the 
team into consideration when making selection decisions. One coach, for example, stated “[I 
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would select] combinations, like the ability of a combination over individual ability.” On the 
other hand, rather than combining players, some coaches would compare players for one 
position. If two players were deemed too similar, for example, only one player was selected. 
For a different coach though (he claimed in his post-season interview) this meant that he 
selected a player because he was the same as another player. A selection decision on one 
player sometimes depended on who would replace them if they were not selected. Similarly, 
an informal ranking system was reported in their post-season interviews by coaches, as one 
coach articulated “[a player was] third or fourth on the pecking order.” Who was selected in 
different positions at times (both in pre-season and post-season interviews) influenced the 
selection of a player. Additionally, who would not be selected if another player was also 
impacted on selection decisions (from post-season interviews only). In their post-season 
interviews, coaches reported using the ability of other players and how they performed to 
make selection decisions. How a player impacts other players was stated in both pre-season 
and post-season interviews to influence selection decisions, while in just the post-season 
interviews, coaches took into consideration how the selection of a player would affect other 
players in general and on their game performances specifically. Furthermore, some coaches 
changed their selection decisions based on what the other players said to them, especially if 





Other players cues included in the cues from other sources category 
Other players Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Comparison to other players      
Same player -  1  +1 
Too similar 2  1  -1 
Ranking  -  3  +3 
Replacement  2  1  -1 
Player combinations      
Combinations  5  2  -3 
Other player selections      
Other players 1  1  - 
Who isn’t playing -  1  +1 
Game performance of other players      
Game performance of other players -  1  +1 
Ability of other players      
Ability of other players -  2  +2 
Impact on other players      
Impact on others 4  1  -3 
Impact of selection on others -  1  +1 
Effect on other players performances -  1  +1 
Other player input      
Other player input 3  2  -1 
Key player input 3  3  - 
 
4.3.1.3.2: Team. 
The team, rather than individual players, also influenced selection decisions. The 
ability of the team (e.g., whether the team had the ability to cope without a certain player 
being selected) affected (from both pre-season and post-season interviews) selection 
decisions. Also, management of the team was thought to (and reportedly did) influence 
selection decisions, “Keeping [the players] together as a unit, long term, is probably the most 
important selection criteria.”  
During post-season interviews, coaches stated they took more information about the 
team into consideration when making selection decisions. The standard of the A team and the 
B team and whether the team can “afford another week” without a player, for example, were 
cues for one coach. Alternatively, another coach described basing a selection decision on 
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whether the team could cope with the selection of a player (as this player was perceived to be 
of low ability). How a team performs and communicates (as a whole) with their coach also 
affected selection decisions. What the team wanted to achieve, and the collective winning 
mentality, influenced selection decisions, as one coach explained “The kids who were kinda 
like ‘yeah but we still wanna win and we’d still like to win the league so can we have those 
[games] where you just pick the best players?’”. Some coaches reported that the number of 
players within the squad in total (including B team players) or the number of players already 
selected into a team for an upcoming game impacted their selection decisions. Furthermore, 
one coach recalled how the number of B team players attending training would reinforce his 
selections, “It's got to be working somewhere, and the fact that the B team guys, even the 
crap ones are training each week…nobody’s that upset with the way we're selecting.” 
Table 14 
Team cues included in the cues from other sources category 
Team Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Ability of the team      
Ability of the team 1  1  - 
Standard of the 1st team -  1  +1 
Standard of the 2nd team -  1  +1 
Team can cope  -  1  +1 
Can afford another week without player -  1  +1 
B team training attendance       
B team training attendance -  1  +1 
Team performance      
Nature of loss -  1  +1 
Team management      
Team management 2  2  - 
Team communication      
Team input -  1  +1 
Coach-team communication -  1  +1 
Team goals      
What the team wants to achieve -  1  +1 
Players’ winning mentality -  1  +1 
Number of players      
Number of players -  4  +4 
Second team player numbers -  1  +1 




4.3.1.3.3: Other coaches. 
In pre-season interviews, coaches described how they would rely on other coaches to 
help make selection decisions. Whilst some were more specific about which coaches would 
(i.e., in pre-season interviews) have an impact on their selection decisions (e.g., assistant 
coach and B team coach), most articulated who influenced them in their post-season 
interviews. One coach, for example, stated “…I pretty much let my forwards coach pick our 
forwards, you know he works with them more than I do.” Another coach said “…the last say 
really on the backs came down to [the backs coach].” Rather than other coaches simply 
making the selection decisions, occasionally their input, playing experience, or relationships 
with the players influenced selection decisions. Furthermore, one coach recalled thinking 
about what his B team coaches wanted to achieve and wanting to keep them happy when 
making selection decisions, “Sometimes I just take [not selecting a B team player for the A 
team] on the chin and go ‘well actually, it does them a favour, they'll have a stronger team, 
they'll be happier with it’”. 
Table 15 
Other coaches cues included in the cues from other sources category 
Other coaches Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Other coach input 5  3  -2 
Assistant coach      
Assistant coach -  1  +1 
Assistant coach input 2  1  -1 
Assistant coach’s playing experience  -  1  +1 
Forwards coach      
Forwards coach -  2  +2 
Forwards coach-player relationship -  1  +1 
Backs coach      
Backs coach -  1  +1 
Backs coach-player relationship -  1  +1 
Second team coaches      
Second team coach input 1  1  - 
What the second team coaches want to achieve -  1  +1 




4.3.1.3.4: Selection panel. 
Two coaches (during post-season interviews) spoke about a selection panel (i.e., a 
group of senior individuals at a club, such as coaches, captains, and senior players, who 
collectively discuss selection decisions) who discussed selection decisions, as one explained 
“Selection as I said went into more of a, not a committee but more of a selection panel.” Who 
was in the selection panel depended on what coaching (or club) resources coaches had at their 
disposal (e.g., senior players, other coaches, director of rugby). 
4.3.1.3.5: Other sources. 
For one coach speaking in his post-season interview, his club (e.g., what the club 
wanted to achieve) and the club physiotherapist had an impact on his selection decisions. A 
different coach was influenced by the selection decisions he perceived other teams (in 
general) made (e.g., what type of players other teams select) while another explained how the 
parents of the players impacted his selection decisions, “On selection you do get parents that 
think little [player]’s better than he is…as you go through…that process and sometimes you 
select them on the bench.” 
Table 16 
Other sources cues included the in cues from other sources category 
Other sources Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Selection panel      
Selection panel -  2  +2 
Club      
What the club wants to achieve -  1  +1 
Physio      
Physio input -  1  +1 
Parents      
Parent -  1  +1 
Other teams      





4.3.1.4: Situational cues. 
Coaches, both in pre-season and post-season interviews, stated that the position they 
were selecting for influenced their selection decisions. In his post-season interview, however, 
one coach was more specific when he described how selecting for a substitute position 
impacted the way he made the decision.  
Coaches suggested in pre-season interviews, and reported in post-season interviews, 
that selection for an A game (e.g., league and cup games) was different to selection for a B 
game (e.g., friendly). Coaches also described in post-season interviews that the importance of 
the upcoming game and where the location of the game was (for away games) influenced 
their selection decisions. Coaches also stated, both in pre-season and post-season interviews, 
how the opposition (and the coach’s knowledge of the opposition) and their league position 
impacted their selection decisions. Although one coach tried not to do this, “As a coach I 
don't particularly like looking at the opposition, every now and again there's a game where 
you really have to.” In post-season interviews, coaches also took into consideration the level 
of the opposition and the size of the opposition’s players and the standard of the referees 
when making his selection decisions. 
Coaches thought they would use, and reported using, what happened in the most 
recent game as selection cues. Specifically, coaches reported using the results of games and 
the level of the opposition they played as selection cues for the following game. Furthermore, 
one coach focussed on what position his team were in the league when making his selection 
decisions. 
Coaches suggested in their pre-season interviews that there may be times where they 
have no choice with selection, which is a situation they also described in post-season 
interviews. One coach, for example, explained “On a couple of occasions I had no choice 
because there was no one else.” In his post-season interview, one coach recalled how logistics 
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(e.g., travel arrangements) played a part in his selection decisions when he stated “When I 
brought one [player] up to the A team I always brought the other [brother] because of 
logistics.” The rules (e.g., concussion protocol) were also described in pre-season and post-
season interviews to impact selection decisions. 
In two clubs, players were eligible to play for the adult teams which affected two 
coaches’ selection decisions because these players would not have been available for 
selection if they were selected for the adult teams, something suggested in their pre-season 
interviews, while a different coach (who did not suggest this in his pre-season interview) was 
influenced by how he had always made his selection decisions (e.g., what type of players he 
had always selected). 
Table 17 
Position cues included in the situational cues category 
Position Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Position dependent 1  1  - 






Upcoming games cues included in the situational cues category 
Upcoming games Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Upcoming game      
A game 1  2  +1 
B game 2  2  - 
Friendly 3  3  - 
[Opposition team name] game  -  1  +1 
League game 2  2  - 
Cup game 2  1  -1 
Under 18s cup game 1  1  - 
No B game -  1  +1 
Upcoming game 2  3  +1 
Importance of upcoming game -  1  +1 
Away game location -  1  +1 
Upcoming opposition      
Opposition  6  3  -3 
Knowledge of opposition 3  2  -1 
Opposition league position 1  1  - 
Level of upcoming opposition -  1  +1 
Size of opposition -  1  +1 
Standard of referee      
Standard of referee -  1  +1 
 
Table 19 
Situational cues included in the situational cues category 
Situational cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Recent games      
Recent results 2  2  - 
Level of opposition in previous game 2  1  -1 
League position      
League position 2  1  -1 
No choice      
No choice 1  3  +2 
Logistics      
Logistics -  1  +1 
Rules      
Rules 4  3  -1 
Concussion protocol -  1  +1 
Adult team      
Adult team 1  2  +1 
Norm      




4.3.1.5: Environmental cues. 
One coach suggested in his pre-season interview, and reported in his post-season 
interview, that the weather conditions and the pitch his team played on affected his team 
selection decisions because the weather and pitch surface changed his tactics. 
Table 20 
Environmental cues included in the environmental cues category 
Environmental cues Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
      
Weather      
Weather 2  1  -1 
Pitch      
Pitch 1  1  - 
 
4.3.2: Word frequency analysis. 
A word frequency analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) 
examines the differences (if any) between the cues coaches claimed they would use in 
selection decisions (pre-season) and what cues they reported actually using (post-season). 
Additionally, the extensiveness (Krueger et al., 2001) of coaches’ responses (i.e., how many 
coaches contributed to each cue) provides insight into how important coaches felt each 
category was and the level of similarity among coaches. 
Table 21 documents the total number of themes, sub-themes, and cues in each 
category across both pre-season and post-season interviews. The pre-season interview results 
highlight that coaches stated they would use player cues to make selection decisions more 
often than any other category. Similarly, coaches in post-season interviews echoed their 
predictions by stating they mostly used player cues in their selection decisions. Coaches did 
state in both pre-season and post-season interviews they would (and reportedly did) use coach 
cues, cues from other sources, situational cues, and environmental cues, but to a lesser extent. 
Furthermore, the number of cues coaches reportedly used over all categories either increased 
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or stayed at the same from pre-season to post-season interviews. The frequency with which 
cues were stated, however, decreased (see Table 22).   
In pre-season interviews, coaches thought they would use a total of 213 cues to make 
selection decisions but reported using only 110 (51.64%) of these same cues in their post-
season interviews (meaning 103 cues were not stated) and an additional 148 new cues (258 
cues in total emerged from post-season interviews). Table 23 shows that the number of 
coaches who described using the same cues decreased from pre-season to post-season 
interviews (apart from four coaches saying the same cues). The cues coaches all stated they 
would use in pre-season interviews were: size, ability, general game performance, 
availability, and opposition. In post-season interviews coaches all claimed they used attitude, 
availability, and injured cues.  Also, the number of cues only one coach described using to 
make selection decisions increased from pre-season to post-season interviews. 
Table 21 
The number of themes, sub-themes, and cues from pre-season and post-season interviews 
 Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
Categories Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues 
Player cues 8 31 142  8 34 166  - +3 +24 
Coach cues 6 - 15  7 - 17  +1 - +2 
Cues from other 
sources 
6 13 26  8 18 45  +2 +5 +19 
Situational cues 7 2 28  9 3 28  +2 +1 - 
Environmental 
cues 
2 - 2  2 - 2  - - - 















      
Player cues 720  660  -60 
Coach cues 85  63  -22 
Cues from other sources 137  125  -12 
Situational cues 138  74  -64 
Environmental cues 7  5  -2 
TOTAL 1087  928  -162 
 
Table 23 
The number of coaches who stated each cue in pre-season and post-season interviews 
Number of coaches who 
stated cue 
Pre-season  Post-season  Comparison 
     
6 5 2.35%  3 1.16%  -2 -1.19% 
5 10 4.69%  4 1.55%  -6 -3.14% 
4 10 4.69%  14 5.43%  +4  +0.74% 
3 21 9.86%  19 7.36%  -2  -2.50% 
2 53 24.88%  47 18.22%  -6  -6.66% 
1 114 53.52%  171 66.28%  +57  +12.76% 
TOTAL 213   258   +45  
 
4.4: Discussion 
This study sought to investigate the cues coaches use to make team selection 
decisions and whether the cues coaches claimed they would use in pre-season interviews 
were different to the cues they reported using throughout the season, in the post-season 
interviews. Results show that coaches use a large number of cues from five categories (i.e., 
player cues, coach cues, cues from other sources, situational cues, and environmental cues) to 
make selection decisions, with coaches most frequently claiming to rely on cues that arose 
from the players. Furthermore, the number of cues coaches thought they would use for 
upcoming team selection decisions (pre-season interviews; N=213) was less than the actual 
number of cues reportedly used (post-season interviews; N=258). Also, just under half 
(48.36%) of the predicted cues highlighted at the pre-season interview stage were not actually 
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used in team selection decisions (or at least stated during post-season interviews), suggesting 
that coaches were unable to predict exactly which cues they would reportedly rely on to make 
team selection decisions. 
4.4.1: Content of the cues. 
When making selection decisions, coaches reported overwhelmingly relying on cues 
that arose from the players. This reflects previous studies that have examined how coaches 
assess athletes (e.g., Larkin & O’Connor, 2017; Solomon & Rhea, 2008) and how players are 
selected for teams (e.g., Ahmed, Deb, & Jindal, 2013; Iyer & Sharda, 2009; Johansson & 
Fahlén, 2017), but also in broader contexts of how one person makes a judgment or decision 
on another person (e.g., Brocklehurst et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2005). Given that coaches in the 
current study were making decisions on their players, it is hardly surprising that much of the 
information reportedly used originated from the players themselves. The breadth and detail of 
the player cues coaches claimed to use, however, was a novel result compared to previous 
studies on team selection (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) as coaches drew upon a variety of 
appearance, psychological, ability, performance, behaviour, personal, management, and 
situational cues. 
Coaches stated they would take a player’s age and physical appearance into 
consideration when making selection decisions. This replicates previous studies which found 
that coaches considered a player’s age when making selection decisions (e.g., Johansson & 
Fahlén, 2017) and that players selected for games were taller, heavier, and older than those 
not selected (e.g., Baker, 2017; Gabbett et al., 2009). It is understandable that coaches use 
physical appearance cues to base their selection decisions on given that greater size is 
considered a desirable trait in rugby union (Howard, Cumming, Atkinson, & Malina, 2016) 
because of the high physical demands of the sport (Darrall-Jones, Jones, & Till, 2015). No 
coach, however, described taking anthropometric measurements of their players. This means 
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that coaches, who have been found to use “sight” to make judgments on their players (e.g. 
Fiander et al., 2013; Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), may have been using their perception of a 
player’s size, rather than objective measurements, to inform their team selection decisions. 
This has been previously documented within rugby union, evidenced by the existence of 
relative age effects (RAE; e.g., Lewis, Morgan, & Cooper, 2015), meaning that the bigger 
(and older) players have an increased probability of selection (Schorer, Baker, Büsch, 
Wilhelm, & Pabst, 2009). 
Psychological cues were stated to affect coaches’ selection decisions (it is worth 
noting that whilst it is possible there was a shared meaning among participants behind the 
psychological cues described, it was beyond the scope of this study to clarify this so these 
results should be interpreted with this in mind), especially a player’s attitude and personality, 
which has been previously reported (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Every coach stated that 
a player’s attitude influenced their selection (although this was not stated by every coach in 
their pre-season interviews). When discussing a player’s attitude, coaches would describe a 
concept that seemed to be an expression of their personality (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) that 
was general in nature and either positive or negative (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). With regards 
to personality, it is unclear that when coaches described specific traits they were referencing 
the big five personality traits (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness; Costa & McCrae, 1992) or personality-trait-like individual differences 
(PTLID; i.e., traits linked to personality that do not belong to the big five; Laborde, Breuer-
Weißborn, & Dosseville, 2013) between players. Coaches stated, for example, that a player’s 
selection would depend on whether they “fit in” with the other players or are “dogged.” 
Fitting in with others could refer to extraversion (part of the big five), as people who are 
extravert prefer the interaction of social groups (Maltby, Day, & Macaskill, 2009), while 
doggedness may be similar to hardiness (i.e., a multidimensional personality trait that is 
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hypothesised to protect people from stress; Eschleman, Bowling, & Alarcon, 2010), which is 
considered a PTLID. Whilst it is clear that coaches place value on a player’s personality (and 
attitude) when making selection decisions, it is less clear as to which personality traits 
coaches are referring to. This means further research is needed, especially as personality can 
be subject to change (Boyce, Wood, Daly, & Sedikides, 2015) and personality measures can 
help a coach predict within competition, short-term, and long-term performances (Gee et al., 
2010). 
There were some players who were selected by coaches based solely on an ability 
cue, often referred to as the “best” players. Although it has been previously suggested that 
coaches do not select the best players, but rather they select the players who work best 
together (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), within the current study coaches seemed to be stating 
that they would simply select the best players. Whilst the results from the current study 
suggest coaches may have followed a ‘take-the-best’ (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) 
decision strategy, there were no suggestions that coaches used the ability cues to distinguish 
between two alternatives (a key element of TTB). Instead, coaches were simply selecting 
these players because they were the best rather than deciding who was the best of two 
alternatives (in cases where an ability cue was reportedly used). Coaches, therefore, were not 
generating more than one option when deciding some team selection decisions. This suggests 
that coaches may have followed a ‘take-the-first’ (TTF; Johnson & Raab, 2003) decision 
strategy when selecting these players. TTF suggests that in familiar tasks, experts choose one 
of the first options that comes to mind because it represents the best option (Johnson & Raab, 
2003). Furthermore, options that have been repeatedly chosen in previous decisions are more 
strongly associated with the current decision (Ward, Ericsson, & Williams, 2013). When 
selecting the best players, coaches may have, therefore, been choosing the first player that 
came to mind (rather than generating more than one option) because they have been 
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repeatedly chosen as the best player in the past. This is not to suggest that coaches 
exclusively used TTF to make selection decisions. Coaches may have, for example, used TTF 
to select the best players and then (once all the best players are selected) decided, between 
alternatives, who else should be selected with a TTB decision strategy (there is evidence that 
coaches do decide between alternatives when they stated they compared players). Further 
research is, however, needed to more explicitly investigate the decision strategy (or 
strategies) used by coaches.  
How someone becomes labelled the best player is, however, unclear. Whilst coaches 
were describing one cue when making these selection decisions (and therefore adhering to the 
definition of a cue as a single piece of meaningful information; Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & 
Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013), it is also not known whether 
this was always the case. Previously, for example, coaches may have considered several 
different cues that led to the conclusion that a player was the best. So, over time (and after 
this player has been repeatedly chosen because they are judged to be the best player) coaches 
could go from using several cues that lead to the conclusion that someone is the best player, 
to simply one cue, the “best player cue” (although further research is needed to back up this 
claim). It is also worth noting that while coaches may select the first option because they 
believe it is the best option (i.e., the best player), it may in fact not be the best option (i.e., not 
objectively the best player). Consequently, coaches using TTF when selecting their best 
players is not necessarily a reflection of decision quality, as in traditional TTF studies (e.g., 
Raab & Laborde, 2011).  
With the highest number of cues reported in this category, how a player performs (in 
several different contexts) can impact coaches’ selection decisions. This reflects previous 
studies that show coaches use a variety of performance cues to select players (e.g. Johansson 
& Fahlén, 2017) and that selected players perform better on, for example, physical fitness 
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(e.g., Barfield & Malone, 2012) and skill tests (e.g., Gabbett et al., 2007) and in games (e.g., 
Woods et al., 2016). Selected players who are as young as three years old also perform better 
in technical skill tests than non-selected players (e.g., Archer, Drysdale, & Bradley, 2016) 
and some have even suggested that performance measures should be preferred to 
anthropometric measures in talent detection (Melchiorri et al., 2017). As rugby union is a 
sport that requires, among other things, speed, strength, power, and aerobic capacity (Duthie, 
2006), it is no surprise that the coaches in the current study stated that these qualities 
influenced their selection decisions.  
Similarly, coaches described several general rugby skills (e.g., tackling and passing) 
and position specific skills (e.g., kicking and scrumming) that affected the selection of a 
player. Again, it has been previously highlighted that rugby union players require both 
common and unique skills that contribute to performances (Greenwood, 1997; James, 
Mellalieu, & Jones, 2005) so it not unusual for coaches to use these skills as selection cues. 
This may, however, suggest that coaches were adopting a traditional, linear approach to 
coaching where skills are to be mastered and displayed (possibly) in training (Partington & 
Cushion, 2013; Rothwell et al., 2017; Vinson et al., 2016) and are seen as a prerequisite for 
selection (Oorschot et al., 2017), something that has been previously reported (Johansson & 
Fahlén, 2017). Furthermore, in their study, Johansson and Fahlén (2017) found that a mixture 
of past performances and current performances and form created the foundation for coaches’ 
selection decisions. Coaches from the current study reflected this view with regards to game 
performances (both past and current) but also included performances within training as 
selection cues. Interestingly, some coaches spoke about selecting “tried and tested” players. 
These were players who had previously been selected and performed to a satisfactory (or 
“safe”) level. As it has been found that coaches stick to tried and tested coaching methods to 
prove their knowledge and expertise (Harvey, Cushion, & Massa-Gonzalez, 2010), they may 
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also select tried and tested players because their performances will also prove their 
knowledge and expertise of selection (or at least not prove otherwise). Furthermore, 
becoming a tried and tested player may be a step towards being considered one of the best 
players (i.e., the “best player cue”). Players who perform satisfactorily are selected again 
because they are tried and tested, and once this pattern occurs enough times, these players are 
perceived as one of the best players. Further research is needed, however, to substantiate 
these claims. 
It has long been identified that someone’s behaviour can influence how others judge 
or make decisions on them (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The results from the current study 
suggest that coaches are also affected by how their players behave and, more specifically, 
communicate. It has been previously reported that behaviour is an important consideration in 
coaches’ selection decisions, even trumping other selection cues relating to skills or previous 
performances (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Whilst the effects of a coach’s behaviour on 
athletes (e.g., Wu, Lai, & Chan, 2014) and athlete behaviour on coaches (e.g., Fiander, Jones, 
& Parker, 2018) are well known, there is very limited research (to the author’s knowledge) on 
how athlete behaviour can impact a coach’s decisions on that same athlete. The current study 
therefore adds to the extant literature by indicating that behaviour is an important and 
deliberate cue used in selection decisions. Coaches, however, did fail to predict upfront that 
behaviour would affect their selection decisions (apart from one coach), although they did say 
communication would be (and subsequently it was perceived to be) a selection cue.  
How selection affects a player was also taken into consideration by coaches when 
they were making selection decisions. It is known that players who are not selected can have 
negative experiences (e.g., detraining, stress, and a loss of identity; Caterisano et al., 1997; 
Neely et al., 2017; Woods & Thatcher, 2009), even if they are selected as a substitute (Woods 
& Thatcher, 2009). Whilst there have been calls to investigate whether coaches actually know 
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their behaviour can impact their athletes (Thelwell, Wagstaff, Chapman, & Kenttä, 2017), 
this novel result suggests that (when it comes to team selection at least) coaches do consider 
how their athletes will be affected by their actions. 
Coaches all stated (in post-season interviews) that a player’s availability and injuries 
affected their team selection decisions (during pre-season interviews every coach also 
predicted they would use the availability cue). Operating at the amateur level, these coaches 
had to consider that players, instead of attending games (or training), occasionally had to 
work or study for exams. With regards to injuries, rugby union is a physically demanding 
contact sport and, as such, has a high incidence of injury (Brooks, Fuller, Kemp, & Reddin, 
2005; Hendricks, Sarembock, Jones, Till, & Lambert, 2017; Yeomans et al., 2018). Although 
research surrounding injuries within amateur rugby union is scarce (Swain, Lystad, Pollard, 
& Bonello, 2011; Yeomans et al., 2018), coaches from the current study certainly highlighted 
how important injuries are (with regards to selection), demonstrated by one coach suggesting 
that his team’s season was defined by injuries. 
Coaches described several selection cues that, rather than coming from the players, 
originated from the coaches themselves. The coach-player relationship, for example, was 
described by one coach as having such a big impact on selection that it meant one player did 
not get selected because of it. Coaches do not behave in the same way with all their players 
because of, for example, individual differences in athlete behaviour (Mageau & Vallerand, 
2003). As a result, a player may not get selected simply because the coach does not “get on” 
with them.  
Johansson and Fahlén (2017) reported that football coaches often connected selection 
with their game plan (although there was some ambiguity as to whether the game plan 
dictated who coaches would select or if the abilities of the players informed the game plan). 
Coaches from the current study described selecting players who had specific physical and/or 
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skill characteristics (e.g., speed, size, and technique) to fit the coaches pre-determined game 
plan. This game plan was forged from the coaches’ broader style of rugby they wanted their 
players to play (e.g., fast and energetic or open and flexible) and, for one coach, coaching 
philosophies. As every coach was working within a performance sport environment (i.e., 
contexts where athletes concentrate on competition rather than participation; Lyle, 1999), 
these requirements, game plans, styles of rugby, and philosophies often related to the goal of 
winning. One coach, for example, stated the team must win games so the club would be seen 
as the best in the local area. Success as a coach is often judged by the team’s performance 
and achievements (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003), meaning success equals winning and failure 
equals losing (Cumming, Smoll, Smith, & Grossbard, 2007). Winning is seen differently 
from coaches working within different sporting contexts (Cumming et al., 2007), but at its 
very core, coaching is training people to perform better in their sport (Wu et al., 2014). If, 
however, coaches are focussed on winning they may feel high levels of stress (and lower 
levels of well-being) and begin to exhibit controlling behaviours towards their players 
(Ntoumanis & Mallet, 2014; Stebbings, Taylor, & Spray, 2011; van de Pol, Kavussanu, & 
Ring, 2011). These controlling behaviours can then lead to a number of negative 
consequences for the players (Cheval, Chalabaev, Quested, Courvoisier, & Sarrazin, 2017), 
that may ultimately lead to a drop in player performance and an adverse effect on the goal of 
winning. 
Some coaches stated that they made certain selection decisions because of what the 
players wanted. This demonstrates an understanding of their players’ feelings and intentions 
that can be a key factor in positive relationships (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Losoya & Eisenberg, 
2001). If coaches can accurately infer what their players are thinking and feeling (i.e., 
empathetic accuracy; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990), players are likely to feel 
satisfied (Lorimer & Jowett, 2009b). Coaches, however, were assuming (i.e., assumed 
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similarity; Lorimer & Jowett, 2009a) they understood their players rather than knowing they 
did (i.e., actual similarity; Lorimer & Jowett, 2009a). Further research would be able to 
discover whether coaches are able to accurately understand their players feelings and 
intentions, which would lead to positive relationships. 
Interestingly, one aspect of every coach cue is they can all be considered long-term 
and relatively stable. A coach’s experience, for example, would likely not change hour-by-
hour whereas their emotions can (Abro, Klein, Manzoor, Tabatabaei, & Treur, 2015). 
Coaches in the current study, though, did not say that any dynamic, rapidly changing cues 
(e.g., coaches’ own emotions and stress, or priming, which is when environmental cues 
unconsciously affect subsequent judgments and decisions; Weingarten, Chen, McAdams, Yi, 
Hepler, & Albarracín, 2016) influenced their selection decisions. Therefore, further research 
is needed to examine whether this occurs, especially as previous research on team selection 
(e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) and in other areas (e.g., Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009) 
suggest that these cues would affect coaches’ selection decisions. 
Previous research found that when deciding on a player for selection, coaches will 
take the other players into consideration (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Coaches in the current 
study added to this notion when they described, for example, selecting combinations of 
players (rather than single players), how the selection of a player will affect the other players, 
and who is already selected in positions around the player being decided upon. Coaches also 
used the team as a whole as a selection cue, something not (to the author’s knowledge) 
previously discussed in the literature. The ability of the team, what the team wanted to 
achieve, and the total number of players in the squad, for example, were taken into 
consideration by coaches when making selection decisions.  
For coaches to be recruited to this study, they had to make, or have the final say in, 
team selection decisions. During pre-season interviews, coaches suggested they might take 
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their other coaches’ opinions into consideration when making selection decisions, but 
ultimately, they made the decisions themselves. When discussing who actually made the 
selection decisions in their post-season interviews, however, some coaches stated that it was 
in fact not them who made (some of) the selection decisions. One coach, for example, let his 
forwards coach select the forwards while another allowed his backs coach to select the backs. 
The delegation of decision making can improve teamwork (Flores-Fillol, Iranzo, & Mane, 
2017) and help head coaches cope with coaching stress (Olusoga, Butt, Maynard, & Hays, 
2010). Delegation could also lend support to the notion of coaching as orchestration (Jones & 
Wallace, 2005). Orchestration suggests that coaching is a complex social process that 
requires guiding or steering (Santos, Jones, & Mesquita, 2013). A key finding from a study 
conducted by Santos et al. (2013) on orchestration was that coaches delegate part of the 
coaching process to their assistant coaches to develop control over the selection process (as 
assistants act as surrogates for head coaches). This responsibility, however, was actually an 
illusion of empowerment (Jones & Standage, 2006) as these coaches gave their assistants the 
impression of control (e.g., having one-on-one discussions, handling specific parts of 
training) while making all of the decisions themselves. Rather than making every selection 
decision themselves, some coaches from the current study gave some within their coaching 
team (e.g., forwards and backs coaches) complete autonomy over specific selection decisions 
(e.g., forwards and backs, respectively). Further research is needed, however, because it is not 
clear if coaches were adopting shared leadership practices (Wallace, 2001), which can 
provide several benefits (e.g., providing a fulfilling experience for all), attempting to give 
responsibility to others so blame will not rest with themselves if outcomes are dissatisfactory 
(Steffel, Williams, & Perrmann-Graham, 2016), or simply because they did not have the 
power to make these decisions (Watson & Foster-Fishman, 2013). 
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What type of game is upcoming affected selection decisions, with games typically 
referred to as A games (e.g., league games and cup games) or B games (e.g., friendly). One 
coach stated that you select for the A games and the remaining players are automatically 
selected for the B game (i.e., no selection required for the B game). Coaches tended to select 
the best players for the A games, with a view to win these games, while the B games were a 
chance to rotate and allow other players (those not typically selected for the A games) to 
play. Whilst it is known that there are differences between players selected for A games and 
B games (e.g., body mass, playing experience, skill; Gabbett, 2002), the current results 
suggest that coaches do use different selection cues for different types of games (e.g., ability 
cues for A games and situational cues for B games).  
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), coaches also 
considered who the opposition was when making selection decisions. This finding is 
appropriate when it is considered that the opposing team can have an impact on player 
performances (e.g., Carling, 2011). Coaches also stated that the results from recent games 
(i.e., win or loss) would impact selections. For instance, coaches would be hesitant to change 
winning teams but would make changes in selections if the team lost. This is a selection 
pattern that has been previously reported in rugby union (e.g., Sedeaud et al., 2017). A further 
interesting influence on coaches’ selection decisions were the number of choices available to 
the coach. More specifically, some coaches described instances where they felt they had no 
choice but to select a player because, for example, there were no other players to select. 
Coaches described these decisions as less than ideal but necessary and seemed to base these 
selections on nothing other than “there is no one else.” It was unclear, however, if there was 
in fact only one choice available (i.e., one player, meaning the selection decision is 
automatically made) or if the coaches had already decided that the alternatives were 
unsuitable and were left with one choice (i.e., had made one or more selection decisions 
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which led to an unsatisfactory player being chosen because there were no other players to 
consider). 
Coaches suggested that two environmental cues, the weather and the pitch, would 
affect their upcoming selection decisions. Only one coach, however, stated in his post-season 
interview that his selections were influenced by these cues. Simonsohn (2007) reported that 
university admissions officers weighted academic attributes (e.g., GPA) more heavily on 
cloudier days and non-academic attributes (e.g., leadership) on sunnier days. The current 
study suggests that when making selection decisions coaches are also affected by the weather, 
the difference from the Simonsohn (2007) study being that coaches in the current study 
consciously used weather cues in their selection decisions whereas the university admissions 
officers did not. 
4.4.2: Word frequency analysis. 
The increase in the number of cues from pre-season predictions to post-season 
recollections suggests that coaches were unable to estimate how many cues would inform 
their selection decisions. Coaches were also unable to accurately predict their selection 
decisions as only half of the cues (n=51.64%) coaches predicted they would use for selection 
decisions were also reported in post-season interviews. Furthermore, the number of new cues 
reported in post-season interviews outweighed the number of cues coaches predicted they 
would, and reportedly did, use (148 new cues compared to 110 cues stated in both pre-season 
and post-season interviews). Coaches, it seems, had failed to foresee future events that would 
impact their team selection decisions (Kahneman, 2012). When predicting a future event, 
what makes that prediction “good” is (a) consistency (i.e., correspondence between prediction 
and judgments), (b) quality (i.e., correspondence between prediction and observations), and 
(c) value (i.e., benefits of predictions to others; Murphy, 1993). By these criteria, coaches’ 
predictions on how they will make selection decisions were inconsistent, of low quality, and 
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of little value to, for example, a player wanting to know how their coach will be selecting 
their teams. One reason that coaches failed to make good predictions may relate to the 
projection bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). It suggests that coaches, in 
failing to account for factors such as social influences and changes in the environment, may 
have projected their pre-season (or current) preferences for team selection onto future team 
selection decisions, thus leading to inaccurate predictions. 
Along with the total number of cues increasing, from pre-season to post-season 
interviews, the frequency with which these cues were reported decreased (1087 times to 928) 
while the percentage of cues only one coach described using to make selection decisions 
increased (53.52% to 66.28%). Taken together, these results suggest that, in pre-season 
interviews, coaches demonstrated more similarities on which cues they think they will use to 
make selection decisions than in post-season interviews. Furthermore, during the season 
coaches displayed a pattern of using cues specific to their situations which they did not 
predict pre-season and were not used by any other coach. This again points to a poor ability 
to predict their future decisions (Murphy, 1993) and a possible projection bias (i.e., the 
projection of current preferences on expected future preferences; Loewenstein et al., 2003).  
With regards to the cues that all coaches reported in a consistent manner in their pre-
season interviews, size, ability, general game performance, availability, and opposition were 
reported. With no previous research on rugby union coaches’ selection decisions, it is 
difficult to say why the current coaches all thought they would base their upcoming selection 
decisions on these cues. This is especially true when it is unclear if these coaches received 
any formal education about team selection from the rugby union governing body, the RFU. 
If, however, attention is taken away from academic research and formal education and onto 
the media, there may be a reason. A search of online newspapers reveals several stories about 
why rugby union coaches have selected their players. Within these articles, coaches are 
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quoted as selecting players because of their size (e.g., Jones, 2018), ability (e.g., Williams, 
2018), performances (e.g., Morgan, 2018), availability (e.g., Cantillon, 2018), and the 
opposition (e.g., Keating, 2018). Whilst this is only anecdotal evidence, there is research 
which suggests that the media can influence decision making behaviour (e.g., Robbennolt & 
Studebaker, 2003), including those within sport (e.g., Sanderson, Weathers, Grevious, Tehan, 
& Warren, 2016). This may also explain why in post-season interviews coaches only 
demonstrated similarities on attitude, availability, and injured cues as coaches may have been 
recalling what happened during the season rather than a media narrative of what they should 
be selecting players on. These are, however, claims that require further research investigation. 
Although coaches did not accurately predict which cues they would use in team 
selection decisions, from pre-season to post-season interviews the themes and sub-themes 
largely remained the same (82.76% and 80.43%, respectively). In post-season interviews, for 
example, coaches said they selected players with a “rugby brain” (cue) which came under the 
sub-theme “intelligence.” No coach predicted they would use this cue, but they did predict 
that they would use several other cues that came under the intelligence sub-theme. Coaches, 
therefore, while failing to predict the exact cues they would use to select players on, were 
relatively accurate in a broader sense (i.e., the themes and sub-themes). Put another way, 
coaches roughly knew why they would make their selection decisions, but not exactly. This 
reflects an observation made by Jones (2009) that coaches may not be able to find the 
relevant language to adequately convey what they know. Coaches in the current study, 
however, stated that they were confident that they communicated the cues they both would 
use, and perceived they did use, to make selection decisions (although this is an area that 





4.4.3: Strengths and limitations. 
This study offers a number of novel, significant, and interesting results that have yet 
to be discussed in the existing literature. As discovered in Chapter 2 (see 2.5: Conclusion, p. 
35), only one study (i.e., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) has previously reported on coaches’ 
team selection decisions, but that study’s purpose, however, was not to explicitly examine 
these crucial decisions. Readers are, therefore, offered an insight into both the large number 
and variety of cues coaches claim to use to make team selection decisions and how these 
change between pre-season predictions to post-season recollections.  
The design of this study was innovative in that coaches were interviewed at two time 
points, namely pre-season and post-season. This longitudinal, season-long study design is 
rare within qualitative sport research (Petrovic, Koprivica, & Bokan, 2017) and is crucial for 
the development of theoretical explanations of phenomenon (Cresswell & Eklund, 2007). 
This study was an exploration that aimed to provide an intimate first-hand understanding of 
team selection decisions that others can attempt to verify and expand with further research 
(Given, 2008). In such studies, smaller sample sizes are appropriate because they can offer a 
deep understanding of a previously unexplored phenomenon (Boddy, 2016). Furthermore, the 
total number of participants included in this study was at an acceptable level if participants 
were interviewed multiple times (Morse, 2000) as data saturation (i.e., no new trends or 
themes are elicited by new participants, meaning a thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon under study is achieved and data collection is ended; Kuper, Lingard & 
Levinson, 2008) can become evident at six interviews (Boddy, 2016). 
It is also important to consider the limitations. When coaches explained the 
information they would use, and reported using, in selection decisions, along with issues 
pertaining to interviewing people (e.g., memory decay over time, misinterpretation of 
constructs; Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984; Harris & Brown, 2010) they may 
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have described both cues and inferences based on cues (i.e., a conclusion based on cues; e.g., 
Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008). Training attendance, for example, was a cue coaches 
predicted and reported using in selection decisions. This is a binary cue which indicates the 
presence or absence of an attribute (did the player attend training?) relevant to the task (team 
selection; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006). On the other hand, in their post-season interviews, two 
coaches claimed they selected players because of the effort they put in during training. When 
it is considered that the definition of a cue (as adopted in this thesis) is a single piece of 
information (Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et 
al., 2013), it can be said that “effort in training” is not a single cue (although coaches seemed 
to treat it as a single cue). Instead, this could be an example of an inference. The cues that led 
to this inference are, however, unclear. Among the cues reported, therefore, several may in 
fact be inferences. Some coaches, though, did make the distinction between cues and 
inferences. One coach, for example, stated he selected players who were good 
communicators, an inference based on whether they communicated with the other players in 
training and games and communicated with the coach (cues).  
Regarding the information cues provide, coaches in the pre-season interviews 
indicated they would use cues to make selection decisions that were similar (in terms of 
description) to, for instance, the “rugby brain” cue. The “knowledge of tackling” cue, which 
was predicted in pre-season interviews, could conceivably contribute to the rugby brain cue 
(described in post-season interviews). Coaches, therefore, may have mistakenly described 
two different selection cues when the information these cues offered was, in fact, the same 
(i.e., cue redundancy; Karelaia, 2006). 
Given the author’s experience and knowledge of rugby union, it could conceivably be 
both a strength and a limitation of this study. Whilst this experience and knowledge 
contributed to building rapport with the coaches (Berg, 2007) and allowed for detailed, 
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informed follow-up questions during the interviews (Sparkes & Smith, 2014), the author 
could have made assumptions during the research process (e.g., data analysis) based on his 
background. Although the author attempted to maintain a subjective self-awareness of his 
potential biases (Readdy et al., 2016), given that qualitative researchers adhering to 
constructivism position themselves within their research (Petrovic et al., 2017) it is possible 
the author’s experience and knowledge of rugby union did unknowingly alter the research 
process. 
4.4.4: Future directions for research. 
Researchers are provided with a unique insight into a key element of coaching 
practice, coaches’ team selection decisions. Specifically, this study demonstrated not only the 
large number of cues used to make team selection decisions, but also the variety of cues 
drawn upon by coaches working with the performance sport environment. Whilst several 
recommendations for future research have been outlined above (see 4.4: Discussion, p. 85), 
described below are some key areas. Given the exploratory nature of this study, however, 
researchers are encouraged to continue to examine the cues used in team selection decisions. 
The reason for this is to both verify was has been reported in the current study and to identify 
which cues are universal and which are unique to coaches working within specific contexts. 
Coaches from the current study, for example, were all from different teams working with 
players at different levels and ages. As a result, the question of whether coaches working with 
one team would also consider the number and variety of cues reported here is necessary to 
answer.  
 As coaches seemed to select some players based on the “best player cue,” further 
research is needed to determine if this is treated as a single cue by coaches or an inference 
mistaken as a single piece of information. Furthermore, understanding how a player becomes 
to be known as one of the best is vital for researchers and those involved in, for example, 
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talent identification and development. One result from the current study that may contribute 
to a player being thought of as the best is the notion of “tried and tested” players (i.e., players 
the coach previously selected and who performed to an acceptable level). Researching the 
means by which other people (e.g., parents, sponsors, media) might influence coaches’ 
decision-making behaviour (e.g., Robbennolt & Studebaker, 2003; Sanderson et al., 2016) 
would also be an interesting line of enquiry, as this study offers preliminary evidence that 
coaches’ decisions may be influenced by these sources. 
4.5: Conclusion 
The aims of this study were to investigate which cues coaches use to make team 
selection decisions and whether the cues coaches claimed they would use (in pre-season 
interviews) were different to the cues they reported using (in post-season interviews). Results 
revealed both the large number, and variety, of cues reportedly used by coaches to make 
selection decisions. Whilst coaches reported mostly relying on player cues, they also used 
coach cues, cues from other sources, situational cues, and environmental cues. Coaches were 
also unable to fully predict which cues they would use to select their teams as only half of 
predicted cues were also reported in post-season interviews. Furthermore, from pre-season to 
post-season interviews, the frequency with which cues were stated decreased while the 
percentages of cues only one coach stated increased. This pattern suggests that coaches were 
using cues specific to their situation which they did not predict and were not used by any 
other coach. In defence of the coaches, however, it could be argued that because they work 
with different players, they would draw upon different selection cues. If we were to look at 
coaches working together to coach (and make selection decisions on) one team, would the 
same individualistic results occur?  
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Chapter 5: “The Best or the Rest”: A Case Study of a Rugby Union Coaching Team’s 
Team Selection Decisions 
5.1: Introduction 
Rugby union coaches working within the performance sport environment (i.e., 
contexts where athletes concentrate on competition rather than participation; Lyle, 1999) 
claim to use a large number and wide variety of cues (i.e., a single piece of information 
within an environment that holds meaning and is used to form a judgment; Cooksey, 1996; 
Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013) when making team 
selection decisions. These include player cues (e.g., ability, performance), coach cues (e.g., 
styles of rugby, winning mentality), cues from other sources (e.g., other players, other 
coaches), situational cues (e.g., upcoming game, opposition), and environmental cues (e.g., 
weather, pitch; see 4.3: Results, p. 57). It is not clear, however, if coaches working within the 
same coaching team draw upon the same cues (or the large number of cues) previously 
reported. Additionally, although it is accepted that team selection is a complex multi-criteria 
problem in which coaches are required to consider a large amount of information (Tavana et 
al., 2013), the processes coaches go through when making team selection decisions is poorly 
understood (Bradbury & Forsyth, 2012). Furthermore, as rugby union teams tend to have 
several coaches all contributing to team selection decisions, with the head coach (usually) 
making the final decisions (Calder & Durbach, 2015; Lemyre et al., 2007), the coaching team 
should be taken into consideration when studying team selection decisions. The primary aims 
of this study, therefore, are to (a) examine which (and how many) cues rugby union coaches, 
working within the same coaching team, use to make team selection decisions, (b) discover 
the processes coaches go through when making team selection decisions, and (c) investigate 
if the relationships among the coaching team impact team selection decisions. 
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Additionally, head coaches are (usually) responsible for making team selection 
decisions, along with the help of their coaching team (Calder & Durbach, 2015; Lemyre et 
al., 2007). It is of vital importance, therefore, that how and why head coaches make team 
selection decisions is understood. Furthermore, as there has been a low correlation reported 
between coaches self-reported and observed behaviour (Curtis et al., 1979), it is essential that 
head coaches are observed when making selection decisions so as not to rely on self-reported 
data, which can be problematic (Bernard et al., 1984; Harris & Brown, 2010). Also, training 
is a crucial environment in which coaches communicate their knowledge, experience, and 
expertise to athletes (Antonini Philippe & Seiler, 2006; Lorimer & Jowett, 2009a; Sagar & 
Jowett, 2012). A consequence of this is coaches can impact (among other aspects) how well a 
player performs (Kassing & Anderson, 2014) which could give that player a better chance of 
being selected (given that most of selection is based on performance cues; see 4.3.1.1.4: 
Performance cues, p. 62). As such, exploring how coaches spend their time during training is 
vital. The secondary aims of this study are, therefore, to (d) compare and examine the 
differences (if any) in the selection cues the head coach stated in his (post-season) interview 
with those he discussed during training and (e) investigate how the head coach spends his 
time during training. 
5.2: Method 
The current study adopted an exploratory case study approach with a single-case, 
embedded (i.e., multiple units of analysis) design. Yin (2014) suggested an exploratory case 
study is appropriate when “how” or “why” questions, with no propositions (i.e., no theory 
development prior to data collection), are being asked about a real-life, contemporary 
bounded system (bounded by time and place; Creswell, 2013) where the researcher has little 
or no control over relevant participant behaviours. As previously outlined (see 4.2.4: 
Researcher subjectivities, p. 55), it should be noted that the author adheres to the beliefs of 
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constructivism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Hansen, 2004; Ponterotto, 2005; Schwandt, 1994, 
2000; Sciarra, 1999) and has played and coached rugby union for over 15 years. 
5.2.1: The case. 
The case in the current study was a coaching team made up of five rugby union 
coaches who were all coaching the same rugby union colts team (i.e., both under-17s and 
under-18s) over one season (i.e., October to May) in a performance sport environment (i.e., 
contexts where athletes concentrate on competition rather than participation; Lyle, 1999). 
Though not formally split into two teams, as demonstrated by all players training together 
every Thursday evening, an A team (typically higher ability) and B team (typically lower 
ability) were selected for each game weekend. Games were either friendlies (i.e., non-
competitive games against any team), league games (i.e., competitive games against teams in 
the same league), or cup games (i.e., competitive games against teams, for example, in the 
same region). Coaches classified themselves as: (a) the head coach; (b) the assistant coach; 
(c) the forwards coach; (d) the backs coach; and (e) the periphery coach (see Figure 4). It is 
typical to have several coaches within one rugby union team all contributing to team selection 
with one coach (usually the head coach) making the final selection decisions (Calder & 
Durbach, 2015; Lemyre et al., 2007). All coaches were male, White, held a minimum Level 
Two RFU coaching qualification, and had experience playing rugby union. The information 





Figure 4. The hierarchy of the coaching team (as stated by the coaches). The dashed lines 
represent all coaching relationships while the solid lines represent long-term relationships 
between coaches. 
5.2.1.1: The head coach. 
At 36 years old, the head coach was the youngest member of the coaching team. He 
had been involved with the club for 15 years both as a player and a coach, though at the time 
he only occasionally played. He had instead been focusing on coaching the colts, something 
he had been doing for five years. As head coach, he knew that while the other coaches may 
offer their input on selection, at the end of the day he made the final selection decisions. For 
eight of his 11 years in coaching, he had been coaching alongside the assistant coach. He 
believes the length of this relationship is the reason why they were both in tune with their 
selection decisions. He had coached the under-18s for one season (as under-17s) but this 
season was the first time he coached the under-17s (as they were under-16s the previous 
season). 
5.2.1.2: The assistant coach. 
The assistant coach (who was 54 years old) had been coaching for a total of 10 years. 
At the time, he was coaching both the colts and the men’s senior second team. He had also 
been coaching together with the head coach for eight of these years (in the colts) and claimed 
that if he and the head coach were to select any side over the past eight years, they would 






only be one player out with each other. Like the head coach, he had coached the under-18s in 
the previous season and coached the under-17s for the first time this season. 
5.2.1.3: The forwards coach. 
The forwards coach described himself as a “clubman.” He was 56 years old and had 
played or coached at the club for 40 years, starting as a young player who eventually played 
for the first team, became club captain, and then went into coaching. He coached both the 
colts and the men’s senior first team. With 25 years’ coaching experience, he was also the 
most experienced in the coaching team. Unlike the head coach and assistant coach, the 
forwards coach had been coaching the under-18s for the past 12 years (although he too 
coached the under-17s for the first time this season). Like the head coach and assistant coach, 
however, he had a long coaching relationship with the backs coach. Both had been coaching 
the under-18s for 12 years because they each had a son in this group of players. 
5.2.1.4: The backs coach. 
As mentioned above, the backs coach (who was 48 years old) had been coaching the 
under-18s for 12 years (his total coaching experience) with the forwards coach. This is 
because he had a son in this group of players, who was also the captain of the A team. He 
also coached the under-17s for the first time this season. 
5.2.1.5: The periphery coach. 
The periphery coach (who was 49 years old) was the least involved in the coaching 
team. Although he had been coaching at the club (and in total) for 19 years, he took a step 
back this year to concentrate on different roles he had at the club. By taking a step back 
though, he felt like he had more of an objective view on how the coaching team operated and 
the players’ attitudes towards selection decisions. He had also followed the under-17s, as well 




5.2.2: Data collection. 
Central to any case study is the collection of in-depth information from a variety 
sources (e.g., direct observations, interviews, documents, and reports; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 
2014). In the current study, data collected were semi-structured interviews with all five 
coaches and direct visual and audio observations of the head coach. As the head coach stated 
that he made the final selection decisions (and for practicality reasons), visual and audio 
observation data collection methods were only focussed on the head coach. Although 
conversations the head coach had with the coaching team, players, and parents were captured 
in the observations, only data obtained from the head coach and the coaching team were 
analysed. Data obtained from players or parents were removed. 
5.2.2.1: Semi-structured interviews. 
One of the most common and important sources of case study evidence (Yin, 2014) 
are semi-structured interviews (Weiss, 1994) which were used to facilitate the gathering of 
rich and insightful data (Bryman, 2001; Carson et al., 2005). An interview guide was 
compiled by reading relevant decision-making literature (e.g., the framing of information as 
either positive or negative; Johnson-Laird, 1983) and previous research related to team 
selection decisions (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008). The interview guide (see Appendix B) was 
used to provide a guiding framework, but coaches could move the interview in the direction 
they chose (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The interviews were all conducted by the author and 
began with topical, introductory questions intended to build rapport and to encourage 
participants to begin talking (e.g., “How did your season go?”). The main questions followed 
which allowed participants to explore and discuss what information they used to select teams 
(e.g., “Describe how you selected your team”). Participants were then invited to add anything 
missed during the interview (e.g., “Is there anything else that you would like to discuss?"). 
Probes were also used throughout each interview to allow coaches to expand upon and clarify 
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their responses (Patton, 2002). It is worth noting the head coach also participated in the 
previous study (Chapter 4), meaning his interview data is included in both the post-season 
interviews from Chapter 4 as well as the current Chapter. For an example transcript, see 
Appendix E. 
5.2.2.2: Direct observations (visual and audio). 
Direct observation is a key tool for collecting data in qualitative research (Creswell, 
2013) and, given that a case study should take place in real-world settings, allows researchers 
to observe participants in the relevant social or environmental conditions (Yin, 2014). 
Furthermore, direct observations can confirm or challenge self-reported interview data 
(Green & Thorogood, 2009; Stuckey et al., 2014). Given the potential limitations of relying 
on self-reported behaviours (e.g., memory decay over time, misinterpretation of constructs; 
Bernard et al., 1984; Harris & Brown, 2010; see 4.4.3: Strengths and limitations, p. 100), 
direct observations can provide additional information that is not subject to these issues 
(Henry & Eggly, 2012). Direct visual and audio observation data were collected over five 
training sessions across a season (data were collected from five training sessions as the 
researcher could only access five training sessions). 
5.2.3: Procedure.  
Following ethical approval from the Ethics Committee in the Department of 
Psychology at Middlesex University, participants were approached in person by the author 
and invited to take part in the study. 
5.2.3.1: Semi-structured interviews. 
Participants were informed of the aims of the interview and what would be required 
should they agree to take part. Interviews were then organised at a variety of locations (e.g., 
rugby union club or participants’ houses) for days and times that suited the participants. 
Before the interviews began, participants were advised of the interview procedure, its 
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relevance to the study, ethical procedures (e.g., confidentiality and anonymity), and the 
process of withdrawal. Once participants had any questions answered and were aware of the 
implications of involvement in the study, informed consent was obtained. Each interview 
lasted between 63 and 82 minutes (M=72.27, SD=7.63) and was digitally recorded and 
transcribed verbatim once completed. 
5.2.3.2: Direct observations. 
The head coach was filmed (by the author) using a video camera (Nikon D7000) that 
was mounted onto a tripod with a proficient zoom. Upon arrival at the rugby club, the video 
camera was placed in a position where the head coach could be clearly seen. Filming started 
when the training session began and stopped when the training session ended. A microphone 
with a digital voice recorder (Olympus WS-450S) was also attached to the head coach five 
minutes before the training session began and removed five minutes after the training session 
had finished. Training sessions lasted between 54 and 84 minutes (M=72.79, SD=11.07) and 
the author subsequently synchronized the video and audio recordings and transcribed each 
training session verbatim. 
5.2.4: Data analysis. 
5.2.4.1: Semi-structured interviews. 
Data collected from the semi-structured interviews were subjected to a thematic 
analytic process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). The steps were: (a) familiarising 
yourself with your data; (b) generating initial codes; (c) searching for themes; (d) reviewing 
themes; (e) defining and naming themes; and (f) producing the report. Similar to the previous 
Chapter (see 4.2.5: Data analysis, p. 55), this process began with the author reading all 
transcripts on several occasions to familiarise himself with the data whilst also writing notes 
in the margins so he could begin to comprehend passages and start to generate initial codes. 
After a period of critically reviewing proposed themes (by engaging with supervisors as 
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“critical friends”; Smith & McGannon, 2017), this process culminated with the final themes. 
These steps allowed for the identification, analysis, and reporting of patterns (or themes) 
within data. Themes were identified using an inductive approach (i.e., themes identified were 
strongly linked to the data; Patton, 2002). Researchers in sports coaching (e.g., Donoso-
Morales et al., 2017; Readdy et al., 2016) and psychology (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Roulston, 2001) have frequently utilised thematic analysis as a qualitative analytic 
method (for example raw data and coding see Appendix F). It is worth noting that data were 
originally collected for the purpose of examining the cues coaches used to make team 
selection decisions and, as such, the interview guide was designed for this aim (see Appendix 
B). During analysis, however, the data depicted information regarding the selection processes 
coaches go through when making selection decisions and how the relationships among the 
coaching team impacted their selection decisions. 
A word frequency analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) was 
also performed to investigate the level of similarity among the coaching team. To perform the 
analysis, the cues described by coaches in the interviews were the “words” used to calculate 
the total frequencies across all interviews. Additionally, the extensiveness (Krueger et al., 
2001) of the coaches’ responses (i.e., how many coaches contributed to each cue) was also 
analysed to provide insight into how important coaches felt each category was. 
5.2.4.2: Direct observations. 
Observational data collected from the head coach talking to himself, other coaches, 
players, and parents, across five training sessions, were subjected to the same analytic process 
as the data collected from the semi-structured interviews (i.e., thematic analysis; Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Only data relating to team selection and related concepts (e.g., player 
evaluations) were analysed. Data not analysed included, for example, discussions about the 
coaches’ personal lives. Similar to the analysis of the interview data, a word frequency 
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analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) was performed to examine 
whether the information the head coach claimed he used to make selection decisions in his 
(post-season) interview was different from what he said in training sessions (during the 
season).  
Data were also analysed to calculate the frequencies and types of verbal 
communication between the head coach and the other coaches, players, and parents and how 
the head coach spent his time during training (i.e., descriptive statistics; LeCouteur & Feo, 
2011). Verbal communication was coded as actions that emerged from data analysis (i.e., an 
inductive approach). The categories demonstrated: (1) the total time spent by the head coach 
during training sessions, (2) the average time spent on each action, and (3) the average length 
of each action interaction. As the data collected during observations focused on the head 
coach (the microphone was attached to the head coach’s jacket), only data from the head 
coach were used in the word frequency analysis and descriptive statistics. 
5.3: Results 
5.3.1: Semi-structured interviews. 
Presented below are the results from the interviews with all five coaches within the 
coaching team (for the full list of cues, see Tables 24 to 35). These results represent the cues 
coaches reportedly used to make selection decisions (i.e., player cues, coach cues, cues from 
other sources, and situational cues), the selection processes undertaken by coaches (i.e., 
upcoming game, discussions among coaches, un/important game, selection decision, post-
selection discussions among coaches and players, and team announcement), and the power 
relationships among coaches that affected selection decisions (all these categories emerged 
from the data). Regarding the cues coaches reportedly used to make selection decisions, the 
player cues were cues related to the players themselves (e.g., the players’ ability, 
performances, and personal situations). Coach cues are cues derived from the coaches 
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themselves internally (e.g., a coach’s behaviours, communication, and previous selection 
decisions) rather than from any external stimuli. Cues from other sources are cues gathered 
from external stimuli that are not the players that the selection decisions are being made on 
(e.g., other players, coaches and teams). Cues that related to the situation coaches found 
themselves in (e.g., an upcoming game, winning the league, and no choices) that were not 
related to any immediate external or internal stimuli (and were intangible) made up the 
situational cues category. 
5.3.1.1: Cues. 
Presented below are the cues (i.e., player cues, coach cues, cues from other sources, 
and situational cues) coaches reportedly used to make team selection decisions, aim (a) of 
this study (i.e., examine which [and how many] cues rugby union coaches, working within 
the same coaching team, use to make team selection decisions). 
5.3.1.1.1: Player cues. 
5.3.1.1.1.1: Appearance cues. 
Most of the coaches reportedly used a player’s size as a selection cue when making 
selection decisions. The periphery coach even thought that other selection cues were being 
overlooked for size cues, “Players with the better skill set will be overlooked in preference to 
players who have a bigger size.” The periphery coach also stated that smaller players would 
miss out on selection. Furthermore, the head coach stated that he did not select a player 
because of his first impression of that player’s size. There were some games that coaches 
selected players of a certain age (e.g., under-17s cup). Additionally, for the important games, 
coaches would select the under-18 players. According to the backs coach “…there’s an 
under-18s team that would be the A team.” The periphery coach thought this happened 
because of the relationship between the forwards coach and backs coach and the under-18 
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players. The head coach remembered a time where the other coaches reacted negatively to 
him dropping an under-18s player, “Everyone’s like ‘whoa, but that lads under-18!’”. 
Table 24 
Number of coaches who stated appearance cues included in the player cues category 
Appearance cues Number of coaches 
  
Physical appearance  
Size 4 
How they look 1 
Age  
Under 18 4 
Under 17 2 
 
5.3.1.1.1.2: Psychological cues. 
Three coaches reported to use a player’s attitude during selection decisions. More 
specifically, coaches claimed to use a player’s attitude towards the coach, selection, fitness, 
the game, in training and their team ethic to make selection decisions. The assistant coach 
remembered a player being dropped for having a poor attitude. Two coaches stated that the 
intelligence of players influenced selection decisions, with the periphery coach saying that 
“…slow learners” were usually not selected. The assistant coach said he would look for a 
player’s confidence and coachability (i.e., a players’ perceived ability to be coached) when 
making selection decisions. Coaches also claimed to use a player’s character when selecting 
players. If, for example, a player was thought of as tough, uncompromising, calm, aggressive, 






Number of coaches who stated psychological cues included in the player cues category 
Psychological cues Number of coaches 
  
Attitude  
Team ethic 1 
Attitude towards selection 1 
Attitude towards coach 1 
Attitude  2 
Attitude to fitness 1 
Attitude to the game 1 
Attitude in training 1 
Intelligence   
Rugby brain 1 
Game sense 1 
Knows the moves 1 
Slow learners 1 
Confidence   
Confidence 1 
Character   








Coaching ability 1 
 
5.3.1.1.1.3: Ability cues. 
For the important games, coaches would select their best players, or the players 
labelled as star players, to put out the strongest team, the periphery coach recalled that 
“…individual players who are labelled the star players [would be selected].” Coaches, for 
example, would select the strongest (in terms of perceived ability) forwards while the best 
backs “…selected themselves” (again, because of their perceived ability). The head coach 
remembered one player being selected for having the reputation of being one of the best 
players, “He was living on reputation.” Players may have been classified as one of the best 
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for their perceived ability. By contrast, some players were considered backup players who 
were only selected when the best players were not available. 
Table 26 
Number of coaches who stated ability cues included in the player cues category 
Ability cues Number of coaches 
  
Ability  
Strongest team 4 
Best player 5 
Very good 3 
Backs picked themselves 1 
Reputation 1 
Best pack 1 
Ability 2 
Back up  
Back up 1 
 
5.3.1.1.1.4: Performance cues. 
The head coach and backs coach reported to select wingers on their speed. The head 
coach also selected fast flankers, “We would wanna go a certain way with having two fast 6 
and 7s.” Rather than speed, the backs coach stated that selection for some players would be 
based on footwork while the forwards coach based some of his selections on strength. 
Coaches reported using several general rugby skills to help make selection decisions, 
including: handling, passing, ball carrying, running and running lines, defence, and tackling 
power. Coaches also reported using position specific skills that related to the positions each 
player could play. The forwards coach, for example, selected a fly-half who controlled the 
game and was a kicker. The assistant coach selected a scrum-half who took the ball into 
contact and an inside centre who could tackle. A player was selected if they were considered 
a blindside flanker who could jackal (i.e., the winning of the ball, by the defender's team, 
after a tackle and before a ruck has formed) and cover the blind side (i.e., the side of the 
scrum, ruck, or maul closest to the touchline). The assistant coach said he selected front row 
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players who could scrum. The forwards coach stated a hooker was never dropped because of 
his ability in the scrum, along with his ability in the line-out, while a different player was 
selected for his mauling. Rather than position specific skills, some players were selected 
because they could play more than one position, although the backs coach did say he selected 
specialist players. 
Coaches’ observations of players in training would influence their selection decisions, 
the backs coach explained “It was probably a gut feel on a couple of things we saw in 
training.” The head coach was more specific and said he selected players based on the effort 
they put in during training, their tackle rate, and (along with the backs coach) their general 
performance. 
Most coaches reported using the objective performance statistics (that were available 
to them) to select players, the head coach recalled saying “We gotta re-look at [selection] and 
just do it on game stats.” This information was also used to confirm selection decisions and to 
make sure a selection was correct, as the assistant coach suggested “[our selection] was 
correct based on [the] stats.” The head coach even stated that he became reliant on this 
information, although he did admit to only using the objective performance statistics three of 
four times throughout the season. The specific performance statistics coaches reported 
utilising were the number of carries, tackles made, missed tackles, and passes. The head 
coach recalled selecting one player over another because of the number of carries reported, 
“Although [player name] was a better scrummager, [player name] would carry more.” There 
were, however, disagreements between the head coach and backs coach as to what was an 
acceptable number of tackles made and missed. The backs coach thought a 50% success rate 
(i.e., half of attempted tackle were made, the other half were missed) was acceptable whereas 
the head coach indicated that it was unacceptable. The objective performance statistics were 
also used by the head coach to infer game performances. According to the head coach, if a 
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winger had a low number of carries then it was determined that he did not do much in the 
game while a forward’s low passing count suggested he took the ball into contact too much. 
To make selection decisions, the head coach also reported that he drew upon how many tries 
a player scored and how long players were on the pitch for, objective performance cues not 
provided by the objective performance statistics. 
As well as the performance information gathered from the objective performance 
statistics, every coach also reported using what they saw in games to make selection 
decisions. In general, players who performed well were likely to be selected again while 
those who did not perform well were not selected, as explained by the head coach “I dropped 
[player name] once because he wasn’t producing.” The periphery coach said coaches were 
only evaluating one performance, although the backs coach suggested this may have only 
occurred in situations where the coaches were not sure about selecting a player in the first 
place, “Unless it was someone where…you…weren’t sure about putting them in in the first 
place and then they don’t deliver.” More often, though, these decisions were made after more 
than one performance, as the head coach recalled “There was a couple of games he was 
awful, I had to drop him.” What also impacted selection decisions was how the player reacted 
after a poor performance, with one player being dropped because he did not react in a way the 
coaches wanted him to. A player was thought to have performed poorly if they did not put in 
much effort during a game, defended poorly, did not make their usual runs, was on the edge 
of a ruck too often, or did not contribute in open play. 
At times, some coaches reportedly relied on historical game performances when 
making selection decisions. The backs coach, for example, described selecting a player 
because he had seen him play before. The head coach even remembered seeing a player play 
as far back as the previous year, “He played in the under-17s cup last year when he was a 16 
and we, me and [assistant coach name] and [forwards coach name] were like ‘fuck, he’s the 
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nuts’”. Although the information coaches drew upon did not always go in the players favour, 
as the forwards coach argued for a player not to be selected because of the number of yellow 
cards he had received in previous games. This was a decision that the assistant coach 
remembered, “I think he’s had the most yellow cards out of all of them, so that went against 
him.” This is also an example of what the backs coach described as a “cumulative effect” 
(i.e., selection cues over several weeks, rather than at one point, affecting selection decisions) 
with regards to selection decisions. 
The assistant coach and forwards coach stated that some players were selected 
because of “merit,” which tended to be improvements in performance made by the player. 
Furthermore, players were known to have a certain style of rugby which coaches claimed to 
use as selection cues. Some players, for example, were selected because they were considered 






Number of coaches who stated performance cues included in the player cues category 
Performance cues Number of 
coaches 
 Performance cues  Number of 
coaches 
      
Gross motor skills   Objective game performance   
Speed 2  Performance statistics  4 
Footwork 1  Carries  2 
Strong 1  Tackles  3 
General rugby skills   Missed tackles  1 
Handling  2  Passes  1 
Tackling power 2  Tries  1 
Run 3  Time played  1 
Ball carrier 2  Game performance   
Basic skills 2  Defensive performance   2 
Skills 3  Effort in games  2 
Running lines 2  General game performance   5 
Runs hard 1  No bullocking runs  1 
Passing 2  Edge of a ruck  1 
Ball player 1  Game   3 
Defensive ability 1  No contributions in open play  1 
Position specific skills   Pre-season friendlies  1 
Position 2  Historical game performance   
6 2  Yellow cards  2 
Controls the game 1  Historical game performance  3 
Covering blind side 1  Cumulative effect  1 
Over the ball 2  Merit   
Kicking 1  Merit  2 
Line out 3  Improved  2 
Mauler  1  Player’s style of rugby   
Tap and go 1  Enforcer  2 
Scrum  2  Footballer   1 
Tackle ability 1  Tackler  1 
Training performance      
Training 3     
Effort in training 1     
Tackles in training 1     
General training performance 2     
 
5.3.1.1.1.5: Behaviour cues. 
A player’s behaviour influenced whether they were selected. More specifically, how 
players behaved in training, including whether they helped other players and listened to the 
coaches, contributed to their selection. Furthermore, the assistant coach and backs coach 
wanted players to communicate with them and reportedly did not select those players who did 
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not. The backs coach also suggested that how a player communicated with him affected his 
selection decisions. 
If someone, everything you tell them they just look and go “well you old fart you 
have no idea what you’re talking about” then you probably think also “well hold on, 
when it comes down to a decision when you’re quite similar, who am I gunna pick?” 
On one occasion, a player not being selected was the result of his communication with 
the backs coach, “A kid came up and said, ‘look I’m not prepared to go and travel an hour 
and a half and not get a guaranteed 20 minutes’”. The forwards coach also placed importance 
on communication in games when it came to selection decisions, remembering one player 
being selected because he was a better talker than other players. 
Table 28 
Number of coaches who stated behaviour cues included in the player cues category 
Behaviour cues Number of coaches 
  
Behaviour  
General behaviour 2 
Behaviour in training  
Helping others out 1 
Behaviour in training 3 
Communication  
Haven’t told us 1 
Backs coach-player communication 1 
Player doesn’t want to play 1 
Have told us 1 
Listening in training  
Listening in training 3 
Communication in games  
Communication in games 1 
 
5.3.1.1.1.6: Personal cues. 
The head coach and the backs coach both claimed that the school a player attended 
influenced their selection decisions because, for example, they were unavailable or the school 





Number of coaches who stated personal cues included in the player cues category 





5.3.1.1.1.7: Situational cues. 
A player’s availability (made up of three cues: fit, injured, and availability) was 
considered by every coach during selection decisions. The periphery coach stated that if some 
players were simply available they would be selected, suggesting this is a crucial selection 
cue. Training attendance was also a selection cue reportedly used by coaches, with players 
being rewarded with selection for attending training. According to the forwards coach, if a 
player was continually late for training then it was taken into consideration when making 
selection decisions (although it is unclear what the effect was). Both the head coach and the 
backs coach said the number of games a player had played influenced their selection 
decisions. The backs coach also remembered selecting a player because he had previously 
played in a position before, while the forwards coach recalled a player being selected because 












Number of coaches who stated situational cues included in the player cues category 
Situational cues Number of coaches 
  
Availability  
Fit  2 
Injured 4 
Availability  4 
Training  
Late for training 1 
Training attendance 3 
Player’s playing history  
Played there before 1 
Number of games played 2 
He’s our 10  
He’s our 10 1 
 
5.3.1.1.2: Coach cues. 
The relationships coaches had with their players, according to the periphery coach, 
influenced their selection decisions. This is a view supported by the backs coach, “There’s a 
bit of history on that [selection].” Coaches also had a style of rugby that they preferred which 
affected their selection decisions, as the backs coach explained “He’s more of a maverick and 
I’m perhaps more of a…you should do what you do.” If a player did not fit in to the coaches’ 
preferred style of rugby, they struggled to be selected. According to the periphery coach “…if 
they don’t fit into a certain style, then it’s gunna be very difficult to break into the team.” 
Coaches also stated what they wanted regarding a player’s characteristics. Coaches, therefore, 
were deciding what they wanted in a player and then selecting players based on their desires 
rather than identifying what qualities the players had and basing their selections on those, as 
alluded to by the forwards coach “I just don’t want two bangers, so I’d rather have a ball 
player that can set up a banger.” The periphery coach built on this notion when he suggested 
that some coaches were selecting based on what they were comfortable with, “[the coaches] 
revert back to perhaps old ways or revert back to a comfort zone, what they’re sure of or what 
they feel safe with.” The head coach recalled a time when he let a player be selected to gather 
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evidence to prove that the player should not have been selected, while the forwards coach 
suggested that a player was not selected simply because “…they really piss you off.” 
During selection discussions, the periphery coach claimed that the coach with the 
loudest voice or who argued the most had the most influence over selection decisions, “The 
person who can be bothered to argue the most can have the most influence on [selection].” 
The backs coach remembered times where he did not push very hard for a player’s selection 
and how doubts over a player’s selection affected their subsequent selection. The periphery 
coach also thought that a lack of knowledge on every player, a winning mentality, and a fear 
of being seen to make mistakes all affected the other coaches’ selection decisions. 
Table 31 
Number of coaches who stated coach cues 
Coach cues Number of coaches 
  
Coach-player relationship  
Coach-player relationship 2 
Desires  
Style of rugby 3 
Coach’s requirements 3 
Evidence gathering  1 
Comfort zone 1 
Piss you off 1 
Behaviour  
Coach doesn’t push 1 
Communication   
Loudest voice 1 
Coach who argues the most 1 
Knowledge  
Coach has no knowledge of players 1 
Goals  
Coach’s winning mentality 1 
Perception of how other coaches judge the coach  
Fear of making a mistake 1 
Previous selection decisions  





5.3.1.1.3: Cues from other sources. 
5.3.1.1.3.1: Other players. 
When making selection decisions, coaches would, at times, use information from the 
other players. The head coach, for example, remembered selecting a player and not selecting 
a different player because of the similarities they had to other players. Coaches also ranked 
players, which influenced their selection decisions, the head coach indicated “Putting people 
into positions as in we know, OK, those four of the back rowers out of that eight are really 
what we think are gunna be in and around our league side.” Furthermore, combining players 
affected team selection decisions according to the backs coach “I think you pick your 9 and 
10 [together].” 
Table 32 
Number of coaches who stated other players cues included in the cues from other sources 
category 
Other players Number of coaches 
  
Comparison to other players  
Same player 1 
Too similar 1 
Ranking  3 
Player combinations  
Combinations  1 
 
5.3.1.1.3.2: Other coaches. 
The head coach stated that the other coaches would give him their input when it came 
to selection, something confirmed by the forwards coach and periphery coach. The backs 
coach did, however, recalled a time when the head coach overruled the other coaches, “[head 
coach name] took some decisions and said ‘no we’re not gunna put the best side out’ even 
though logically you might have done.” The periphery coach, however, suggested that the 
assistant coach and the forwards coach had a lot of influence in selection decisions, “A lot of 
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weight was going on what [forwards coach name] or, maybe [assistant coach name] was 
saying on selection.” With regards to the forwards coach, his weight may have been to push a 
forwards orientated way of playing, according to the periphery coach “[forwards coach name] 
is a forwards orientation…person, has a certain way of playing.” The forwards coach and 
backs coach had relationships with the under-18 players that influenced their selection 
decisions, as the backs coach explained “Where it’s different is [forwards coach name] and I 
know the under-18 group really well, we’ve known them for years and I’m sure we’re 
somewhat swayed by what they did at under-15 and under-16.” The periphery coach stated 
that this was because of a sense of loyalty, “Coaches from the year above were very 
partisan…and loyal to their particular age group.” Furthermore, the head coach remembered 
the forwards coach would champion the under-18 players because of this loyalty, “[forwards 
coach name] would champion him because he was one of his original lads” and “[forwards 
coach name] was still adamant he wanted his guys.” The backs coach, however, suggested 
these selections were based on a gut feel. Although he also recalled a time where he told a 
player their selection was due to himself and the forwards coach simply wanting to select 
him, “‘in the end I just probably wanted to pick you, [forwards coach name] did [too]’”. The 
periphery coach also suggested that some selections were due to two players being related to 
two coaches (the forwards coach and backs coach). 
5.3.1.1.3.3: Other teams. 
The head coach and assistant coach suggested that they made some selection 
decisions because that was what other teams do, when discussing selection cues the assistant 





Number of coaches who stated other sources cues included in the cues from other sources 
category 
Other Sources Number of coaches 
  
Other coach input  
Other coach input 1 
All coach input  
All coach input 2 
Head coach  
Head coach 1 
Assistant coach  
Assistant coach 1 
Forwards coach  
Forwards coach 3 
Forwards coach’s way of playing 1 
Forwards coach-player relationship 3 
Backs coach  
Backs coach 2 
Backs coach-player relationship 3 
Parental relationship  
Parental relationship 1 
Other teams  
Other teams 2 
 
5.3.1.1.4: Situational cues. 
Selection decisions were determined by the upcoming game, in terms of important or 
unimportant games. The important games were the league games and cup games while 
friendlies and B games were deemed unimportant. There was one league game, however, that 
was not important as it was the last game for the under-18 players. The forwards coach 
recalled “The last game of the season we…picked…a team of just 18s, cause it was their last 
game ever as an age group.” Whilst most coaches concentrated on what type of game was 
upcoming, the periphery coach suggested that he focused on who they were playing against. 
There was an occasion where the head coach also focused on the opposition, but it was the 
opposition in a previous game, “The level of opposition we were playing, he should’ve just 
carved it up, but he didn’t.” 
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The backs coach suggested that selection decisions may have been different if the 
team were winning their league. This coach also stated that, at times, there were no choices 
when it came to selection decisions, which was particularly evident when it came to a lack of 
backup players, “We didn’t have an obvious replacement.” Sometimes the rules (e.g., the 
permitted number of substitutes) limited selection decisions. The head coach also recalled 
selecting players with certain physical characteristics because that was what they had always 
selected, “We always used to have a fly boy and a brute force.” 
Table 34 
Number of coaches who stated upcoming games cues included in the situational cues 
category 
Upcoming games Number of coaches 
  
Upcoming game  
Under 18s cup game 3 
Friendly  1 
[Opposition team name] game 3 
Upcoming game 1 
Importance of upcoming game  3 
B game 2 
League game 1 
Under 17s cup game 1 
Upcoming opposition  
Opposition  1 
Level of upcoming opposition 1 
 
Table 35 
Number of coaches who stated situational cues included in the situational cues category 
Situational cues Number of coaches 
  
Winning the league  
Winning the league 1 
No choice  
No back up 1 




We always had 1 
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5.3.1.2: Selection processes. 
Presented below are the results relating to the selection processes undertaken by 
coaches (i.e., upcoming game, discussions among coaches, un/important game, selection 
decision, post-selection discussions among coaches and players, and team announcement), 
aim (b) of this study (i.e., discover the processes coaches go through when making selection 
decisions).  
5.3.1.2.1: Upcoming game. 
The first step in the selection process (see Figure 5), according to the backs coach, 
was to assess what type of game was upcoming. This informed the coaches as to how 
important the game was, which subsequently dictated the quality of the side to be selected 
and which selection process to follow. For games perceived to be important or unimportant, 
coaches adhered to the process outlined in Figure 6 or Figure 7, respectively. Once at the end 
of these processes, coaches would then continue at the “Selection decision(s)” stage in the 




Figure 5. The selection processes. 
5.3.1.2.2: Discussions among coaches. 
Once the type of game was established, and the quality of side to be selected decided 
upon, all five coaches began discussing selection. At this point, the head coach usually 
selected a draft team, as the periphery coach recalled “[head coach name] would make a 
rough call on what he wants where.” Then, at training, every coach would meet so they could 
all voice their opinions. The backs coach felt these face-to-face (or verbal communications) 
discussions were especially important if there were any disagreements in selection.  
I think where there were particular contentions we tried to at least have a...either…be 
there on Thursday to discuss it face-to-face, or if not…there [to] have been at least a 
phone call with someone, least a verbal, not just a written communication…to make 
sure it was all balanced. 
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Whilst these discussions involved every coach, the backs coach indicated that he 
would have more input on the backs selection decisions and less on the forwards selection 
decisions (although he would still offer an opinion). As there were three forwards orientated 
coaches (compared with one backs orientated coach), there would be more arguing about 
selection decisions involving the forwards. Selection was, therefore, made by multiple 
coaches who would negotiate with each other. Whilst the head coach wanted the input from 
all of his coaches, the periphery coach believed these discussions (conducted the way they 
were) caused issues. 
When you don’t have one person making an overall decision, and it becomes more of 
a forum, then you’re down to very much the person with the loudest…voice, will have 
the most influence, or the person who can be bothered to argue the most can have the 
most influence on [selection]. 
5.3.1.2.3: Important games. 
An important game (see Figure 6) was usually a league or cup game. Whilst league 
and cup games were considered A games, however, not all A games were important (for an 
example, see 5.3.1.2.4.2: Special game, p. 136). For the important games the coaches would 
simply select their best available team and, for certain games (e.g., cup games), they “knew” 
who they would select, as the forwards coach explained “Ultimately when it was the 17s cup 
run, or the 18s cup run, we knew who we were picking really.” The selection of these players 
(according to the backs coach) was “obvious” or because (according to the head coach) they 
“selected themselves.” This selection process rarely changed throughout the season, as 
explained by the backs coach “There was probably…one or two changes…from the…best 15 
we would’ve picked at the start of the season to the end of the season.” Most changes in 
selections that did occur (of which there were not many) were due to injuries. The periphery 
coach reflected this view when he suggested that up to seven positions within the team were 
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protected, meaning that certain players would be selected irrespective of most selection cues, 
“That place will be taken, if that player’s available, that player will play, regardless of 
whether that players on form.” Although there were cases where this happened with players 
who played a specific position (e.g., fly half), the backs coach described simply selecting the 
best players. 
I think we would try and put the best back three on the pitch…and then kind of work 
out their positions, rather than say “we’ve got a specialist full back and two wings” 
…or…“inside centre, outside centre” no put the best two guys on the pitch and they 
can work it out themselves. 
5.3.1.2.3.1: Unavailable. 
Although there were not too many instances of injury or unavailability, the coaches 
had to occasionally make selection decisions due to these issues. If this happened with the 
backs, the head coach stated that he knew there was a backup player. In one case, however, 
the head coach remembered telling the backs coach that they needed a fly-half because there 
was no backup, “I said to [backs coach name] ‘we needed a 10’ cause [fly-half’s name] was 
injured or whatever [and] we didn’t have a backup 10.” When this happened, the coaches had 
to identify a replacement player and support them, even if that meant selecting someone in 
the under-16s because they had to select someone, as the backs coach stated “You look at the 
other kids and go ‘well we gotta put one of them in there’”. 
5.3.1.2.3.2: Initial doubt. 
There was one instance during the season where the coaches began to doubt whether a 
player should continue to be selected. The forwards coach remembered that the coaches 
highlighted his poor performances as the reason for this doubt. The coaches then began to 
seek evidence (e.g., objective performance statistics) to confirm their doubt, which justified 
their reservations, so the player was not selected for the next game. 
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5.3.1.2.3.3: Tight call. 
At times during the season, coaches had to decide between two players who were 
perceived to be very similar. At this point, coaches began to seek extra information to help 
make the selection decision. The information sought was usually not rugby specific (although 
the head coach did say he would refer to the objective performance statistics). A player’s 
behaviour in training, for example, influenced the assistant coach’s selection decisions, “If 
there’s a 50-50 chance between A and B, and B’s the one larking about, you have to go with 
A.” Furthermore, whether a player attended training affected who the backs coach selected. 
If there’s two people who are very much similar and the fly half is turning up every 
week and is there on a Thursday…it’s then pretty harsh to say “there’s this kid who’s 
basically the same as you, I don’t think he’s better than you” [but he’s selected]. 
Similarly, if neither player could attend training, the assistant coach would select the 
player who informed the coaches that they could not attend. If, however, the coaches could 
not make the selection decision then both players were selected with a pre-determined plan of 




Figure 6. The selection process for an important game. 
5.3.1.2.4: Unimportant games. 
Unimportant games (see Figure 7) were referred to as B games, which were the 
friendlies or “weaker” (referencing quality of opposition) games. Coaches saw unimportant 
games as an opportunity for everyone to play, as the assistant coach explained “You…have a 
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B fixture, where you try and get rugby for all.” Selection for these games was based on 
availability, with a focus on players who have not played recently. The head coach even 
recalled sending a message to every player stating this to be the case, “We’d send all the 
[players a message] and say ‘right, who’s available? Preference will be going to the guys that 
didn’t play or were on the bench [last week]’”. The backs coach also claimed they would 
select a team with more players than normal to give everyone some game time. 
5.3.1.2.4.1: Pre-selection discussions among coaches and “A” player(s). 
The only example of coaches talking to A players as part of the selection process is 
when the head coach needed to select an A player for a B game, “sometimes I’d have to say 
to [player name] “[player name] look, we’ve only got two second row, can you come and 
bench and be the second-row cover?” In this case, the player was happy to be selected so he 
was. 
5.3.1.2.4.2: Special game. 
For the last league game of the season, the coaches decided to only select under-18 
players because it was their last game together. Although usually an important game, this 
game was thought of as an unimportant game. The usual selection processes (see 5.3.1.2.3: 




Figure 7. The selection process for an unimportant game. 
5.3.1.2.5: Selection decision(s). 
Returning to the overall selection process (see Figure 5), while the other coaches may 
have had an input in selection decisions, according to the head coach, he made the final 
selection decisions, “At the end of the day the others will give me their input but I’m the one 
who picks it.” The backs coach also shared this view. The head coach and backs coach also 
stated that the head coach had to overrule the other coaches in some selection decisions. 
There was one occasion, however, where the head coach wanted to drop a player but was 
overruled by the forwards coach and backs coach. The head coach explained that “…I wanted 
to change [player name] a lot earlier, but [backs coach name] and [forwards coach name] 
were both ‘no let’s keep going’ ‘oh OK’ so I sort of listened to them.” Similarly, the head 
coach acknowledged that he did not select the backs, “I never picked the backs, I’ll be honest 
there, I knew what I thought I’d have, but it was always, the last say really on the backs came 
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down to [backs coach name].” The periphery coach went even further and suggested that the 
head coach relied on the assistant coach and forwards coach to select the team, “A lot of 
weight was going on what [forwards coach name] or, maybe [assistant coach name] was 
saying on selection, and…[head coach name] would…go with what [the forwards coach]  
thought.” 
5.3.1.2.6: Post-selection discussions among coaches and players. 
Once the team has been selected, the forwards coaches suggested that the coaches 
would inform the players who were not selected during a tight selection decision (it was not 
clear if this happened with any other players who were not selected). 
When you’re explaining it to little [player name] why, and if they have been dropped 
and they’re right on the edge…before we announced the team to anybody, [head 
coach name] and I, or whoever it is, will take them aside and explain why, what’s 
happened, before we announce it. 
Usually after the team had been announced (but sometimes before), if it were an 
important game coaches would also tell the substitutes that they might not play. For an 
unimportant game substitutes would be informed that they would play. 
5.3.1.2.7: Team announcement. 
Once all the relevant players had been spoken to (if necessary), the final stage of the 
team selection process was to announce the team to all the players at training, as the backs 
coach explained “We don’t tend to announce the team until at least part of the way through 
training on a Thursday night.” 
5.3.1.3: Power relationships among coaches. 
Presented below are results pertaining to the power relationships among coaches that 
affected selection decisions (i.e., dominance-submission), aim (c) of this study (i.e., 




According to the head coach he made the selection decisions, “At the end of the day 
the others will give me their input but I’m the one who picks it.” This was confirmed by the 
backs coach, who stated that the head coach made the selection decisions, “Ultimately [head 
coach name], it was down to [head coach name] to take the final decision.” The backs coach 
went on to say that the head coach also made broader decisions that dictated selection, “It’s 
not always about picking the best side and I think [head coach name] manages that quite 
well.” The periphery coach, however, did not think this. The periphery coach recalled that the 
head coach would suggest an initial team and then the other coaches would negotiate who 
they wanted to select, “[head coach name] would make…a rough call on what he wants 
where, and then…you’d have a meeting with everybody together, and everybody would have 
their input…so it’s all very much a matter of negotiation.” Furthermore, the head coach 
himself stated that he did not select the backs, something he left to the backs coach. In a 
broader sense, too, the head coach did not make all the decisions. When selecting a player for 
the player of the year award, the forwards coach thought the player put forward (in this 
example, by the assistant coach) was not the correct choice and argued until he made the 
decisions himself. 
When we got to player of the year…we knew [player name] had players’ player, so 
[assistant coach name] is like being this nice, generous bloke saying “well if [player 
name]’s got that, then somebody else should get coaches’ player” and I said “well 
that’s bullshit…my opinion is that if you’re the best player, you get it”…so I argued 
that point fairly forcibly and the others back me up. 
There were several occasions when a coach would overrule another (or more than 
one) coach when it came to selection decisions. The head coach, for example, claimed he had 
to overrule the other coaches on a couple of occasions during the season. This included a time 
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when the head coach was able to overrule the forwards coach (after the head coach was being 
overruled by the forwards coach) on a selection by using the objective performance statistics. 
[Forwards coach name] would champion him because he was one of his original lads, 
whereas I would be “I’m not too sure” and I’d always have a back-up, and then your 
analysis came in…I just went [tapping noise] “there you go.” 
The head coach, however, did recall times when the backs coach and both the backs 
coach and the forwards coach together overruled him, he recalled the latter situation “I 
wanted to change [player name] a lot earlier, but [backs coach name] and [forwards coach 
name] were both ‘no let’s keep going’ ‘oh OK’ so I sort of listened to them.” The backs 
coach also remembered himself and the forwards coach overruling the head coach, “‘in the 
end I just probably just wanted to pick you, [forwards coach name] did’ and [head coach 
name] was standing there and I said ‘he didn’t wanna pick you though’”. The forwards coach 
also claimed he overruled the assistant coach on a selection decision. 
[Assistant coach name] is saying “oh you’ve gotta play [player name]” …I said 
“who’s the best player we’ve got…when he’s fit, who’s the best player? Who’s the 
captain of the side?” And he said “well [player name] is” I said “[player name] has to 
play” and [player name] played. 
There were also times where selection for the adult second team (which was selected 
by the assistant coach) overruled selection for the colts, as the assistant coach explained “I 
had first dibs for the 2s, so that’s sometimes caused a little bit of conflict, sometimes, but nine 
times out of ten people worked around it.” 
The assistant coach also described a time when he and the head coach took control 
over the team that the forwards coach and backs coach had previously been in control of. 
Obviously, they come normally with a squad, so pre-season we would then analyse 
everyone’s position, and then we’d come in to say, to say for instance A, B, C, D, E, 
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F, G, are normally picked as the first 15, we might go “right A, X, Y, Z, are now in 
there.” 
According to the forwards coach, however, he controlled the team in general, “You 
see it a lot of the sessions actually that, if I was here then [head coach name] would let me 
take [it].” Both the assistant coach and periphery coach also thought this was the case. Yet 
while the forwards coach may have been in control, the assistant coach indicated that he 
could control the forwards coach, “I can control him, where I’ll say ‘come on [forwards 
coach name] give it a rest’, or the boys will come up to me and say something and then I’ll go 
‘[forwards coach name], come on’”. 
The forwards coach claimed that he and the backs coach had an ownership of the 
under-18 age group within the colts team, “Though [player name]’s age group coming up to 
colts, there’s no way [backs coach] and I wanted to stop and just hand over to [head coach 
name].” The assistant coach also stated that the under-18 age group were the forwards 
coach’s team, “Then also his team, I wanna say his team because the team he brought into the 
colts.” 
There was one example of the forwards coach undermining the head coach on 
selection. The forwards coach did not agree with how the head coach wanted to select the 
team so went to the club’s director of rugby to complain. The director of rugby agreed with 
the forwards coach and instructed the head coach to select the team in a different way. 
[Head coach name] said the year before “…the 18s will be the A team and the 17s 
will be the B team” I said “that’s bollocks, absolute bollocks” so I went to see 
[director of rugby name] and I said…“you need to have a say here as DOR on what’s 
happening” and he said “no, if 15 of the 17s are the best players, they will play as the 
A team” which is how it should be in my opinion, so [head coach name] took that. 
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There were times when coaches referred to one of two sub-teams within the coaching 
team. The sub-teams were made up of the head coach and assistant coach as one pair and the 
forwards coach and backs coach as the other. The backs coach explained that the reason there 
were sub-teams was the relationships the forwards coach and backs coach had with the under-
18 age group. 
Where it’s different is [forwards coach name] and I know the under-18 group really 
well, we’ve known them for years and I’m sure we’re somewhat swayed by what they 
did at under-15 and under-16, whereas [head coach name] hasn’t seen any of them, 
you know whereas we didn’t know the under-17 group until this year…[head coach 
name] and [assistant coach name] are clean on everyone. 
The backs coach thought the sub-teams were good as it meant the sub-team who were 
unfamiliar with the under-18 age group (the head coach and assistant coach) did not have any 
pre-conceptions, “I think it’s good that [assistant coach] and [head coach name] are coming 
in with no pre-conceptions.” 
5.3.1.3.2: Submission. 
The periphery coach believed that the head coach totally relied on the forwards coach 
(and to a lesser extent the assistant coach) when it came to selection decisions. The periphery 
coach thought the head coach did not take input (or enough input) from the other coaches and 
instead relied on what the forwards coach (and the assistant coach) said on selection 
decisions. 
He should have had greater input from the pool of coaches, to…help him out, and 
then a lot of weight was going on what [forwards coach name] or, maybe [assistant 
coach name] was saying on…selection, and…[head coach name] would…go with 




5.3.1.4: Word frequency analysis. 
A word frequency analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) 
investigated the level of similarity among the coaching team (regarding cues) and the 
extensiveness (Krueger et al., 2001) of the coaches’ responses (i.e., how many coaches 
contributed to each cue) to examine how important coaches felt each category was. 
Table 36 shows how many common selection cues the coaching team stated during 
their interviews. The numbers represent how many of the same selection cues the coaches on 
the top row stated as the coaches in the left-hand column. The head coach and backs coach 
reported the same cues more often than any other pair of coaches (with 30 cues), while the 
forwards coach and the periphery coach reported the least (6 cues). 
The level of similarity among the coaching team has been displayed as a percentage 
of each coach’s total cues in Table 37. The results suggest that roughly a third (32.35%) of 
the information coaches claimed they used to make selection decisions was the same. For 
over two thirds of the information reportedly used in selection decisions (67.65%), therefore, 
coaches were not stating the same thing so were relying on their own cues in selection 
decisions.  
There were only two cues that every coach stated they used in selection decisions 
(i.e., general game performance and best player). Furthermore, most of the cues coaches 
reportedly used in selection decisions were not repeated by another coach (see Table 37). In 
fact, the percentage of cues one coach stated (58.62%) outweighed the percentage of cues that 





The total number of selection cues the coaching team stated and the number of cues and the 
percentage of commonality among the coaching team 
  Total 
cues 




Backs coach Periphery 
coach 
Average 
Head coach 71 - 19 (26.76%) 19 (26.76%) 30 (42.25%) 14 (19.72%) 20.50 (28.87%) 
Assistant coach 43 19 (44.19%) - 18 (41.86%) 14 (32.56%) 9 (20.93%) 15.00 (34.89%) 
Forwards coach 48 19 (39.58%) 18 (37.50%) - 11 (22.92%) 6 (12.50%) 13.50 (28.13%) 
Backs coach 52 30 (57.69%) 14 (26.92%) 11 (21.15%) - 19 (36.54%) 18.50 (35.58%) 
Periphery coach 35 14 (40.00%) 9 (25.71%) 6 (17.14%) 19 (54.29%) - 12.00 (34.29%) 
  15.90 (32.35%) 
  
Table 37 
The number of coaches who stated each cue 
Number of coaches who stated cue Total number of cues 
5 2 1.38% 
4 6 4.14% 
3 20 13.79% 
2 32 22.07% 
1 85 58.62% 
TOTAL 145  
 
5.3.2: Direct observations (visual and audio). 
Following the results from the semi-structured interviews outlined above, presented 
below are the results from the analysis of data collected from directly observing the head 
coach talking to himself, the coaching team, players, and parents, across five training sessions 
(only data obtained from the coaching team were analysed, not data directly from players or 
parents). Results relating to cues are presented in four categories (i.e., player cues, coach 
cues, cues from other sources, and situational cues; for a full list of cues, see Tables 53 to 71). 
A word frequency analysis and descriptive statistics (for the head coach) are then presented. 
5.3.2.1: Cues. 
Presented below are the cues (i.e., player cues, coach cues, cues from other sources, 
and situational cues) revealed from direct visual and audio observations of the head coach 
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during the five training sessions, aim (d) of this study (i.e., compare and examine the 
differences [if any] in the selection cues the head coach stated in his [post-season] interview 
with those he discussed during training).   
5.3.2.1.1: Player cues. 
5.3.2.1.1.1: Appearance cues. 
The periphery coach drew upon a player’s size (i.e., their height, weight, or a 
combination of the two) when discussing a selection decision, “[player name]’s getting a little 
bit big for [a position].” Age was a cue the head coach and forwards coach reportedly used to 
select players when, for example, it was decided that a team of under-17 players (and some 
under-18s) would be selected for an upcoming game. 
Table 38 
Number of coaches who stated appearance cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the player cues category 
 
Appearance cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Physical appearance    
Size 1  1 
Age    
Under 18 2  4 
Under 17 1  1 
Under 16  1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.1.2: Psychological cues. 
Three coaches reportedly used psychological cues when making selection decisions. 
The forwards coach, for example, told his players that he used their attitude as a selection 
cue. Furthermore, the periphery coach liked a player because he was “willing” while the head 
coach wanted to know a player was “confident.” The head coach also looked favourably 
towards a player who was a “nice lad” and unfavourably towards those deemed to be “bad 
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elements,” “If there is bad elements in the fucking side and we see them, bad elements won’t 
be fucking there too long.” 
Table 39 
Number of coaches who stated psychological cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the player cues category 
 
Psychological cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Attitude    
Attitude  1  1 
Confidence     
Confidence 1  1 
Character     
Good lad  1  1 
Willing 1  1 
Bad elements 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.1.3: Ability cues. 
When making selection decisions, some coaches would take into consideration how 
“good” a player was. This may be a general description of a player’s ability (e.g., “he’s a 
fucking great player”) or more positionally specific (e.g., “[player name] is a good prop”). 
The forwards coach, however, simply wanted to select the best players, he stated “We’ve got 





Number of coaches who stated ability cues, and the number of training sessions mentioned in, 
included in the player cues category 
 
Ability cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Strongest team 1  2 
Best player 2  2 
Reputation  1  1 
Ability 3  3 
Solid 2  1 
Very good 2  4 
Positional ability 2  2 
First choice 1  1 
What player offers 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.1.4: Performance cues. 
Every coach reportedly used a variety of performance cues to inform their selection 
decisions. A player’s footwork, speed, and strength all influenced some coaches’ selection 
decisions. The head coach, for example, focused on a player’s aerobic fitness. Almost all 
coaches also cited several general rugby skills. Handling, for example, impacted one player’s 
selection, as the assistant coach explained “It was his hands…his hands let him down.” 
Another player was told by the assistant coach that he needed to improve his ball carrying 
skills and his ability on the floor with regards to selection. Every coach selected players 
because of the position they play, especially when it came to selecting substitutes, the head 
coach indicated “[player name] covers front row, second row…[player name] covers back 
row…[player name] covers scrum half.” This may be because these players had to perform a 
certain skill specific to their position (e.g., “he lifts done he? [Player name] can lift”). In some 
cases, however, not being able to perform skills specific to their position went against 
players, as the backs coach explained “I’m not playing [player name] at full-back, this 
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kicking thing (inaudible).” Other players were selected for the style of rugby they play (e.g., 
“physical” players). 
How a player generally performed in training affected some selection decisions, as the 
head coach stated “Let’s see how he goes, let’s see how it goes, put [player name] in to start 
with and we’ll see how it goes.” More specifically, for one player to be selected the head 
coach had to see him “get some hits” in training. A player’s general game performance also 
influenced selection decisions. When discussing selection decisions, almost every coach 
reportedly used a player’s general game performance as a selection cue, as the forwards 
coach explained “On Sunday he was fucking awesome out there.” A player’s positional game 
performance also influenced the backs coach’s selection decision, “I’ve seen [player name] 
play on the wing.” Two coaches recalled specific cues about players performances when 
making selection decisions. For example, the head coach remembered a player’s tackling and 
another player’s lack of contribution in open play, while the assistant coach recalled a 
player’s lack of speed. One player’s historical game performance influenced two coaches’ 
selection decisions. The head coach did not want to select this player because he had only 
played well once in two years whereas the backs coach wanted to select the player for the 
same reason (i.e., he had played well in the past). These coaches also referred to how this 
player had been recently performing for another team in selection decisions, for example, the 




Number of coaches who stated performance cues, and the number of training sessions mentioned in, included in the player cues category 
 
Performance cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 





 Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
          
Gross motor skills     Training performance     
Speed 3  1  General training performance   2  3 
Footwork 1  1  Hits in training  1  1 
Strong 1  1  Training   1  1 
Aerobic fitness     Objective game performance     
Aerobic fitness 1  3  Performance statistics  1  1 
General rugby skills     Game performance     
Handling  2  1  Decision making   1  1 
Spatial awareness 1  1  Carries  1  1 
Defence 1  1  General game performance   4  4 
Ball carrier 1  1  Positional game performance  1  1 
Basic skills 1  1  Tackling in game  1  1 
Reading of the game 1  1  Passing in game  1  1 
Ability on the floor 1  1  Speed in game   1  1 
Position specific skills     Scrum in game  1  1 
Position 5  5  No contribution in open play  1  2 
Kicking 3  3  How player got injured in game  1  1 
Scrum 1  2  Historical game performance     
Lifting 1  1  Historical game performance  2  1 
Returning 1  1  Another team performance     
Catching high ball 1  1  Another team performance  2  1 
Position cover 2  3  Player’s style of rugby     
     Physical  1  1 
     Takes the bosh   1  1 
     Finishes it off  1  1 
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5.3.2.1.1.5: Communication cues. 
The head coach sought input from the players themselves to aid selection decisions 
(the backs coach also recalled doing this once). Players, for example, were asked which 
positions they would like to play (e.g., “I’ll let you and [player name] sort out inside [centre] 
and out[side centre]”), whether they were happy playing in an unfamiliar position (“can I put 
you down as front row cover?”), or whether they were happy starting a game (“[player 
name], I may have to start you Sunday”). The head coach also highlighted a player talking 
during a training session, “Who can you hear out there? [Player name].” 
Table 42 
Number of coaches who stated communication cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the player cues category 
 
Behaviour cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Communication    
Player input 2  4 
Communication in training    
Talking in training 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.1.6: Personal cues. 
Where a player lived influenced the head coach and backs coach when it came to 
selection decisions, for example, the backs coach asked “…does anyone live up near there?” 






Number of coaches who stated personal cues, and the number of training sessions mentioned 
in, included in the player cues category 
 
Personal cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
School    
School 2  1 
Exams 1  1 
Where player lives    
Where player lives 2  1 
 
5.3.2.1.1.7: Situational cues. 
Three coaches outlined that injuries and availabilities affected their selection 
decisions. The head coach in particular sought out this information from his players. In all 
cases, though, this information would determine a selection decision, as the forwards coach 
explained “We’re assuming if [player name]’s injured…he can’t play.” Some selection 
decisions seemed to completely rely on whether the player attended training, as the forwards 
coach stated “…if he doesn’t get here that’s our decision made anyway.” Furthermore, for 
one player the fact that he had played games went in his favour in selection decisions for the 
head coach, “He’s been playing when we’ve asked him to play.” The number of games a 
player had played also influenced selection decisions. The time a player spent as a substitute 
in the previous game or if they did not play at all influenced selection decisions too. At times, 
players not selected for an upcoming game meant they were selected for the game after that, 
as the head coach indicated “For those that are not in it, you know, heads up, keep going, 
you’ve got a game next [weekend].” A player being selected for the adults first team, how 
long they had been at the club, how experienced they were, and whether they were playing 
for another team also affected selection. Furthermore, one player was not selected for one 
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game because he was banned while another was not considered for selection until he had paid 
his club membership subscription fee. 
Table 44 
Number of coaches who stated situational cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the player cues category 
 
Situational cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Availability    
Fit  2  1 
Injured 3  5 
Availability  1  5 
Training    
Training attendance 3  3 
Game    
Game attendance 1  1 
Player’s playing history    
Number of games played 1  2 
Didn’t play last week 1  1 
Time spent as a substitute 1  1 
Number of games played in the first team 1  1 
Years at the club 1  1 
Experience 1  1 
Another team    
Another team 1  2 
Selection for upcoming game    
Not selected for upcoming game 2  2 
Rules    
Ban 1  1 
Membership subscription    
Membership subscription 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.2: Coach cues. 
The head coach liking a player seemed to affect that player’s selection, “I do [like 
you], you know I do.” Sometimes, however, a player was selected simply because coaches 
wanted to. The head coach’s winning mentality may have influenced his selection decisions, 
along with what he thought his players wanted and his team needs. Moreover, how the head 
coach perceived a player’s position and happiness affected his selection decisions. The head 
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coach also selected a player based on his prior knowledge of that player, “I know he ain’t 
gunna give me shit.” 
Table 45 
Number of coaches who stated coach cues and the number of training sessions mentioned in 
 
Coach cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Coach-player relationship    
Coach-player relationship 1  1 
Desires    
Head coach 3  2 
Goals    
Coach’s winning mentality 1  1 
What they want  1  1 
What the team needs 1  1 
Perception of players    
Coach perception of position 1  1 
Perceived player happiness 1  1 
Knowledge    
Preconceived ideas 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.3: Cues from other sources. 
5.3.2.1.3.1: Other players. 
When coaches were deciding whether to select a player, the other players in the team 
would influence this decision. Coaches, for example, would compare players’ general game 
performances or rank players. The head coach would also combine players when selecting, 
“We can put…[player name] in at hooker…and still have [player name] on the back row 
throwing.” The backs coach suggested that who was selected to play with a specific player 
would determine what position he played, “If [player name] plays [player name] will go 
inside, if [player name] plays [player name] will be outside.” The head coach also selected a 
player simply because a different player was not available. The likelihood of a player getting 
injured during a game and a player’s aerobic fitness levels also influenced the forwards 




Number of coaches who stated other players cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the other sources category 
 
Other players 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Other players 1  2 
Comparison to other players    
Performance comparison to another player 4  2 
Ranking  1  1 
Player combinations    
Combinations  1  3 
Other player selections    
Other players 1  1 
Other player’s injury    
Other player’s injury 2  1 
Other player’s availability    
Other player’s availability 1  1 
Other player’s aerobic fitness    
Other player’s aerobic fitness 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.3.2: Team. 
What the team wanted to achieve (or what the head coach thought the team wanted to 
achieve) influenced selection decisions. How the team historically performed, and their past 
achievements, also affected selection decisions. The impact a selection would have on team 
performance also influenced selection decisions, as the forwards coach explained “The 
difference is now with this squad, I could take seven off that bench and drop seven into that 
starting team and it would…hardly make a bloody difference.” Furthermore, the number of 





Number of coaches who stated team cues, and the number of training sessions mentioned in, 
included in the other sources category 
 
Team 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Team performance    
Historical team performance 1  1 
Past achievements    
Past achievements 1  1 
Impact on team performance    
Impact on team performance 1  1 
Team goals    
What the team wants to achieve 1  1 
Number in a position    
Number in a position 1  1 
Number of players    
Number of players 1  1 
 
5.3.2.1.3.3: Other coaches. 
The forwards coach suggested that selection decisions were made among the coaches, 
“We pick the team between us.” Yet there were occasions where this was not the case. At 
times, most coaches (not the head coach) would make the selection decisions themselves. 
These same coaches, however, would also offer their input into the other selection decisions 
(rather than making the decisions themselves), for example the forwards coach stated “I 
wouldn’t take [player name] on the bench” Whether the assistant coach or forwards coach 
liked a player may have also affected selection decisions, the assistant coach explained “He 





Number of coaches who stated other coaches cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the other sources category 
 
Other coaches 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
All coaches    
All coaches 2  1 
All coach input 2  2 
Assistant coach    
Assistant coach 1  1 
Assistant coach input 2  2 
Assistant coach-player relationship 1  1 
Forwards coach    
Forwards coach 2  3 
Forwards coach input 2  4 
Forwards coach-player relationship 1  1 
Forwards coach perception of position 1  1 
Backs coach    
Backs coach 3  3 
Backs coach input 2  3 
 
5.3.2.1.3.4: Other sources. 
The club’s physiotherapist influenced one selection decision, as the head coach 
recalled “[physiotherapist name] said ‘no’”. The players’ parents may have also impacted 
selection decisions. 
Table 49 
Number of coaches who stated other sources cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the other sources category 
 
Other sources 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Physio    
Physio input 1  1 
Parent     




5.3.2.1.4: Situational cues. 
Team selection decisions were impacted by the nature of the forthcoming game. 
Under-17s cup games, for example, restricted selection decisions to the under-17s players. 
Furthermore, for one game, coaches selected every available under-18 players because it was 
their last game. Coaches seemed to refer to important games by the type of game (e.g., 
“we’ve got a big league game on Sunday”) but would almost always refer to the opposition 
(rather than the game type) in unimportant games (e.g., “next week we got [opposition team 
name]”). Coaches were forced not to select anyone in one case, however, as the opposition 
cancelled the game. The number of choices coaches had influenced selection decisions (e.g., 
between one player or two). The adult team, rules, and what coaches normally do or have 
done in the past also influenced coaches’ selection decisions. 
Table 50 
Number of coaches who stated situational cues, and the number of training sessions 
mentioned in, included in the situational cues category 
 
Situational cues 
Number of coaches 
who stated cue 
 Number of training 
sessions cue 
mentioned in 
    
Upcoming game    
B game 1  1 
[Opposition team name] game 1  1 
League game 2  3 
Cup game 2  1 
Under 17s cup game 1  3 
Opposition     
Opposition 1  2 
Opposition cancelled 1  1 
Number of choices    
No choice 2  2 
Number of choices 1  1 
Rules     
Rules 2  3 
Norm     
What we do 2  2 
Adult team    




5.3.2.2: Word frequency analysis. 
A word frequency analysis (e.g., Solomon & Rhea, 2008; Yamauchi et al., 2011) 
determined whether the information the head coach claimed he used to make selection 
decisions in his (post-season) interview was different from what he stated in training sessions 
(across the season). As the data collected during observations focused on the head coach (the 
microphone was attached to the head coach’s jacket), only interview and audio observation 
data from the head coach were used in the word frequency analysis.  
Table 51 shows the number of themes, sub-themes, and cues in each category for the 
interview and observations, which remained relatively similar. This would suggest the head 
coach correctly identified in the interview what he stated across training sessions with regards 
to the cues that informed his selection decisions. The total number of themes, sub-themes, 
and cues from the interview to the observations did, however, increase. Additionally, when 
the number of themes, sub-themes, and cues for each category are taken as a percentage of 
the total number of themes, sub-themes, and cues, a different pattern emerges (see Table 52). 
The information in Table 52 suggests that the head coach thought, based on the 
interview data, he relied on player cues for most of his selection decisions. According to the 
observation data, however, the head coach did not use player cues as much as he stated, 
instead relying less on player cues and more on coach cues, cues from other sources, and 
situational cues. Furthermore, somewhat more revealing is the number of training sessions 
each cue was mentioned in. The information in Table 53 suggests that the head coach may 
have been using cues to select for each upcoming game separately and not part of a long-term 
selection strategy. This is demonstrated by 70.00% of the total number of cues stated during 
training sessions being mentioned in only one training session. The only cues to be stated 





The number of themes, sub-themes, and cues from the interview with, and observations of, the 
head coach 
 Interview  Observations  Comparison 
Categories Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues 
Player cues 7 20 51  7 24 53  - +4 +2 
Coach cues 1 - 3  5 - 8  +4 - +5 
Cues from other 
sources 
3 4 8  4 11 17  +1 +7 +9 
Situational cues 2 2 5  6 - 12  +4 -2 +7 
TOTAL 13 26 67  22 35 90  +9 +9 +23 
 
Table 52 
A comparison of the percentage of the total number of themes, sub-themes, and cues from the 
interview with, and observations of, the head coach 
 Interview  Observations  Comparison 
Categories Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues  Themes Sub-
themes 
Cues 
Player cues 53.85% 76.93% 76.12%  31.82% 68.57% 58.89%  -22.03% -8.36% -17.23% 




23.08% 15.38% 11.94%  18.18% 31.43% 18.89%  -4.90% +16.05% +6.95% 
Situational 
cues 







The number (and percentage of the total number) of cues mentioned by the head coach 
across training sessions 
Number of training sessions Cues 
5 2 2.22% 
4 3  3.33% 
3 8  8.89% 
2 14  15.56% 
1 63  70.00% 
TOTAL 90  
 
5.3.2.3: Descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics (e.g., LeCouteur & Feo, 2011) provide an overview of how the 
head coach spent his time across all five training sessions (training sessions lasted between 54 
and 84 minutes; M=72.79, SD=11.07; aim [e] of this study, i.e., to investigate how the head 
coach spends his time during training). A total of 12 actions emerged from the data analysis 
(see Table 54), with the head coach spending most of his time talking to others (mainly the 
other coaches but also players, parents, and unknown persons) while observing (not 
coaching) training. The head coach spent more time doing nothing (e.g., walking around, 
standing, collecting balls and cones, and using his phone) than talking to individual players. 
Table 55 shows the average time the head coach spent on each action across training 
sessions. Again, the head coach spent most of his time speaking to others while observing 
training. On average, however, the head coach spent more time doing nothing than talking to 
players (both individually and as a group). 
The head coach, on average, spent less than nine seconds on each interaction with  
individual players (see Table 56). Taken together with the average total time spent talking to 
individual players, this suggests the head coach had frequent but short interactions with his 
players across training sessions. These results show the head coach spent most of his time 
talking to others (mainly the other coaches) while observing training, both as a total amount 
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of time and average interaction length, and a remarkably small amount of time talking to 
individual players. 
Table 54 
The time spent (and the percentage of the total) on each action by the head coach across all 
five training sessions 
Action Time Percentage of total 
Talking to others while observing training 01:06.16 23.50% 
Observing training and coaching 00:57.23 20.35% 
Talking to other coaches 00:44.06 15.64% 
Talking to players (multiple) 00:26.05 9.25% 
Listening to others talk 00:25.06 8.90% 
Does nothing 00:23.45 8.42% 
Talking to player (individual) 00:22.58 8.15% 
Talking to coaches and players together 00:09.05 3.22% 
Talking to researcher 00:05.06 1.81% 
Talking to unknown person and coaches 00:01.00 0.35% 
Talking to unknown person 00:00.57 0.34% 
Talking to unknown person and players 00:00.11 0.07% 
TOTAL 04:41.58  
 
Table 55 
The average time spent on each action by the head coach (across all five training sessions) 
Action Average time 
Talking to others while observing training 00:13.15 
Observing training and coaching 00:11.29 
Does nothing 00:09.45 
Talking to player (individual) 00:09.36 
Talking to other coaches 00:08.49 
Talking to players (multiple) 00:05.13 
Listening to others talk 00:05.01 
Talking to coaches and players together 00:01.49 
Talking to researcher 00:01.42 
Talking to unknown person and coaches 00:01.00 
Talking to unknown person 00:00.19 







The average interaction length (in seconds) of each action for the head coach across all five 
training sessions 
Action Average interaction 
(in seconds) 
Talking to researcher 51.00 
Talking to others while observing training 39.56 
Listening to others talk 20.66 
Observing training and coaching 20.05 
Talking to unknown person and coaches 15.00 
Talking to other coaches 14.60 
Talking to players (multiple) 13.29 
Talking to coaches and players together 12.74 
Talking to unknown person and players 11.00 
Talking to player (individual) 8.97 
Does nothing 6.20 
Talking to unknown person 4.81 
 
5.4: Discussion 
The primary aims of this case study were to (a) examine which (and how many) cues 
rugby union coaches, working within the same coaching team, use to make team selection 
decisions, (b) discover the processes coaches go through when making selection decisions, 
and (c) investigate if the relationships among the coaching team impact team selection 
decisions. Coaches drew upon a large number and wide variety of player cues, coach cues, 
cues from other sources, and situational cues to make team selection decisions. Furthermore, 
the selection process was dictated by how important the upcoming game was perceived to be 
(i.e., important or unimportant), which led to a “the best or the rest” selection strategy. Power 
(dominance-submission) also played a role within team selection decisions as it impacted the 
relationships among the coaching team.  
The secondary aims of this case study were to (d) compare and examine the 
differences (if any) in the selection cues the head coach stated in his (post-season) interview 
with those he discussed during training and (e) investigate how the head coach spent his time 
during training. Results revealed that the head coach discussed some selection cues with 
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others in training (e.g., other coaches, players, and parents) but not all and that most of the 
cues were only discussed in one training session (only two cues were discussed in all five 
training sessions). The head coach also spent most of his time observing training and more 
time doing nothing than talking to his players. 
5.4.1: Semi-structured interviews. 
Presented below is a discussion based on the results gained from the semi-structured 
interviews (i.e., cues, selection processes, power relationships among the coaching team, and 
the word frequency analysis) with the coaching team. 
5.4.1.1: Cues. 
Coaches reported that they mostly relied on player cues to make team selection 
decisions, which has been previously reported (e.g., see Chapter 4, p. 51; Ahmed et al., 2013; 
Iyer & Sharda, 2009; Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Furthermore, the breadth and detail of the 
player cues were like that of the player cues reported by the coaches from the previous study 
(see 4.3.1: Cues, p. 58). Coaches in the current study reportedly used a number of 
appearance, psychological (similar as reported in Chapter 4, it is important to note that it was 
beyond the scope of this study to clarify shared meaning behind psychological cues, so these 
results should be interpreted with this in mind), ability, performance, behaviour, personal, 
management, and situational cues to make selection decisions. 
Coaches reported using a player’s size as a selection cue, as did the coaches from the 
previous study (see 4.3.1.1.1: Appearance cues, p. 58). Size is considered a desirable trait in 
rugby union (Howard et al., 2016) due to the high physical demands of the sport (Darrall-
Jones et al., 2015). Again, like coaches in Chapter 4, coaches from the current study did not 
report taking any anthropometric measurements of their players. This means that these 
coaches may have also been relying on their “sight” (Fiander et al., 2013; Johansson & 
Fahlén, 2017) of a player’s size, rather than objective measurements. The periphery coach 
164 
 
provided detail for this when he suggested that coaches chose to select bigger players over 
smaller players with better skills. This is a phenomenon documented in modern rugby union 
whereby it has become increasingly difficult for players with the prerequisite skills to 
successfully compete if they do not also have the necessary physical characteristics (Lombard 
et al., 2015). It is thought that this trend may be due to changes in the rules (e.g., greater 
policing of the breakdown; Duthie et al., 2003) and may be reinforced by the fact that teams 
with bigger players are more successful at Rugby World Cups (Sedeaud et al., 2014). 
Coaches in the current study, then, were adhering (consciously or unconsciously) to a 
scientifically documented trend within rugby union. This trend, however, can cause issues for 
players at the colts age group (i.e., under-17s and under-18s). The physical mismatch 
between players is a possible contribution to (sometimes catastrophic) injuries among teenage 
rugby union players (Nutton et al., 2012). As coaches were basing their selections on size, the 
players (and the opposing players) may have been exposed to a higher risk of injury. 
Furthermore, if coaches highlight the importance of size by only selecting those who are 
bigger, longer term players may begin to display maladaptive behaviours (e.g., the use of 
illegal muscle-building substances; Till, Jones, McKenna, Whitaker, & Backhouse, 2016) to 
modify their body sizes.  
It has been previously reported that coaches, rather than selecting the best players, 
select the players who work best together (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Every coach in the 
current study, however, echoed coaches from the previous study (see 4.3.1.1.3: Ability cues, 
p. 61) when they stated that they simply selected the best players (for the important games). 
Again, like the coaches from the previous study (see 4.4.1: Content of the cues, p. 86), the 
coaches in the current study seemed to also follow a ‘take-the-first’ (TTF; Johnson & Raab, 
2003) decision strategy whereby they were selecting the first player that came to mind 
because they have been repeatedly chosen as the best player in the past. Whilst there are 
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systems in sport that attempt to identify the best players (e.g., the National Football League 
draft: Boulier, Stekler, Coburn, & Rankins, 2010), it is unclear how the players from the 
current study became to be thought of by the coaches as the best. Some researchers seemed to 
have defined being the best in sport as those who win the most (e.g., Radicchi, 2011), yet two 
coaches in the current study described those being best as having the most ability. Whether 
coaches viewed ability from an incremental theory (i.e., an acquirable skill that is improvable 
through practice and effort; Mascret, Falconetti, & Cury, 2016) or an entity theory (i.e., a 
fixed gift or talent that is not easily modified by practice; Mascret et al., 2016), the belief that 
being the best means having the most ability may have something to do with the fact that 
rugby union is a team sport. In rugby union, the team, rather than individuals, win or lose (or 
draw). Coaches, therefore, cannot judge who the best players are based on who wins because 
individuals in rugby union do not win, so they base their judgments on a player’s ability 
instead (although this is speculative notion that requires further research). Additionally, the 
achievement goal theory (AGT; Nicholls, 1989) may provide a framework to understand how 
coaches measure ability, and therefore who is the best, in rugby union. According the AGT, 
the motivational climate created by coaches can be either task-involving, where individuals 
are evaluated on personal development, or ego-involving, which promotes social comparison 
between individuals (Ames, 1992; Jaakkola, Ntoumanis, & Liukkonen, 2016). It is not clear 
whether coaches from the current study were assessing a player’s ability by comparing them 
against themselves or each other (or against something else), but AGT offers a platform for 
future researchers to investigate this notion. 
Coaches from the current study, similar to those in the previous study (see 4.3.1.1.4: 
Performance cues, p. 62) and in other studies (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), reportedly 
relied upon performance cues more than any other cues to make team selection decisions. 
Considering that rugby union players require, among other qualities, speed, strength, power, 
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aerobic capacity (Duthie, 2006), and common and unique skills (Greenwood, 1997; James et 
al., 2005), it is not surprising that coaches use these cues in their selection decisions. The 
mastery of skills is even seen by some as a prerequisite for selection (Johansson & Fahlén, 
2017; Oorschot et al., 2017). Coaches had access to, and reported using, objective 
performance statistics. The head coach even suggested that he exclusively selected players 
using the objective performance statistics for the league and cup games (although, according 
to the head coach, this may have occurred only three and four times). Performance statistics 
are often used to evaluate and monitor team and individual performances (Vaz, Van Rooyen, 
& Sampaio, 2010). In some cases, however, coaches were using these statistics to prove that 
a player should have been selected and to confirm that a player should not be selected in the 
future after having doubts about their selection in the first place. In both cases, coaches may 
have been seeking information from the objective performance statistics that supported their 
previously held beliefs, expectations, or desired outcomes (i.e., a confirmation bias; Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). These biased search processes could have led to the 
maintenance of the coaches’ positions (i.e., a player should have been selected or a player 
should not be selected again), even if the objective performance statistics did not justify their 
positions (Johnston, 1996). Furthermore, by justifying or making selection decisions on a 
player’s objective performance statistics, coaches were demonstrating that they used cues that 
arose from one player, rather than comparing players with alternative information (i.e., 
objective performance statistics from different players). Coaches, therefore, may have been 
ignoring the fact that some relevant information was missing from their selection decisions 
(Garcia-Retamero & Rieskamp, 2009). 
There were also disagreements as to what were good and bad performances, 
according to the objective performance statistics. This phenomenon has been previously 
reported (e.g., Black & Holt, 2009) when it was discovered that coaches from the same club 
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are inconsistent when assessing their athletes. In the current study, when presented with the 
same 50% successful tackle rate (i.e., half of attempted tackle were made, the other half were 
missed) the head coach claimed it was “shocking,” whereas the backs coach thought it was 
acceptable. It has been noted that when provided with the same information, individuals can 
draw different conclusions (Macquet, 2013) because they use information selectively based 
on their beliefs and preferences (Korte, 2003). Rather than seeking confirmatory information 
(i.e., confirmation bias; Jonas et al., 2001), coaches may have also been selecting (not 
necessarily consciously) specific objective performance cues that supported or preserved their 
beliefs (March, 1999; March & Simon, 1993). The head coach also described using the 
objective performance statistics to infer how a player performed in other areas (i.e., 
reasoning; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). If a winger had a low number of carries, for 
example, the head coach inferred that they did not do much in the game. It was also 
concluded that a forward took the ball into contact too much if they made a low number of 
passes. In these cases, the head coach seemed to be generating new information (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2012) by inferring how these players performed based on the available objective 
performance statistics (Coletti, Scozzafava, & Vantaggi, 2014; Zeithamova, Schlichting, & 
Preston, 2012). Again, however, prior beliefs can have an impact on how performance 
information is interpreted (Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016). By making these inferences, 
therefore, the head coach may have revealed some of his beliefs about players performances 
(i.e., wingers do a lot during games if they carry often and forwards carry enough if they 
make many passes). The objective performance statistics then confirmed these beliefs and led 
to the inference that the winger did not do very much in the game and the forward took the 
ball into contact too much. 
Not every coach stated they used the objective performance statistics in selection 
decisions, yet every coach indicated they based their selection decisions on a player’s general 
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game performance. Coaches from a previous study (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) also 
stated that their assessments of athletes’ performances were of significant importance during 
selection decisions. During games, it has been reported that coaches spend just over 40% of 
their time in silence analysing both individual player and team performances (Smith & 
Cushion, 2006). Coaches from the current study were, however, making selection decisions 
after the previous game had finished (if coaches first discussed selection at training, it would 
have been four days since the game). They were, therefore, relying on their memory of player 
performances (coaches did not say if they used additional resources, such as notes, to help 
recall player performances).  
Several studies (e.g., Connelly, 2013; Franks, 1993; Franks & Miller, 1986, 1991; 
Nicholls & Worsfold, 2016) have revealed, though, that coaches can only accurately recall 
roughly 40% of player performance information (and for some coaches with the use of notes; 
e.g., Nicholls & Worsfold, 2016). Furthermore, Jones, James, and Mellalieu (2008) reported 
that an elite head coach with 12 years’ experience was only able to accurately report three out 
of 13 (or 23%) performance indicators when recalling their team’s performance. Laird and 
Waters (2008) did, however, report that coaches can accurately recall 59% of critical 
performance events, yet still not a perfect recollection. Whilst every coach from the current 
study claimed to use a player’s general game performance as a selection cue, in reality, 
limitations of their memory may have led coaches to only remember the key events of a 
match, which may have given them a distorted impression of how a player performed 
(Carling, Williams, & Reilly, 2005). This could also explain the broad terms coaches used to 
describe a player’s game performance, such as “superb,” “good,” or “awful.” Whilst failing 
to recall how a player specifically performed, coaches may have been describing a general 
feeling based on the key events they do remember (although further research is needed on 
this latter claim). 
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Similar to the coaches in the previous study (see 4.3.1.1.8: Situational cues, p. 70), a 
player’s availability was considered during selection decisions and, in some cases, dictated 
selection decisions. The periphery coach, for example, stated that if the best players were 
available, they would be selected (for important games) irrespective of any other selection 
cue. If this were the case, some coaches may have only used two cues to select some players, 
the “best player cue” and the availability cue (this would only be accurate if coaches treated 
the “best player cue” as one cue). Furthermore, the head coach stated that when selecting for 
the unimportant games, he also reportedly relied on the number of games played cue and the 
availability cue (two cues). In both selection processes (i.e., important games and 
unimportant games), therefore, coaches revealed the importance of the availability cue. This 
is likely because this team were considered amateur (so players had other commitments, such 
as school) and the high incidence of injury in rugby union (Brooks et al., 2005; Hendricks et 
al., 2017; Yeomans et al., 2018). 
Johansson and Fahlén (2017) revealed that coaches’ selection decisions can be 
affected by how much time they spend with their athletes (if selection criteria were ill-
defined). Some coaches from the current study (i.e., the forwards coach and the backs coach), 
according to the periphery coach, also seemed to be influenced by their relationships with 
some of the players (i.e., under-18s). One reason for this could be an intergroup bias, or the 
tendency to evaluate and treat in-group members more favourably than out-group members 
(Everett, Ingbretsen, Cushman, & Cikara, 2017; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Both the 
forwards coach and the backs coach had been coaching the under-18 players for the past 12 
years and had not coached the under-17 players at all. As such, they may have developed an 
in-group with the under-18 players and, as a result, an out-group of the under-17 players. 
Furthermore, as deliberation (which, according to the coaches, occurred during selection 
decisions) can cause increased intergroup bias (Everett et al., 2017; Ma, Liu, Rand, 
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Heatherton, & Han, 2015), the forwards coach and the backs coach may have favoured their 
in-group (i.e., under-18 players) during selection discussions. 
Some coaches have a well-established style of play and physical and skill 
characteristics (e.g., body composition, aerobic fitness, position roles) of players in mind that 
fit their preferred style (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; Ostojic, Mazic, & Dikic, 2006). Other 
coaches, though, evaluate what characteristics their players possess and then develop styles of 
play from those (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Coaches from the current study selected players 
based on the former, that is, they had a style of rugby in mind and specific characteristics 
they wanted their players to possess, and then selected the appropriate players. The periphery 
coach, for example, stated that players who had the better skill sets were overlooked in 
preference for players who were big. Other coaches reflected this view when describing what 
characteristics they wanted their players to have, which often related to size.  Given the high 
physical demands of rugby union (Darrall-Jones et al., 2015) and the desirability of players 
with greater size (Howard et al., 2016), it is understandable why rugby union coaches would 
create a style of rugby that utilises big players. Selecting big players, though, can have 
disadvantages. Coaches working with young athletes, for example, may be selecting those 
who have matured (or are maturing) early at the expense of those who mature at a later rate 
(Malina, Eisenmann, Cumming, Ribeiro, & Aroso, 2004). As a result, late maturing athletes 
may be overlooked or excluded (Till, Cobley, O’Hara, Chapman, & Cooke, 2013) who, if not 
overlooked or excluded, can display superior performances as adults (compared to their early 
maturing counterparts; Pearson, Naughton, & Torode, 2006). By holding a well-established 
style of play and physical and skill characteristics of players in mind that fit their preferred 
style, coaches may have, again, been falling victim to a confirmation bias (Jonas et al., 2001). 
Coaches may have been seeking out specific player cues that fit their preferred style of rugby 
(e.g., size cues). If this was happening, however, coaches may have been making poor 
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decisions because other, potentially more relevant cues, were being ignored (Hernandez & 
Preston, 2013).  
This also leads to the conclusion that luck seemed to have played a role in team 
selection decisions. For some players, it was lucky that they possessed the “right” 
characteristics the coaches were looking for (in the current study, size). For others, though, 
they were in the unlucky position that they possessed the “wrong” characteristics (in the 
current study, small and skilful). If these same players were coached by other individuals, 
their luck might have been reversed (i.e., small and skilful players preferred over big players). 
It is said that talent in sport is socially constructed (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen, 
1993) by coaches who, because they are in contexts where they hold a dominant position, can 
define players as “talented” by their own tastes and classificatory schemes (Christensen, 
2009). As a result, there is no agreed definition for talent (Larkin & Reeves, 2018). A similar 
situation may have occurred with the current coaches. They may have placed value on 
specific characteristics, subsequently basing their selection decisions on them, because of 
their own tastes. In other words, although the size of a player may not correspond to how 
“good” they are, coaches from the current study thought that the big players were the best, so 
big players were selected. Luck is an important factor in sport (e.g., Vine, 2016) and could 
also play a central role in selection decisions (although this requires further investigation). 
Coaches stated they took other players into consideration when making selection 
decisions, which has been found in previous research (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; see 
4.3.1.3.1: Other players, p. 74). The head coach, for example, explained how he ranked 
players into two groups: those who will be considered for important games and those who 
will not. Whilst ranking can force individuals to make decisions (Vriens, Moors, Gelissen, & 
Vermunt, 2017), ranking athletes for the purposes of team selection can be limiting 
(Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). It may be further limiting if players are ranked into the groups 
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the head coach from the current study did. The head coach seemed to be excluding some of 
his players before the season had begun by concluding that they will not be considered for the 
important games. When utilised effectively, however, ranking lists can be informative as they 
can predict performances (Trewin, Hopkins, & Pyne, 2004).  
The head coach and assistant coach stated that the reason why some players were 
selected was that other rugby union teams selected players like them too (in these cases, with 
reference to players’ size, speed, and ability). This may suggest the existence of shared 
beliefs and attitudes within rugby union (or at least a belief by these coaches that shared 
beliefs and attitudes exist) which can result in the emergence of group norms (Patterson, 
Carron, & Loughead, 2005). As a result of group norms, behavioural standards are expected 
of group members through the reinforcement of acceptable (i.e., select big, fast, and good 
players) and unacceptable (i.e., do not select big, fast, and good players) behaviours (Carron 
& Eys, 2012; Munroe, Estabrooks, Dennis, & Carron, 1999). Whilst it is difficult to conclude 
that group norms exist within rugby union from a single case study, these two coaches 
seemed to suggest there could be (although this does need further research). Rather than 
group norms within rugby union, though, the head coach also described selecting players 
because, as a team, they had always selected these types of players (in these cases, with 
reference to players’ size and speed). This suggests that in their group, the socially accepted 
selection behaviour was to select those who are big and fast. It is unclear, however, whether 
the “group” included everyone within the team (i.e., coaches and players), just the coaches, or 
simply the head coach who may have believed that this behaviour was a group norm. Again, 






5.4.1.2: Selection processes. 
The selection processes reported here, whilst pertaining to the coaches from the 
current study, offer preliminary evidence and a visualisation of a previously unknown 
element of the coaching process. This goes beyond the “why” (or cues) of coaches’ team 
selection decisions and sheds light onto the “how” (or processes). The backs coach stated that 
the first step in the selection process was to focus on the type of game that was upcoming 
(e.g., A game, cup game, or B game). This would then dictate the quality of the side to be 
selected. Although in previous research coaches have concentrated on the upcoming 
opposition (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), coaches from the current study only focussed on 
the type of game (it is worth noting that coaches did consider the opposition during selection 
decisions but not at this stage; see 5.3.1.1.1.7: Situational cues, p. 123). The type of game 
dictated the level of importance coaches placed on the game and the subsequent decision 
process. For an A game (apart from the special game, see 5.3.1.2.4.2: Special game, p. 136) 
or cup game, coaches followed the Important Game process (see Figure 6) and for a B game 
they followed the Unimportant Game process (see Figure 7). It is worth noting it is unclear if 
athletes also thought that these games were of similar levels of importance (or if they placed 
any importance on these games).  
Discussions among the coaching team (usually at training) occurred once the 
importance of the game was established and, according to the periphery coach, what started 
these discussions was the head coach selecting a “draft” team (i.e., a temporary team that was 
subject to change). Communication among team members improves the decision-making 
performance of teams (Ceschi et al., 2014) so this is an important step in the team selection 
process. According to the backs coach, during these discussions he would have more input on 
the backs selection decisions whereas the head coach, assistant coach, and forwards coach 
would have more say on the forwards selection decisions because they were all forwards 
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orientated coaches. Utilising expertise among group members, an important resource, is key 
for groups to operate at their best (Bonner, Baumann, & Dalal, 2002). These discussions, 
however, were at times dominated by the coach with the loudest voice or who could be 
bothered to argue the most. Confident members often have greater influence on group 
decisions (Aramovich & Larson, 2013), so if these behaviours led the group to believe that 
the coach was confident in his decisions then they may have accepted it for this reason alone. 
For games that were deemed important, coaches simply selected the best players if 
they were available (or the best available players if the best players were unavailable). One 
reason for this might be connected to a common notion in sport that success equals winning 
and failure equals losing (Cumming et al., 2007). The negative emotions (e.g., anxiety) 
experienced when contemplating losing the upcoming game may have caused coaches to 
reduce uncertainty by selecting low-risk, low-reward players (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & 
Kassam, 2015; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Selecting the best players would have been a 
low-risk, low-reward option as they offered the team the greatest possibility of winning, but it 
would have been unsurprising if they did win (so the coaches would have gained little praise 
for their selection decisions). Emotions have profound influences on the decisions we make 
(Paulus & Yu, 2012) so further research would highlight the part they play in coaches’ 
selection decisions. The backs coach stated that some players were selected for the important 
games because it was “obvious.” By stating that it is obvious that a player must be selected, 
the backs coach may have also been suggesting that those who hold the opposite opinion (i.e., 
the player should not be selected) will be rejected by the coaching team (Seery, Gabriel, 
Lupien, & Shimizu, 2016). To avoid rejection and to protect self-esteem, a coach, who may 
in private believe the opposite to the coaching team, may in public conform to the coaching 
team’s opinions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The periphery coach’s suggestion that up to 
seven positions were protected (i.e., certain players would always be selected) may be 
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evidence of conformity during selection discussions for important games, however further 
research would be needed to back up this claim. 
There were two situations in which the best players were not selected: if they were 
unavailable or not performing to an acceptable standard. As the team was amateur, players 
were occasionally unavailable due to school commitments or injuries. Coaches would then 
select a backup player or, if none were available, identify a replacement player and support 
them (by coaching them to be able to perform the position). In one instance, a player was not 
performing to the standards expected by the coaches, so they began to seek evidence to 
confirm their doubts. As coaches were using the evidence (in this case, the objective 
performance statistics) to confirm that this player should not be selected again, they may have 
fallen for a confirmation bias (i.e., seeking information that support previously held beliefs; 
Jonas et al., 2001). Coaches, at times, also sought evidence when deciding between two 
players for one position. The evidence, however, was usually not rugby specific (e.g., 
behaviour in training or training attendance). If players could be separated by this information 
(e.g., a player behaved poorly in training or did not attend training) then one player was 
selected, but if no information could separate them then both players were selected (one to 
start and the other as a substitute). 
For unimportant games, coaches selected the players who were not selected for the 
important games and available (except in the special game where only the under-18 players 
were selected). These players were not thought of as the best players which is why they were 
not selected for the important games. At times, though, the head coach highlighted he had to 
ask an A player (considered one of the best players) to play because there were not enough 
players for the upcoming unimportant game. By labelling the games as either important or 
unimportant, the coaches’ selection strategy can be broadly described as “the best or the rest.” 
Humans divide the social world into groups (Kinzler, Shutts, & Correll, 2010) to help 
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navigate a complex social world (Liberman, Woodward, & Kinzler, 2017). These groups (or 
categories) can be based on a seemingly endless number of arbitrary factors, such as sports 
team allegiance (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007), and may occur automatically 
(Weisman, Johnson, & Shutts, 2015). Coaches, therefore, may have automatically divided 
players into two categories (i.e., the best or the rest) to simplify their complex social world. 
Further research is, however, required to investigate this notion. 
Once the selection decisions have been made (though it is unclear if the head coach or 
a different coach made the selection decisions, see 5.3.1.2.5: Selection decision(s), p. 137) 
and if there was a tight call between two players, the coaches would privately inform the 
player who was not selected (if one was not selected). Being eliminated from a sports team 
can damage an athlete’s self-esteem (Grove, Fish, & Eklund, 2004), especially if they have 
built part of their identity around being an athlete (Couturier, 2009). Although no athlete will 
be happy not being selected for a team (Couturier, 2009), given that athlete satisfaction 
increases because of interactions with their coaches (Myer, Beauchamp, & Chase, 2011), 
instigating discussions with athletes about why they are not selected for an upcoming game 
may be the optimal way for coaches to communicate selection decisions.  
The final stage of the team selection process was to inform the squad who is (and by 
extension who is not) selected for the upcoming game. This occurred during training and was 
announced to the whole squad. Given that (according to the coaches) only those who were 
not selected during a close selection decision would have been previously (and privately) 
informed, most players learnt whether they had been selected at this point. Although there is 
no literature (to the author’s knowledge) that has investigated the effects on athletes of 
publicly announcing the team, not being selected to a team can contribute to athlete stress and 
burnout (Cresswell & Eklund, 2007; Woods & Thatcher, 2009). Although these issues may 
occur irrespective of whether athletes are informed of team selection in public or private, 
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further research should be conducted to explore which delivery method is better for athletes 
to cope with. 
5.4.1.3: Power relationships among the coaching team. 
When looking at how the relationships among the coaching team influenced team 
selection decisions, power (dominance-submission) seemed to play a crucial role. To have 
power is to have the capacity to produce intended effects and the ability to influence or 
control the behaviour of another person (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005; Overall, Hammond, 
McNulty, & Finkel, 2016). In social settings, such as a coaching team, power determines how 
decisions are made and implemented (McDonald, 1980). Dominance, which is related but 
distinct to power, is a set of behaviours by which power is exerted and influenced achieved 
(Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005; Jayagopi, Hung, Yeo, & Gatica-Perez, 2009). As a result, 
dominant individuals are successful at dominating conversations and their outcomes 
(Jayagopi et al., 2009) and are met with submission from others (Rogers-Millar & Millar, 
1979). Keeping or changing the focus of conversations and having one’s way are examples of 
controlling behaviours displayed by dominant individuals in group conversations (Madsen, 
2003).  
To achieve dominance, coaches reported several attempts at controlling team 
selection decisions, other selection decisions, and coaching practices in general. Although the 
head coach claimed to make the selection decisions, for example, the forwards coach recalled 
controlling an interaction by overruling the other coaches which ultimately ended with his 
chosen player being selected. In this example, the forwards coach achieved dominance 
through non-negotiation (Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979). There were also other examples of the 
forwards coach and backs coach, individually and together, overruling or undermining the 
head coach when it came to making selection decisions. The head coach did claim to have 
overruled the other coaches, yet only offered one example (in which he did not confirm that 
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his chosen player was selected). Additionally, when discussing which player should receive 
an end of season award, the forwards coach controlled the conversation again though non-
negotiation (Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979) with the other coaches until the player he put 
forward was selected. The forwards coach also claimed to take control of the general 
coaching practices (i.e., leading training sessions), which the periphery coach confirmed. The 
assistant coach, however, claimed to be able to control the forwards coach (although he 
offered no evidence of this).  
To be powerful in social situations, a person must have the ability to influence or 
control the behaviours of another person (i.e., dominance-submission). Power, therefore, is 
the perception of one’s own capacity relative to an interaction partner, not an absolute 
(Dunbar, 2004). Evidence of power over an interaction partner is the periphery coach’s 
suggestion that the head coach submitted to the forwards coach (and potentially the assistant 
coach) and allowed him to make the selection decisions (or at least have more weight in the 
selection discussions and decisions than any other coach, including the head coach). One 
reason why coaches were attempting to dominate and control one another might be authority, 
which “refers to norms regarding who ‘ought to’ control different situations in a relationship” 
(Dunbar, 2004, p. 239). Norms are culturally accepted and based on status which both 
interaction partners adhere to. The forwards coach claimed authority of the team (and by 
extension the team selection decisions) because of the length of time he and the backs coach 
had spent with the team. Yet the head coach may have felt authority over the team (and team 
selection decisions) because of the institutionalised position he held (i.e., the head coach 
role). The perception of legitimate authority that both the head coach and the forwards coach 
felt they had over the team may have caused this battle for power and the resulting 
dominance-submissive behaviours. Further research is, however, needed to extend our 
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understanding of the potential role that power (and dominance-submission) has in coaching 
teams (especially with regards to team selection). 
5.4.1.4: Word frequency analysis. 
 When discussing the cues used to make team selection decisions, coaches 
demonstrated similarities on just under a third (32.35%) of the total number of cues. This 
means they did not show any commonality (or at least stated different cues) on over two 
thirds (67.65%) of the cues reportedly used. “Group decision-making is the process by which 
a collective of individuals attempt to reach a required level of consensus on a given issue” 
(Eliaz, Ray, & Razin, 2007, p. 236). It is difficult to see, though, how these coaches could 
have reached a consensus regarding team selection decisions if they demonstrated no 
commonality on over two thirds of the cues they claimed to use for these decisions. It is not 
clear why coaches did not demonstrate commonality on so many selection cues. Given that 
not selecting someone is costly (as the team would not be able to play in the upcoming 
game), one reason might be that some coaches who typically felt less strongly about their 
preferred player may have been willing to “go with the flow” and allow other coaches with 
stronger feelings to select their preferred player so a selection decision could be made (Eliaz 
et al., 2007). Alternatively, group members can be cooperative (by sharing information to 
reach high-quality group decisions) or competitive (by withholding information to do well 
personally; Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976; Toma & Butera, 2009) meaning that coaches 
may have withheld selection cues from each other. There may, however, have been issues 
with the coaches ability to fully verbalise the cues they used to make selection decisions 
(Jones, 2009; Shanteau, 1988; Svennberg, Meckbach, & Redelius, 2014), meaning that the 
level of commonality among coaches may have been higher if they could (further research is 
needed on this latter point of how coaches define each cue to add to our understanding of 
team selection). There were also only two cues that every coach reported they used in team 
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selection decisions, general game performance and best player. It has been previously found 
(e.g., see 4.3.1.1.4: Performance cues, p. 62; Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) that coaches mostly 
rely on performance cues when making team selection decisions. Johansson and Fahlén 
(2017) also reported that coaches highlighted their eyes as the most important tool in the 
selection process. Coaches have also stated that they select the best players (e.g., see 
4.3.1.1.3: Ability cues, p. 61). As well as this lack of commonality among the coaches, there 
were more cues stated by one coach (58.62%) than by two or more coaches (41.38%). With 
the low level of similarity among the coaching team as to which cues were used to make team 
selection decisions, it begins to question how team selection decisions were made. A full and 
unanimous commonality among coaches is unrealistic in real life situations, so they must 
have reached an acceptable consensus level (Chiclana, Tapia García, del Moral, & Herrera-
Viedma, 2013). But with coaches demonstrating similarities with each other roughly a third 
of the time, and only all stating two cues, this consensus level may be extremely low. In other 
words, coaches may not have had to agree with each other or agreed upon the selection cues 
for a player to be selected (presumably by one coach with his own selection cues). Although 
research is needed to discover the consensus level among coaches when making selection 
decisions. 
5.4.2: Direct observations (visual and audio). 
Presented below is a discussion based on the results gained from the direct visual and 
audio observations (i.e., cues, word frequency analysis, and the descriptive statistics) of the 
head coach. 
5.4.2.1: Cues. 
During the discussions the head coach had with himself, the coaching team, players, 
and parents across training sessions (regarding team selection), most of the cues mentioned 
related to the players themselves. This reflects previous studies (e.g., see Chapter 4, p. 51; 
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5.3.1.1: Cues, p. 114; Ahmed et al., 2013; Iyer & Sharda, 2009; Johansson & Fahlén, 2017), 
including the breadth and detail of the cues reported (see 4.3.1: Cues, p. 58; 5.3.1.1: Cues, p. 
114). The head coach also discussed coach cues, cues from other sources, and situational cues 
during training. 
During the interviews, the coaches stated that a player’s size would factor into their 
selection decisions (see 5.3.1.1.1.1: Appearance cues, p. 114). The periphery coach even 
stated that smaller players with better skills were overlooked in preference for bigger players. 
The head coach, however, rarely discussed a player’s size with anyone during training 
(conversely the only coach to discuss a player’s size with the head coach was the periphery 
coach). The reason for this, though, may be because team selection may have occurred (or 
most of the decisions) before training (evidenced by the head coach selecting a “draft” team 
before training; see 5.3.1.2.2: Discussions among coaches, p. 131). If the head coach was 
selecting the big players and making these selections (or at least most of the selections) 
before training, then the coaches would not have to discuss a player’s size at training because 
the big players have already been selected. Furthermore, coaches stated that, for some games 
(e.g., important games), they “knew” who they would select (see 5.3.1.2.3: Important games, 
p. 132). This implies that coaches may not have voiced their thoughts when making selection 
decisions, meaning they may not have discussed, for example, a player’s size in training. Like 
a player’s size, while being interviewed coaches stated that they selected the best players (for 
the important games) but they rarely stated this in training sessions (in conversation with the 
head coach at least). This may, again, be due to the team selection decisions being made 
before training, and therefore negating the need to discuss selecting the best players at 
training. These are, however, claims that require further investigation. 
The discussions held in training sessions reflected the coaches in the interviews (see 
5.3.1.1.1.4: Performance cues, p. 117) and previous studies (see 4.3.1.1.4: Performance cues, 
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p. 62; Johansson & Fahlén, 2017) whereby the players’ performances were mostly discussed. 
These discussions, however, did not reflect the number of cues that were stated in the 
interviews. Whilst the head coach discussed players’ gross motor, general, and position 
specific skills during training sessions, they were not spoken about often or consistently 
(most were discussed in one or two training sessions). The position a player could play, 
however, was discussed often and across every training session. In rugby union, playing 
positions require individuals to possess unique skills (Greenwood, 1997; James et al., 2005) 
and the mastery of these (and other) skills may even be a prerequisite for selection 
(Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; Oorschot et al., 2017). The head coach (and those who he spoke 
to) may then have viewed the ability to play a specific position, rather than individual skills, 
as a prerequisite for selection. During his interview, the head coach stated that he exclusively 
selected players using the objective performance statistics (for three or four games). Across 
training sessions, however, he barely spoke to himself or anyone else about them. Again, 
though, if he was selecting (most of) the team before training then he may not have needed to 
speak about how he selected players using the objective performance statistics. Every coach 
did discuss the players’ general game performances, which they all suggested influenced their 
team selection decisions in the interviews (see 5.3.1.1.1.4: Performance cues, p. 117). 
Coaches, like in the interviews, used broad terms to describe a player’s performance across 
training sessions, such as “good,” “fucking well,” and “fucking awesome.” This may again be 
a result of an inability to fully recall player performance information (Connelly, 2013; 
Franks, 1993; Franks & Miller, 1986, 1991; Jones et al., 2008; Laird & Waters, 2008; 
Nicholls & Worsfold, 2016). As a result, coaches may have been describing a player’s 
general game performance when they discussed it with the head coach (rather than specific 
performance information).  
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Along with the position a player can play, their availability was also spoken about in 
every training session. During the interviews, a player’s availability was reported as a crucial 
selection cue (see 5.3.1.1.1.7: Situational cues, p. 123), which is likely because the team is 
amateur, so players had other commitments (e.g., school). 
Despite the coaches (including the head coach) stating that they had a style of rugby 
in mind, and specific characteristics they wanted their players to possess when making 
selection decisions, at no point did the head coach discuss these with anyone during training. 
If coaches (or the head coach) did have a style of rugby and specific characteristics that 
informed selection decisions, they may have, again, drawn upon these before training had 
occurred (like a player’s size, ability, and the objective performance statistics).  
During selection discussions, coaches took the other players into consideration, which 
has been previously reported (e.g., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; see 4.3.1.3.1: Other players, p. 
74; 5.3.1.1.3.1: Other players, p. 126). Coaches, for example, compared one player’s 
performance against another’s (although this mainly happened in one training session). These 
discussions, however, rarely contained any measurable cues that would have allowed for an 
accurate player comparison. Instead, coaches would offer broad, subjective opinions of 
performances (e.g., “probably just [player name] over [player name]”). Given that in team 
sports the real measure of a player’s performance is “hidden” (Duch, Waitzman, & Amaral, 
2010), coaches may not have been accurately or fairly comparing players’ performances. 
Interestingly, coaches also stated that because two players may not be able to play the full 
game (because one had an injury, and another did not have the sufficient level of aerobic 
fitness), other players should be selected as substitutes to cover them. This means that 
coaches were selecting players they knew were unlikely to play the full upcoming game, and 
so were selecting some players for no other reason than to cover these players. Put another 
way, coaches preferred to select some players who were at a suboptimal fitness level rather 
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than others who were at an optimal fitness level. Playing with pain or injury can lead to 
further harm (Fenton & Pitter, 2010), which can cause a great deal of stress to players 
(Malinauskas, 2008).  
When referring to the important games during discussions in training, coaches tended 
to mention the type of game (e.g., league game or cup game), whereas for an unimportant 
game coaches would discuss the opposition (rather than referring to these games as B games 
or friendlies). It is not clear why coaches did this, but it may highlight the importance 
different cues had in different scenarios. When facing an important game, for example, 
coaches placed a high level of importance on the type of game but disregarded the opposition. 
This suggests that for important games the opposition did not affect the coaches’ selection 
decisions because they simply selected the best players regardless of who the opposition was 
(as has been previously suggested, see 5.3.1.2.3: Important games, p. 132). For unimportant 
games, therefore, coaches may have factored in the opposition when making selection 
decisions. It is worth noting that coaches may have not wanted to refer to unimportant games 
as B games if this was perceived to be a source of discomfort for the players selected (as 
coaches may have assumed every player wanted to play in the important games and not the 
unimportant games), meaning that the opposition was also ignored when making selection 
decisions for unimportant games (although this is a claim that requires further research). 
5.4.2.2: Word frequency analysis. 
Whilst the total number of themes, sub-themes, and cues remained relatively similar 
across the interview with the head coach and the training observations, when taken as a 
percentage of the total number of themes, sub-themes, and cues, a different pattern emerges. 
When asked, the head coach stated that he used cues from the players themselves most often 
when making selection decisions, along with (to a lesser extent) cues from the coaches, other 
sources, and the situation. Observation data, however, demonstrated that he was influenced 
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by coach cues, cues from other sources, and situational cues more (and player cues less) than 
he recalled. This reflects previous studies that found that people do not fully know, or are 
unable to fully verbalise, their reasons for making decisions (e.g., Jones, 2009; Shanteau, 
1988; Svennberg et al., 2014). 
There were only two cues that the head coach discussed (either with himself, other 
coaches, other players, or parents) in every training session: a player’s position and their 
availability. Along with the fact that the majority (70%) of cues were only stated in one 
training session, it could be argued that the head coach mostly selected for the upcoming 
game and did not have any long-term selection criteria (apart from position and availability). 
Whilst it is not known if coaches should have pre-determined selection criteria, what it 
known is that without any they are at risk of biased selection decisions (Bass, Wu, Schaefer, 
Wright, & McLaughlin, 2013; Calder & Durbach, 2015). Also, as selection (or most of 
selection) seemed to be made before training, the head coach seemed to have used training as 
an opportunity to fill in any gaps in selection by asking his players not already selected which 
position(s) they play and whether they are available for the upcoming game.  
5.4.2.3: Descriptive statistics. 
The head coach spent most of his time observing training (43.85%). It has been 
previously reported that, during games, coaches spend just over 40% of their time in silence 
analysing both individual player and team performances (Smith & Cushion, 2006). The head 
coach, however, rather than watching in silence, spent roughly half of his observing time 
talking to others (23.50%) and the other half coaching (20.35%). This difference may be due 
to the environment (Smith, Quested, Appleton, & Duda, 2017) as training is a context in 
which coaches communicate their knowledge, experience, and expertise to athletes (Antonini 
Philippe & Seiler, 2006; Lorimer & Jowett, 2009a; Sagar & Jowett, 2012). The head coach 
spent the rest of his time either listening (8.90%) or talking (38.83%) to others (mainly 
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coaches) or doing nothing (8.42%). Worryingly, the head coach spent more time doing 
nothing than talking to individual athletes (in total across all training sessions and the average 
time in one training session) or to multiple players (the average time in one training session). 
Coaches have to interact with their athletes (Kristiansen, Tomten, Hanstad, & Roberts, 2012) 
and more frequent and positive interactions can increase athlete satisfaction (Myer et al., 
2011). On average, however, the head coach spent less than nine seconds on each interaction 
with individual players. Coaches’ communication with athletes can have a sizeable impact on 
several aspects of their sport experience (e.g., how well athletes perform; Kassing & 
Anderson, 2014). At less than nine seconds, though, it is difficult to conclude that the head 
coach could have had a positive impact on his players’ sport experience. It is worth noting, 
however, that research examining whether interactions of this length are effective would 
allow for more concrete conclusions to be made, especially considering athletes interpret 
their coach’s behaviours differently (Smith, Shoda, Cumming, & Smoll, 2009). Yet when it is 
considered that two cues were repeatedly mentioned by the head coach in training sessions 
(i.e., position and availability), nine seconds may have been long enough for him to gather 
this information from the relevant players. Additionally, as most of team selection seemed to 
occur before training, training may have been used as an opportunity to select players for the 
remaining positions by asking players what position they play and whether they are available 
for the upcoming game. Training is a crucial environment in which coaches and players work 
closely together (Lorimer & Jowett, 2009a) with the goal of training players to perform better 
in their sport (Wu et al., 2014). But if the head coach spends such a small amount of time 
interacting with his players, it brings into question whether his players were being trained in 
any meaningful sense (in defence of the head coach he was part of a coaching team, so the 
other coaches may have been coaching the players, which the forwards coach alluded to, 
while he took more of an observing role).  
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5.4.3: Strengths and limitations. 
This study provides crucial insight into how a coaching team operates, in relation to 
their team selection decisions, and builds upon the results reported in Chapter 4 (see 4.3: 
Results, p. 57; 4.4: Discussion, p. 85). Given the issues previously highlighted about relying 
on self-reported interview data (Bernard et al., 1984; Harris & Brown, 2010; see 4.4.3: 
Strengths and limitations, p. 100), this study strengthens the results described in Chapter 4 
(see 5.3.1.1: Cues, p. 114; 5.4.1.1: Cues, p. 163) by utilising multiple, in-depth data collection 
methods that are not subject to these issues (Henry & Eggly, 2012). Furthermore, this study 
went beyond the “what” of team selection decisions (i.e., cues) and reported on the “how” 
(i.e., processes, see 5.3.1.2: Selection processes, p. 130; 5.4.1.2: Selection processes, p. 173). 
This is a facet of team selection decisions that has not been previously investigated, which is 
important for both expanding our knowledge and to help improve coaches’ team selection 
awareness and methods.  
This study has revealed a number of key results regarding team selection decisions, 
however the limitations must also be acknowledged. A common concern about case study 
research is generalisability (Yin, 2014). Whilst caution should be taken when generalising the 
results from one case to an entire population (Gordon, Anthony, & Gucciardi, 2017), the goal 
of case study research is “to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisations) and not 
to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalisations)” (Yin, 2014, p. 21). Though the 
interviews were with the entire coaching team (i.e., all five coaches), the observations were 
only of the head coach (and those who he spoke to during training sessions) which the author 
repeatedly highlighted throughout this study (e.g., in the methods, results, and discussion 
sections). This was because the head coach claimed he made the final selection decisions and 
the practicality of one researcher only being able to observe one coach. Furthermore, it 
seemed that a lot of team selection decisions had been made before the observations took 
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place (i.e., before training). This means that some selection cues that were used to make team 
selection decisions might not have been captured during the visual and audio observations. 
Whilst data obtained from observing the head coach (and those who the head coach interacted 
with) offer important insights into team selection that built upon the results from the 
interviews with the coaching team, the results from observation data should be interpreted 
with these points in mind. Similar to the previous study (see 4.4.3: Strengths and limitations, 
p. 100), coaches may have had difficulty in distinguishing between cues (i.e., a single piece 
of information within an environment that holds meaning and is used to form a judgment; 
Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013) 
and inferences (i.e., a conclusion based on cues; e.g., Park et al., 2008) and the authors’ 
experience and knowledge of rugby union may have been limitations. 
5.4.4: Future directions for research. 
The results reported here offer researchers an insight into why and how a rugby union 
coaching team, working within the performance sport environment, makes team selection 
decisions. Specifically, results revealed the cues these coaches used, the processes they 
undertook, how the power relationships among them affected selection decisions, the 
differences between what the head coach reported in his interview compared with what he 
stated during visual and audio observations, and how the head coach spent his time across 
training sessions. As this study was an exploratory case study, researchers are encouraged to 
build upon the results found to further our understanding of team selection decisions. There 
are a number of recommendations for future research opportunities above (see 5.4: 
Discussion, p. 162) but outlined below are some key areas.  
Future researchers could focus on the communications (e.g., emails) among the 
coaching team before training sessions as it seemed from the current study that some of the 
selection decisions (e.g., draft team selection) were made prior to training. Regarding the 
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selection decisions, researchers are encouraged to further investigate “the best or the rest” 
selection strategy employed for important and unimportant games, respectively. Furthermore, 
as the observational data revealed that only two cues were discussed in every training session, 
researchers should explore if coaches regularly rely on a small number of cues and at times 
during the season rely on more (as a large number of cues reported from the observational 
data were only used in one training session). As coaches were relying on their memory of 
player performances, which is reportedly only accurate for roughly 40% of performance 
information (Connelly, 2013; Franks, 1993; Franks & Miller, 1986, 1991; Nicholls & 
Worsfold, 2016), researchers should also identify the accuracy of coaches’ memory with 
regards to player performances, and how it influences team selection decisions. Lastly, 
although luck has been previously identified as an important factor in sport (e.g., Vine, 2016), 
the results suggest that luck also plays a role in team selection decisions. Specifically, it was 
lucky that some players had the “right” characteristics the coaches were looking for while 
others were unlucky that they possessed the “wrong” ones. Exploring this notion can further 
our understanding as to why some players are selected and others are not. 
5.5: Conclusion 
The results of this study suggest that coaches from the same coaching team mostly 
rely on player cues when making selection decisions (but also coach cues, cues from other 
sources, and situational cues). Of these player cues, cues relating to their performances (in 
training and games) were drawn upon the most.  These results were consistent across 
interviews with the whole coaching team and observations of the head coach, although 
discrepancies did emerge (e.g., size was highlighted in the interviews as an important 
selection cue but rarely spoken about during observations). However, although coaches 
claimed to use a large number of selection cues in their interviews, there was little consensus 
across the coaching team as to which selection cues were used in team selection decisions. 
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Also, when discussing the processes coaches went through during team selection decisions, 
they may have (at times) reportedly only relied upon two cues. Selection processes were 
broadly split into important and unimportant games with coaches adhering to a “the best or 
the rest” selection strategy, respectively. It was unclear, however, why coaches labelled some 
players as the best. With regards to the relationships among the coaching team, coaches 
described the forwards coach using dominating behaviours which may have been an attempt 
to gain power over the other coaches (especially the head coach). He may have been 
displaying these behaviours to gain the authority (over the head coach) to make team 
selection (and other) decisions. These behaviours influenced how team selection decisions 
were made and which players were selected.  
This study puts forth the notion (among others) that coaches mostly select their 
players using a “the best or the rest” selection strategy, depending on the upcoming game 
(i.e., important or unimportant game), which relies on a small number of cues (e.g., best 
player, number of games, availability). Whether some players were objectively better than 
others, or if these distinctions only existed inside the minds of the coaches, investigating what 
makes a player the best will further our understanding of one of the most crucial decisions 
coaches make. To summarise, we now further understand the cues rugby union coaches use 
in team selection decisions, the processes they go through, and what can influence them. But 
what does this mean for coaches? How can they benefit from this knowledge? And, more 







Chapter 6: A Chapter for Coaches 
6.1: Introduction 
Following calls for empirical sports coaching research to have practical applicability 
(North, 2013; Taylor & Garratt, 2010; Williams, Alder, & Bush, 2015), it is necessary to 
discuss how the current research addresses this objective. The competitive nature of sport 
often means that coaches do not talk to each other and guard their policies and practices 
because they do not want to give away any secrets (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; Wright, 
Trudel, & Culver, 2007). This study, therefore, offers coaches an insight into how their peers 
make one of the most crucial decisions in coaching (Côté et al., 2007; Couturier, 2009). 
Gaining insights from other coaches is an important part of the learning process (Wright et 
al., 2007) which this series of studies can offer. Whilst there are detailed discussions of the 
results found in the previous studies (see 4.4: Discussion, p. 85; 5.4: Discussion, p. 162), 
including the implications of what was discovered, below is a summary of this thesis 
designed for coaches who wish to simply read about what was found. 
6.2: A Summary for Coaches 
This summary has been formatted to be similar to the RFU Touchline publication, the 
official newspaper of the RFU. This online newspaper contains news and stories related to 
English rugby union and is where an article similar to the following section will be submitted 
for publication. This article will also be submitted for publication in different sport’s national 
governing bodies official newspapers or magazines (e.g., The Boot Room for the Football 





Team selection: “The best or 
the rest” 
Coaches play a crucial role in sport, 
including being responsible for selecting 
teams. For those players selected, their 
emotional wellbeing, vitality, enjoyment, 
life satisfaction, and physical and skill 
performances can improve, whereas players 
not selected may experience detraining, 
stress, and a loss of identity. Yet with 
regards to research, we don’t know much 
about team selection. What information do 
coaches use to make team selection 
decisions? What processes do coaches go 
through when making team selection 
decisions? If there is more than one coach, 
does this influence team selection 
decisions? These are the questions I sought 
to answer with my research. 
What do we know so far? 
After examining every piece of research 
ever conducted on team selection, I found 
that the academic literature does not yet 
have answers as to how team selection 
works. Although we know there are a 
number of things that may influence our 
decisions on other people in sport (e.g., 
referees penalise teams more if they’re 
wearing black kits), we have little idea what 
information rugby union coaches use to 
make team selection decisions.  
My first study: Asking 
coaches themselves 
In light of this, I interviewed six 
coaches (pre-season and post-season to also 
see the information changed) what 
information they use to make team 
selection decisions. They were all coaching 
amateur teams, were qualified (to a 
minimum level 2), and had several years 
coaching experience. I found that coaches 
had a large number of reasons why they did 
or didn’t select a player, 258 reasons to be 
exact! Also, when I assessed what they said 
in their pre-season interview compared to 
their post-season interview, they only 
repeated 110 bits of information both times. 
This means that coaches couldn’t fully 
predict what information they would base 
their selection decisions on. Most of the 
selection information related to the players 
themselves (e.g., size, ability, general game 
performance) and specifically their 
performances (in training and games), but 
also information relating to the coaches 
(e.g., their style of rugby, game plan, 
winning mentality), other sources (e.g., 
other players, other coaches, parents), the 
situation (e.g., upcoming game, opposition, 
rules), and the environment (e.g., weather, 
pitch).  
I also looked at how many bits of 
information coaches described in common. 
In their pre-season interviews, every coach 
said five bits of information (a player’s size, 
ability, general game performance, 
availability, and opposition). But only three 
bits of information (out of 258!) were 
mentioned in their post-season interviews 
(a player’s attitude, availability, and 
injuries) Furthermore, over half the 
information stated in pre-season interviews 
and two thirds of the information 
mentioned in the post-season interviews 
was said by only one coach!  
Taken together, my results reveal that: 
1) these coaches were unable to accurately 
predict which bits of information they 
would use to make selection decisions, 2) 
there are only a few bits of information 
every coach used to make selection 
decisions, and 3) most of the information 
used in selection decisions was only used 
by one coach. In defence of the coaches, 
however, because they were working with 
different players in different teams, they 
might use different bits of information.  
My second study: What 
about one coaching team? 
That’s why I next looked at one colts 
team being coached by five coaches: a head 
coach, assistant coach, forwards coach, 
backs coach, and periphery coach. 
I interviewed all five coaches post-
season to find out what information they 
used in team selection decisions, the 
selection processes they went through, and 
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how their relationships with each other 
affected team selection decisions. I also 
filmed and attached a microphone to the 
head coach in five training sessions through 
the season, so I could see both if his 
interactions with others in training 
influenced his team selection decisions and 
how he spent his time during training. 
I found these coaches again said they 
used a lot of information (145 bits in total), 
although less than the coaches from the 
previous study (which was 258 bits). 
Similar again to the previous study, these 
coaches reported that they also mainly 
relied on information about theirs players 
(e.g., size, attitude, availability), mostly 
made up of performance information (in 
training and games), but also information 
from the coaches themselves (e.g., their 
selection requirements, fear of making a 
mistake, doubt), other sources (e.g., other 
players, other coaches, other teams), and 
the situation (e.g., importance of upcoming 
game, no selection choices, selection rules). 
I also looked at how similar the coaches 
were to each other in terms of the 
information they used for selection. I 
discovered that roughly a third of the 
information the coaches used to make 
selection decisions was the same! This 
means that, in the same coaching team, two 
thirds of the information coaches said they 
used to make selection decisions were only 
used by one (out of five in total) coach! 
Also, there were only two bits of 
information every coach said they used, a 
player’s general game performance and 
whoever they thought the best players were. 
With regards to the selection processes 
the coaches went through, how important 
the game was made a big difference. For an 
important game, coaches simply selected 
the best players (if they were available, if 
they weren’t, coaches selected the best 
available players). This seemed to be 
because coaches wanted to win these games 
and felt that the best players would give the 
team the greatest opportunity to win. When 
faced with an unimportant game, coaches 
would select the rest of the players who 
weren’t selected in the important games (or 
not the best players). The coaches did this 
so that these players could get some game 
time as they weren’t being selected for the 
important games. I’ve called this selection 
strategy the “the best or the rest” 
(depending on the importance of the game).  
I found that the relationships among the 
coaching team also affected team selection 
decisions. The reason for this was power. 
The forwards coach (who had been 
coaching the colt’s team with the backs 
coach for 12 years) was trying to control 
team selection decisions (and other 
decisions and the coaching in general) 
because he felt he had the authority to do so 
(as he had been coaching the team for so 
long). The head coach, on the other hand, 
felt he had the authority to make the 
selection decisions because he was the head 
coach and it was part of his role. This power 
struggle affected team selection decisions 
because, for example, the forwards coach 
overruled the other coaches (including the 
head coach) when they were all discussing 
a selection decision which ultimately ended 
with his chosen player being selected.  
After filming and listening to the head 
coach during training (by attaching a 
microphone to him), I discovered that he 
spoke about similar bits of information he 
spoke about in his interview. Like both the 
previous study and the interviews from this 
study, the head coach mostly spoke about 
player information (e.g., ability, where 
player lives, training attendance), the 
majority of which related to a player’s 
performance (in training and games), but 
also information about the coaches (e.g., 
coach-player relationship, perceived player 
happiness, preconceived ideas), other 
sources (e.g., other players, other coaches, 
physio), and the situation (e.g., upcoming 
game, opposition, adult team). Although 
the head coach did rely less on player 
information (and more on the other bits of 
information) than he thought he did when 
discussing selection cues in his interview.  
The head coach also only mentioned 
two bits of information in every training 
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session. These were a player’s position and 
availability. Coupled with the fact that most 
bits of information were only reported in 
one training session, this suggests that there 
was no long-term selection strategy, so 
coaches were only selecting for the 
upcoming game. Additionally, coaches 
may have completed most of selection 
before training and used training as an 
opportunity to fill in any gaps (which begs 
the question, what is training for?).  
The head coach spent almost half of his 
time observing training (of which he spent 
half this time coaching and the other half 
talking to others) and the rest of his time 
either listening or talking to others (mainly 
the other coaches) or doing nothing. 
Worryingly, though, the head coach spent 
more time doing nothing than talking to 
individual or multiple players! 
Additionally, he spent (on average) less 
than nine seconds talking to individual 
players! When we remember that there was 
only two bits of information stated in every 
training session (a player’s position and 
availability), this nine seconds might’ve 
been long enough time to find out what the 
head coach wanted to know for his selection 
decisions (in defence of the head coach he 
was part of a coaching team, so the other 
coaches may have been doing the coaching 
while he took more of an observing role). 
So, what do we now know? 
In summary, I tried to find out what 
information rugby union coaches used to 
make team selection decisions, the 
processes they go through, and if the 
relationships among coaches influenced 
team selection decisions. I found out that 
coaches say they use a massive amount of 
information, employ a “best or the rest” 
selection strategy, and influence one 
another by trying to gain power (to such an 
extent that it affects selection decisions). 
What should you do then? 
1. Stop and really think about 
selection! How do you select your players? 
What bits of information do you pick up on 
during training and matches? Are there any 
other bits of information you use? And how 
do these bits of information inform your 
select decisions and processes? 
2. Come up with a selection strategy 
and selection criteria with your coaches, 
write it all down, show your players, and 
then stick to it! You’ll make fairer and more 
objective selection decisions as a result 
(this can change at any point too, but start 
the process again!). 
3. Talk about selection to your 
coaching team (trying to avoid any power 
struggles!), players, and parents. Research 
suggests that players are more satisfied 
when that have lots of positive interactions 
with their coaches, so speak to them about 
selection, be open with them, and 
encourage them to talk to you about their 
ideas for selection! 
4. But most important of all, as one 
coach said, team selection “is not a black 
and white area,” so make sure it’s not 
hidden in the grey! Team selection is so 




Chapter 7: General Discussion and Conclusion 
Team selection is one of the most crucial decisions a coach must make (Côté et al., 
2007; Couturier, 2009). Individuals who participate in sport and get selected for teams may 
experience several benefits, including improved psychosocial functioning and emotional 
wellbeing, vitality, enjoyment, life satisfaction, reduced stress and distress, a sense of 
community (Eime et al., 2013), the maintenance and improvement of physical and skill 
performances (Caterisano et al., 1997; Gonzalez et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2012; Scanlan 
et al., 2015) and an increased probability of becoming a successful professional senior player 
(Güllich, 2014). Players not selected, however, can face detraining (Caterisano et al., 1997), 
stress (Woods & Thatcher, 2009), and a loss of identity (Neely et al., 2017). Yet Chapter 2 
revealed that current research had yet to fully understand the information coaches use to 
make team selection decisions (only one study has investigated coaches’ team selection 
decisions; i.e., Johansson & Fahlén, 2017). Although there are some cues that we know 
coaches do use to make selection decisions (as they also separate selected and non-selected 
players, namely age, experience, and skills; Baker, 2017; Gabbett, 2009; Gabbett & Seibold, 
2013; Thissen-Milder & Mayhew, 1991; Young et al., 2005) there are a wide range of 
alternative cues that coaches could use (see Chapter 3, p. 37). Nonetheless, by this point, 
coaches’ team selection decisions were still not comprehensively documented. 
Chapter 4, however, adds to our understanding of team selection by providing an 
insight into which cues rugby union coaches use to make team selection decisions and 
whether the cues coaches said they would use (in pre-season interviews) were different to the 
cues they reported using (in post-season interviews). Specifically, the number of cues coaches 
thought they would use for upcoming team selection decisions (N=213) was less than the 
actual reported number of cues used (N=258). Also, just under half (48.36%) of the predicted 
cues were not reportedly used in team selection decisions, suggesting that coaches were 
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unable to predict exactly which cues they would rely on to make team selection decisions. 
The coaches claimed to significantly rely on cues from the players (especially in relation to 
how they performed in training and games), but also on coach cues, cues from other sources, 
situational cues, and environmental cues. It was also reported that over two thirds (66.28%) 
of the cues coaches said they used (in post-season interviews) were only stated by one coach. 
In post-season interviews, the only cues coaches all reported they used to make selection 
decisions were attitude, availability, and injured cues. 
Whilst Chapter 4 provided an important insight into coaches’ team selection 
decisions, it could have been argued that because they all worked with different players in 
different teams, they would draw upon different selection cues. Using a case study approach, 
the study outlined in Chapter 5, therefore, focused on five coaches who were coaching the 
same team and investigated the cues they used in team selection decisions, the selection 
processes they went through, and how the relationships among the coaching team influenced 
their team selection decisions. This study also observed the head coach to see if there were 
any differences between what he stated in his interview and training regarding selection cues, 
and to examine how he spent his time across training sessions.  
Like the coaches included in the Chapter 4 study, these five coaches also reported 
mostly relying on players cues (and, again, mainly drawing upon training and game 
performance cues), but also coach cues, cues from other sources, and situational cues. This 
was consistent across interviews and observations, although there were some key differences 
(e.g., size was highlighted in the interviews as an important selection cue but rarely spoken 
about during observations). Commonality among coaches on the cues used to make selection 
decisions was, however, relatively low (32.35%). Furthermore, almost two thirds (58.62%) of 
the information used for team selection decisions among one coaching team was only 
reported by one coach. Surprisingly, this is at a level not too dissimilar to the coaches from 
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Chapter 4 (66.28%) who were all coaching different teams. Also, the coaching team as a 
whole all only stated two cues when interviewed about selection decisions - a player’s 
general game performance and the “best player cue.”  
Regarding the selection processes the coaching team adopted when making selection 
decisions, they followed a “the best or the rest” selection strategy (depending on the 
importance the coaches placed on the game). When the upcoming game was deemed to be 
important, coaches seemed to only rely upon the “best player cue” and the availability cue to 
select their “best” teams. For the “rest” in the unimportant games, coaches seemed to use the 
number of games cue and the availability cue. One outcome of the observations in Chapter 5 
is that if they were any gaps in selection, the head coach seemed to rely on two cues, namely 
availability and position, to inform the remaining selection decisions. This is evidenced by 
being the only two cues repeated in every training session and the head coach speaking to his 
players individually for 8.97 seconds on average (potentially enough time to gather two cues 
worth of information). Additionally, attempts by the forwards coach to gain authority over 
the other coaches by using dominant behaviours to gain power influenced how team selection 
decisions were made and which players were selected (among other broader coaching 
decisions and practices). 
7.1: Definition of a Cue 
Though it was stated that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to argue a precise 
definition of a cue (see 1.2: Concepts, Definitions, and Theories, p. 3), considering the cues 
reported it is necessary to comment on how they fit within the adopted definition. A cue was 
defined as a single piece of information within an environment that holds meaning and is 
used to form a judgment (Cooksey, 1996; Dowding & Thompson, 2003; Wiggins, 2006; von 
Helversen et al., 2013), suggesting that cues are the proposed link between the decision 
maker and the environment. Most of the cues reported in this thesis fit within this definition 
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(e.g., player cues, cues from other sources, situational cues, and environmental cues) because 
they can be described as bits of information from the environments the coaches were in (e.g., 
training sessions and games). Coach cues (e.g., desires, philosophies, goals), however, 
originated internally from the coaches themselves, not their environment (assuming the 
environment to mean the surroundings or conditions in which a person lives or operates; 
Oxford Dictionaries, 2019). This suggests that the adopted definition of a cue used in this 
thesis may be reconsidered so as to incorporate every cue reported so it needs to be expanded 
to incorporate this internal information. A new working definition of a cue, therefore, could 
be ‘a single piece of information, from the environment or internal sources, which holds 
meaning and is used to form a judgment.’ This is put forward to continue the debate of what 
is (and is not) a cue (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Martin, 2016; Lim et al., 2005; Rothkopf, 
Weisswange, & Triesch, 2010) but it does require further discussion and research to refine. 
7.2: Strengths and Limitations 
This thesis provides important insight into a crucial, yet relatively poorly understood 
decision process that coaches must regularly undertake, and the methods utilised add 
robustness to the reported findings. The use of a longitudinal, season-long study design in 
Chapter 4 is rare within qualitative sport research (Petrovic et al., 2017). This is vital for the 
development of theoretical explanations of phenomenon (Cresswell & Eklund, 2007). 
Furthermore, the results reported in Chapter 5 were based on multiple, in-depth data 
collection methods that built upon that obtained from self-reported interview data. The use of 
multiple data collection methods meant that the results reported went beyond the “what” of 
coaches’ team selection decisions and also discovered the “how,” a key element that has not 
previously been investigated.  
The author’s experience and knowledge could conceivably be a limitation of this 
thesis. Whilst there are strengths to having this knowledge and experience (e.g., building 
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rapport with coaches, detailed, informed follow-up questions during interviews, and 
researchers adhering to constructivism positioning themselves within their research; Berg, 
2007; Petrovic et al., 2017; Sparkes & Smith, 2014), there are also potential limitations (e.g., 
assumptions made during the research process). Though it is worth noting that the author 
attempted to maintain a subjective self-awareness of his potential biases (Readdy et al., 2016) 
in order to preserve the integrity of the research process. 
7.3: Future Directions for Research 
Researchers have been offered a number of future directions for research throughout 
this thesis (see 4.4: Discussion, p. 85; 4.4.4: Future directions for research, p. 102; 5.4: 
Discussion, p. 162; 5.4.4: Future directions for research, p. 188) which would increase 
existing knowledge of coaches’ team selection decisions. Key recommendations are to 
examine the cues reported to verify that these cues are used in team selection decisions and 
the meaning behind the cues found. Specifically, the “best player cue” requires further 
research attention given that coaches selected some players using it and the meaning behind 
the cue remains unclear.  
Conducting further research on team selection decisions with more coaches (including 
others within the coaching team, such as assistant coaches) working in different environments 
(e.g., professional, semi-professional, participation) and sports will broaden our 
understanding of how coaches make, and what influences, team selection decisions. A variety 
of methods should also be employed to obtain novel and insightful data, which would also 
triangulate individual data (Gorard & Taylor, 2004). These data could include, for example, 
email and text communications between coaches that occur outside of training sessions. 
Given the consequences of team selection on players, which can be both positive (e.g., 
improved psychosocial functioning and emotional wellbeing, vitality, enjoyment, life 
satisfaction, reduced stress and distress, a sense of community, an increased probability of 
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joining an elite developmental trajectory and becoming a successful professional senior 
player, and the maintenance and improvement of physical and skill performances during a 
season; Caterisano et al., 1997; Côté et al., 2007; Eime et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2013; 
Gonzalez et al., 2012; Güllich, 2014; Scanlan et al., 2015) or negative (e.g., detraining, stress, 
and a loss of identity; Caterisano et al., 1997; Neely et al., 2017; Woods & Thatcher, 2009), 
researchers should also examine more systematically how team selection decisions affect 
players. This is especially important as players can interpret their coach’s behaviours 
differently (Smith et al., 2009). Furthermore, given the influence parents have in shaping 
children’s experiences within sport (Bhalla & Weiss, 2010), and their potential influence over 
selection decisions (see 4.3.1.3.5: Other sources, p. 79), parental views of coaches’ team 
selection decisions should also be explored. 
Given that coach success is often judged by the team’s performance and achievements 
(Mageau & Vallerand, 2003), or whether the team wins (Cumming et al., 2007), this may 
offer future researchers an opportunity to use team performance data as an objective indicator 
of coach success in team selection. Whilst in specific contexts (e.g., at participation and 
developmental levels) success may not always equate to winning (Cumming et al., 2007), 
within the performance sport environment there is a focus on winning as an outcome (Lyle, 
1999). Consequently, researchers may be able to use the outcome of a game or competition as 
a measure of how successful a coach’s team selection decisions were. It is worth noting, 
however, that not all wins and losses are appraised and experienced in a similar manner 
(Cumming et al., 2007). Researchers should, therefore, consider the game closeness (i.e., how 
many points/goals the team wins or loses by) when using game outcome as an indicator of 
success as, for example, a narrow loss against a high-quality opponent may be perceived to 
be more of a success than a heavy defeat against a low-quality opponent. Furthermore, 
researchers could also base their measures of success on specific performance indicators that 
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have been found to occur more often in rugby union teams that win games (e.g., tries scored 
or lineouts won on opposition’s throw; Jones, Mellalieu, & James, 2004). 
Outlined below are some additional (albeit preliminary) results that emerged from, but 
were not the focus of, the current thesis. It was, therefore, deemed appropriate to briefly 
highlight them. Coaches seemed to be making selection decisions on a subset of available 
cues. Whilst rational models of decision making suggest coaches should consider all 
available cues (Payne & Bettman, 2001), the results reported in this thesis suggest that 
coaches were relying on heuristics (i.e., “a strategy that ignores part of the information, with 
the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex 
methods” Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p.454) to make selection decisions (evidenced by 
coaches using two cues to make selection decisions). Researchers are, therefore, encouraged 
to identify how many cues coaches use to make their selection decisions. Coaches also 
seemed to place different weight on various cues. Weighting refers to the degree to which 
individuals utilise each cue (Hammond, 1996). One coach, for example, said that if a player’s 
ability was great enough, other cues would not factor into his decision. In this example, the 
coach chose to put more weight on ability cues compared to other cues (at times coaches 
were forced to weight cues differently, such as the injured cue, for practical reasons). Whilst 
seeking to discover the number of cues coaches rely on to make selection decisions, 
researchers should also attempt to examine the individual weighting placed on each cue. 
7.4: Practical Application 
This thesis offers both academics an opportunity to further their understanding of 
coaches’ team selection decisions (as well as a possibility to build on this knowledge) and 
coaches an insight into why and how their peers make these decisions. This latter point is 
crucial as empirical sports coaching research needs to have practical applicability (North, 
2013; Taylor & Garratt, 2010; Williams et al., 2015). Also, coaches are given an opportunity 
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to read about a topic that is often treated as a secret (Johansson & Fahlén, 2017; Wright et al., 
2007). After reading this thesis (or Chapter 6), coaches are encouraged to specifically and 
regularly reflect upon and evaluate their own selection decisions and practices, especially as 
they have been presented with the consequences (both good and bad) of using certain cues in 
their selection decisions. One consequence of particular significance is the coach-athlete 
relationship. Athlete satisfaction, for example, increases with more frequent (and positive) 
interactions with their coach (Myer et al., 2011), while poor communication is linked with a 
poor shared understanding between coaches and their athletes (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003). 
Not only are coaches, therefore, encouraged to communicate with their athletes regarding 
team selection, but athletes should also aim to start a dialogue with their coaches (something 
that coaches should encourage). With this latter point in mind, other stakeholders within sport 
aside from coaches, such as, players, parents, coach employers, club management, and 
national governing bodies, are given an insight into why and how key decisions in their sport 
are made, and the underpinning processes for these decisions. This can inform, among other 
aspects, discussions with coaches regarding selection decisions and coach education and 
development. 
7.5: Conclusion 
Team selection decisions are one of the most vital made by coaches. These decisions, 
though, have consequences for players far beyond who will and will not play in an upcoming 
game, meaning an understanding of why and how they are made is crucial. As one coach 
highlighted, however, team selection decisions are “not a black and white area.” 
Nevertheless, the novel and significant research in this thesis has begun to shed light onto a 
relatively unknown, but extremely important, aspect of the coaching process, which is 
relevant to all coaches, at all levels, in all sports, who are encouraged to go beyond simply 
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Pre-Season Interview Guide 
1. Describe how you select a team 
a. So, is this one decision made at one point or do you continually think about it 
throughout the week? 
i. For example, do you sit down and decide the whole team or do you 
pick individual positions throughout the week? 
b. What exactly do you concentrate on when choosing individual players? What 
do you base your decisions on? 
c. Would selection change during the season at all (e.g., beginning/end of the 
season)? 
d. Would selection change depending on the other team (good/bad/similar; 
lost/won a lot against them)? 
i. For example, if you were playing a good (bad) team would you try and 
limit your loses (maximise your gains) or the other way around? 
ii. So would you ask yourself “how can I win?” or “how can I not lose?” 
when faced with different (good/bad/similar) teams? 
iii. If you were playing a good (bad/similar) team, what kind of player 
(e.g., risky/consistent) would you likely pick? 
e. Would your selection strategy change if the team won (lost) the week before? 
i. Would you ask yourself “if I hadn’t picked him we would’ve won, so I 
won’t pick him again”? 
f. Would anything else cause your selection strategy to change? 
i. Do you remember a time when your selection strategy changed? Why 
did it change? How did it change? 
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2. Describe how you select individual positions 
a. Is this process the same for players in different positions (with different skill 
sets)? 
b. Do you take into consideration how a player previously performed against a 
team (or the previous week)? 
c. Do you use the team from the previous game (or season) and decide to keep or 
reject players or do you start from scratch each game? 
d. Was there a time when you had to make a difficult decision picking between 
two players? 
i. Describe your thought process 
(Specific questions relating to Solomon and Rhea (2008)) 
3. What, if any, physical aspects of a player do you concentrate on when selecting a 
team? How much do you concentrate on the physical aspects (e.g., sport specific 
skills, athleticism, speed, strength) 
a. How important are these to you? 
4. What psychological aspects (personality; e.g., hard worker, communication, mental 
maturity, honesty, confidence) do you look for when selecting a team? 
a. How important are these to you? Compared with physical aspects? 
5. How do you take an athlete’s personal situation (e.g., maturation, family dynamics) 
into account when selecting a team? 
a. Has there been a case where you’ve had to consider this? 
b. How important would this be? 
6. Do you take into consideration an athletes knowledge (e.g., academic, tactical)? 
a. How important is this to you? 
b. Is there a balance between a good personality/athleticism and knowledge? 
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c. Which would stand out for you? 
7. Do you employ any outside help to choose your team? 
a. If so (or not), why? 
8. Do you think you make mistakes (e.g., forgetting athletes will improve, relying on 
other’s opinions, perception one can change athletes) when selecting a team?  
a. Examples of when/how this happened? 
9. Of all these aspects, do you accept that you cannot change any of them or do you try 
to change them and then maybe change your selections as a result? 
(Questions about predicting future success) 
10. How well do you think you are at predicting future success? 
a. Were you better at some bits compared to others? 
b. Describe what you were (un)successful about 
(Questions about what coaches want) 
11. In an ideal world, what information would you use if everything was available to you? 





Post-Season Interview Guide 
1. How did your season go (successful/unsuccessful)? 
a. Why do you think that is? 
b. What were the players like? 
2. Describe how you selected a team 
a. How was selecting the team as a group? 
i. What worked? 
ii. Were there any issues you came across? 
iii. How would you change it (if you wanted to)? 
b. What exactly did you concentrate on when choosing individual players? What 
did you base your decisions on? 
c. Did selection change during the season at all (e.g., beginning/end of the 
season)? 
d. Did selection change depending on the other team (good/bad/similar; lost/won 
a lot against them) or the game type (league/friendly/cup game)? 
i. For example, if you were playing a good (bad) team would you try and 
limit your loses (maximise your gains) or the other way around? 
ii. So would you ask yourself “how can I win?” or “how can I not lose?” 
when faced with different (good/bad/similar) teams? 
iii. If you were playing a good (bad/similar) team, what kind of player 
(e.g., risky/consistent) would you likely pick? 
e. Did you selections ever change because of any rules (either team or RFU)? 
i. When? Why? 
f. Did your selection strategy change if the team won (lost) the week before? 
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i. Would you ask yourself “if I hadn’t picked him we would’ve won, so I 
won’t pick him again”? 
g. Was there ever a time when you wanted to drop someone but couldn’t because 
there was no one to replace them? 
i. What did you do? Why? 
h. Did anything else cause your selection strategy to change? 
i. Do you remember a time when your selection strategy changed? Why 
did it change? How did it change? 
3. Describe how you selected individual positions 
a. Was this process the same for players in different positions (with different 
skill sets)? 
b. Was there a time when you had to make a difficult decision picking between 
two players? 
i. Describe your thought process 
c. How did previous game performances affect selection (in 1st and 2nd team)? 
i. Did training performances affect selection? Did it have the same 
weight as game performances? 
4. Do you pick positions in isolation or in combinations? 
a. Describe a time when you did this 
i. What kind of things did you have to consider (e.g., weak aspects of one 
player’s game)? 
(Specific questions relating to Solomon and Rhea (2008)) 
5. What, if any, physical aspects of a player did you concentrate on when selecting a 
team? How much did you concentrate on the physical aspects (e.g., sport specific 
skills, athleticism, speed, strength) 
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b. How important are these to you? 
6. What psychological aspects (personality; e.g., hard worker, communication, mental 
maturity, honesty, confidence) did you look for when selecting a team? 
b. How important are these to you? Compared with physical aspects? 
7. How did you take an athlete’s personal situation (e.g., maturation, family dynamics) 
into account when selecting a team? 
c. Has there been a case where you’ve had to consider this? 
d. How important would this be? 
8. Did you take into consideration an athletes knowledge (e.g., academic, tactical)? 
d. How important is this to you? 
e. Is there a balance between a good personality/athleticism and knowledge? 
f. Which would stand out for you? 
9. Did a player’s skills ever come into consideration when you were selecting? 
a. What did you do? 
b. How important is skill to you? 
c. Did you ever have to question a selection because of the style of rugby the 
team/player played? 
10. How important is experience to you? 
a. When would you consider experience when selecting your team? 
11. Do you think you make mistakes (e.g., forgetting athletes will improve, relying on 
other’s opinions, perception one can change athletes) when selecting a team?  
a. Examples of when/how this happened? 
(Questions about initial results) 
12. Do you think you relationship with your athletes affects your selection? 
a. Has this ever happened? What did you do? 
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b. Is this the ideal situation? 
13. Did you ever use selection as a management tool? 
a. When? Why? 
14. Do you think you have an ‘instinct’ when it comes to selection (e.g., 
best/amazing/magic)? 
a. When would you rely on this? 
b. Has this ever let you down? 
c. Would you change anything about it? 
15. Was there anything is the environment that affected your selection (e.g., 
parents/weather)? 
a. Why? 
(Questions about what coaches want) 
16. In an ideal world, what information would you use if everything was available to you? 






Example Transcript from Post-Season Interviews from Chapter 4 
Jeff Mantle (pseudonym) 
Researcher: So sort of begin with, describe the process that you went through this season 
when you were selecting your team  
JM: Yeah, so, we were, we were looking to, to, I guess to try, try and build something so we 
wanted to see where we’re at, so our starting point was primarily looking, it was sort of a two 
pronged attack, we were looking for, for talent in each position umm but also characters, so 
people that would fit into a good team umm and guess as we've gone on through the season, 
there's been a few people that have, have probably lacked on the character side, where we've 
moved them out or they've moved on for other reasons and others have come through so I 
think that was probably our main, main approach umm other factors sort of getting involved 
were obviously sort of uhh attendance at training umm of which there are then issues around 
that because we've certainly found this season that umm you know there are some players 
that are probably very deserving of being involved but maybe don't quite have the talent to 
justify it so, you know some of them you would look at and go "yeah they're playing 
regularly second team, they're at training all the time, but they're maybe not quite that quality 
to, to go up on a choice, probably do a job for you if you have to but" so there's those sorts of 
issues coming into it, and then we were also trying to align that with potentially when there's 
choice around what sort of style of rugby we wanna play, so with our artificial pitch we've 
done quite well at getting to a point where out there we can play quite a fast paced game, 
quite a wide game, quite a creative game so as we went on through the season, it maybe 
wasn't our starting point when I spoke to you, we probably weren't thinking about it all that 
much because we were just looking for the right people and then seeing where that evolved 
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umm that come in, we've made several decisions based on well actually this guy fits in with 
our style of play more than the other guy, etc., etc.  
Researcher: OK, so do you think, so it's changed essentially from when we last spoke?  
JM: Yeah I think, I think it's evolved and I think, I just, I wouldn't say, you know it's not a 
major change I think there are those few key factors that are still behind everything but then 
we've maybe got to a point where we've been able to add and go actually there's some other 
questions we can now ask when we're in selection umm you know we're still not, it's quite 
nice that we're still, I think because of the way we've worked as a selection team we haven't 
had to make it too formalised, it hasn't had to be right tick this box, tick this box, OK, that's 
where we end up, we've been quite open and honest with our discussions umm and I've, and 
largely, obviously there's a few instances but most people are on the same wavelength so 
umm although people might have different viewpoints, generally we have all worked towards 
the same sort of goal which has been nice, so, so yeah we've progressed, I would say, yeah 
we've, yeah evolution not revolution quite so much, so yeah  
Researcher: Yeah, so you mentioned then that some of the players maybe moved away from 
the squad, was it  
JM: Yeah, we've had several, one, one major incident where umm a player was disgruntled at 
not being in the first team umm and when, initially showed that frustration by sort of 
storming out of training umm throwing his toys out the pram so then once he cooled down we 
started to talk to him, it became very clear that his motivation of playing was "I need to be a 
first team player" we were like "OK, but why?" It was all about status, that's what he needed 
and so when we, we went into it and went "OK well, where do you see, where do you think 
you fit in the first team? What position should you be playing? Where have we got it wrong?" 
And he goes "I should be starting 7" and straight away there was a disconnect because we 
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saw him as, probably a number 6 only and third or fourth on the pecking order, so there was a 
huge disconnect in terms of where he saw his ability to where we, and not just me, as a group 
everyone was kind of agreed that he was one of those players that, that won't let you down, 
will make his tackles, probably won't lose the ball in contact, but he didn't do anything 
exceptionally well, so he didn't like, he'd never carry for ten metres beyond contact, he'd 
never hit someone in a tackle so hard that he's knocking them backwards, he was never, never 
had an impact and I think my experience, if you've got, you've always got choices in the back 
row and largely people will have something they're good at. So I guess that, that comes back 
to another little selection thing, is actually what are peoples’ strengths? You know what do 
they do well? Rather than looking, looking at the view point of...how great are their 
weaknesses? So you pick someone with less weaknesses, we go actually "what difference can 
that person make on the team because of their strength?" You know so we've got some guys, 
a couple of guys that are like well OK they have to be in the team because of their ability at 
the line out, to jump, and alright they might not be as good around the park but that's 
probably a priority so, yeah, so we've had a few people move on and I think, I think that will 
probably happen again next year but in terms of building a club and a squad, it's probably a 
positive if people don't wanna put the work in and be a second team player and push through, 
and that was the issue, was that really he didn't, just wanted to be a first team player without 
the whole work my way up, which doesn't really work so, yeah so we've had a few instances 
of that and umm we've had a few other players move on but mainly because we weren't 
offering them umm the right training environment which we've sort of amended cause we 
only really did sort of, when I came in first and second team training together umm we had 
quite a lot of new faces come in that needed sort of a more social, development style training 




Researcher: Were there any cases where, so they were the players that left because maybe 
that had issues, were there any cases where players were selected over the people that were 
already in there? Not because those guys that are there had any issues, but actually because 
these guys were pushing through so much  
JM: Yeah, not, not as often as we would want because umm we haven't had stability of 
training in our second team umm and potentially with our coaches that are taking the second 
team, they maybe weren't quite as much on the sort of reward selection that I wanted, they 
very much wanted to put out their best team every week, and there was a bit of compromise 
at times but there have been two or three occasions where yeah, someone's uhh been training 
well but performing in the second team, where actually we've put them in ahead of other 
people umm sometimes that's been based around the game, so there were maybe two or three 
games throughout the season where we would expect to do well, so we were like OK we can 
maybe make two or three changes here if we want because we feel the rest of the squad could 
cope so it was a nice chance to look at someone umm other ones were, yeah were literally 
just straight choices between who's gunna offer the most in that game, that might of come 
down to conditions, so you know if it was November through to February, it's gunna be a bit 
muddier, bit wetter, does that person play a different style of rugby that suits us compared to 
that person? Or, or just looking at it as a straight shoot out on form, who's actually 
performing better at the time? And one might have had a slight dip and etc., so we've had a 
couple of those instances umm and then, you know it's then difficult, it's then about, about 
rotating because sometimes those guys drop down onto the bench and it's how, how many 
times do we keep that player on the bench spot if they haven't moved up? So if they haven't, 
if an opportunity hasn't become available for them to go up, do you put them on the bench for 
that third week? Or do you say "go and have 80 minutes for the second team, we'll bring 
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someone else in" so it's balanced cause I think the key thing to remember is as much as guys 
want to get selected they're also here to play rugby  
[Interruption]  
Researcher: So you were saying then there's this idea then of actually, if players are on the 
bench for a couple of weeks it's actually thinking "right well maybe we should put them 
down in the 2s to get them the game time" so even though they were maybe selected and you 
thought "right they're good enough to be in that 1s squad" actually the idea of giving them 
game time  
JM: Yeah I think so and I think that's just, it's a difficult conversation to have when you put 
anyone from, you're effectively dropping them whatever way you wanna try and, to word it 
because you're effectively dropping them but umm no it has to be that little bit of 
management and it, it hasn't happened all the time throughout the season cause we, we 
admittedly haven’t had, I don't look across our 1s and 2s and go "OK anyone can step up and 
play" it's not that fluid at the moment, but there are one or two positions where we've got a 
little bit of strength where actually we can afford to do that and the person coming on to the 
bench is then not necessarily gunna be a weaker player and it's opportunity, so it's umm it's a 
difficult one to think of but sometimes just a, giving those guys that 80 minutes means that 
they're gunna keep their fitness up, that they're gunna, and sometimes they'll get a better 
opportunity to show what they can do if they go down to the 2s, have a good attitude and play 
well for 80 minutes than maybe coming off the bench for 20 minutes in a game that we might 
be losing or whatever it might be, so it might be, it's almost a bit, it might be harder for them 
to take but actually it might be a better opportunity for them so, so  
Researcher: So it's almost this idea of looking at, you were mentioning then the replacements 
as well so actually the guys that you do move, depending on the game, the opposition or 
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whatever, it then comes down to who's behind them to come in and take their place, assuming 
that if there was no one that you thought would be good enough to come in, then that, 
regardless that you're play bottom of the league, whatever, that change wouldn't happen 
because there was no one else to come in there to fill that gap type thing  
JM: Yeah it's always that, it's always that strength in depth, if we've got no one behind 
pushing then if you've got 18 players and they're fit and available every week and that's all 
you've got then a) you're very lucky that they're not getting injured but that's where you're sat 
with it really so umm it does very much depend on what you've got available, obviously umm 
the, the major reason we've made changes this year has been unavailability’s, you know 
generally just players saying "I can't play this week, I'm at a wedding" or "I'm away on 
holiday" or whatever it may be umm we've tried to get ahead on the curve so that we know 
that quite far in advance, but actually that's probably been, 75% of our changes have probably 
been forced umm so either that or injury, although touch wood we've actually been very 
lucky with injury this year, we haven't, haven't had many long-term injuries, just the odd 
niggle so umm but yeah most of it's been enforced so actually I, we know a couple of months 
ahead "right on these dates, so and so's gunna be away, so what's our plan for that? OK 
maybe he plays all the way up till then, but we're having a look at this player in here, just" or 
we're lining it up and going to so and so, "we know that our fly half’s gunna be away, what's 
your availability like up to here because there's gunna be an opportunity coming up?" so you 
can use it almost as a umm a motivational tactic at times, so if you're playing well in the 2s or 
whatever it may be, just, there is a natural opportunity coming up so, yeah  
Researcher: So it's actually quite long-term then? It's this idea of, of figuring out, assuming 
then you've got say a squad that you think if these guys are fit and healthy and available, 
they're the ones that will get selected, and then it's those few positions on a few weekends 
that aren't there and then planning  
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JM: Yeah I think ideally, cause what we can take 18 on a match day, so 15 and 3 subs, we're 
probably looking at a squad of maybe 25, 26 people, in our thoughts that are, you know, that, 
you would ideally if everyone was fit that's what you would use, probably ends up going a bit 
more towards 30, 35 in an ideal world where you, you end up using those players but 
realistically if you could keep everyone fit, you know your players that are good quality and 
they're the group that you'd wanna, wanna work with all the time but it is very, it doesn't 
always work out, people aren't, not, aren't necessarily great at their scheduling and know what 
they're doing ahead of time or get things wrong but generally try and look sort of two months 
ahead fixture wise just to, cause then I think we, you can, you're in control of what you're 
doing, I don't, as a coach I don't like not, I'll try and control as much as possible or at least be 
ahead of the curve so if I can look at it two months down the line, if I know somethings 
coming up and I think "oh Christ right we're missing 10, 12 and 13 all on one week, what's 
our strategy for that? What...what are we gunna be looking to then? You know is it a team 
where that's gunna cause a big issue? And we might have to prepare for two weeks to change 
our style of play slightly or, or you know actually here's a months period where my starting 
kickers gunna be away so actually I change my training to work a bit more with our back up 
kickers to make sure they can step in, but I think if you know ahead as much as possible then 
it, then it can help you and you can go "well..." and it might, it might affect, so there are a 
couple occasions say we knew umm so we're maybe selecting for, for the next week and 
everyone’s available but the following week someone’s missing, so it might be well actually 
the one where he's missing is a harder game so let’s bring that other person in early knowing 
that he's gunna be away so he's had a bit of time to acclimatise and therefore hopefully 
perform better in the other, the other game, so you, it's just trying to be smart with it at times 
and if that opportunity's available there then it's a, you know, and it might be that that person 
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who's not here comes onto the bench and go "well you're not here next week, we really need 
to have a look at this guy and check that he's, he's OK" you know and go in that way  
Researcher: OK, so then that 75% was down to availabilities, what would you say that other 
25%  
JM: Well the other 25% is choice, so it's gunna be form of players umm it's gunna be tactical, 
so I don't, as a coach I don't, I don't particularly like looking at the opposition, every now and 
again there's a game where you really have to, but most of the time I like to focus on us and 
go "right what are we gunna do that gives them problems?" Every now and again there's a 
game, I think of us playing [opposition team name] away this year, pouring with rain, wet 
and mud, we've built a team to play out on that pitch, they're huge, so you can't just run 
through them, you know we're just looking at "OK well we might just have to bring in one or 
two players that will help us play that game" little bit more physical, maybe a little less 
skilful, but might just get you over the gain line or whatever it may be, so the other 25% is, is 
purely choice, ideally you want that to be well in the other scale, you know you'd want it 
probably to be...you'd want it, I'm not saying you'd necessarily want it the other way because 
you're not necessarily wanting to make a lot of changes but, yeah the changes that you do 
want you probably wanna be your choice, if it's all your choice it means, you might not 
choose to make any changes but it's in your hands and it means people are there week in, 
week out, just realities of life makes that almost impossible so, so yeah, so that's probably 
where we're at, at the moment, I think as you, as you experience a little bit more success that 
becomes a bit easier because people make themselves more available for more fixtures, so 
what you find I think when you're losing games it's easy for people to say "oh I'm not 
available this week, don't fancy that away trip" umm so we look at those things but yeah it's 
really, the planning for it is I guess an element of control, it's wanting to, to know well 
enough in advance that we can change training, that we can get in contact with players if we 
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need to that we can, talking to the second team coaches "alright we know this gaps coming up 
in three weeks, who are we looking at? You've had some options and you've been playing this 
guy on the wing but could we have a look at him in your centres for the next couple of weeks 
just to see how he'd fit? So if we choose to move him up he's there umm" and I hope, I hope 
going forward that as we hopefully recruit more players through word of mouth, etc., and 
retain more players, hopefully those decisions become a bit harder because you've got more 
strength behind, but, yeah  
Researcher: So do you think then your, the way you've selected has been sort of a blanket 
team selection or have, do you think it's gone smaller in terms of positions or combinations?  
JM: How do you mean? In terms of the criteria?  
Researcher: Yeah so the criteria you've been selecting on  
JM: I think it probably, I think it probably has become narrower, I think cause this was my 
first year umm when I first was selecting teams there wasn't a lot of knowledge behind it so 
umm although the other people in the room might have a lot of knowledge, it's then quite 
subjective, you're basing it on not a lot of facts cause you haven't seen a lot of, you go like 
my opinion, he looks like, as you go through the season you go well we know that guy isn't 
very committed so he's sort of moves to the only if necessary pile and, and as I said you find 
a style of play so we had an instance we were playing [opposition team name] so our closest 
rivals umm sort of middle of March so getting towards the end of the season, it was out here, 
we'd lost away to them, it was important that we had a win and our fly half was away umm 
we had one guy who's experienced, could play, good defender, but attacking wise, not as 
much flair that, our existing 10 is a 7s player so he brings a lot of pace and skill into the 
game, but we had a colt who although looked like a 12 year old was, you know, loads of skill, 
loads of pace, and you're like well let’s give him a go in training just to be sure but actually 
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for the team this switch to the colt fly half would be less of a change of style and hopefully 
would be OK, so we bought him in, he was outstanding, he just fitted in really well umm so 
that has, that has, I think that, it's maybe not been something we talked about because I think 
the quality of players...it's probably very umm a subconscious sort of thing where we're 
talking about players, we know that certain players won't necessarily fit our style of rugby so 
you're always looking like for like or better than what you've got, so I think it has become 
narrower in terms of selection, I think we have been, I think the group of players that we're 
picking from naturally has become narrower umm and I think, yeah the reasons why we're 
selecting them become narrower because I think, when I said at the beginning that we picked 
a lot on character, actually, certainly come Christmas, you've weeded out all the guys that 
have got poor attitudes or lack of commitment or whatever so actually that's, that's not even 
really a factor, so you're actually then moving onto other things which is the type of player 
that you want, it's, and form, they're probably the two, two things that come into it, so, yeah  
Researcher: Did you have a style of rugby? Because it sounds like that was an important 
factor, did you have that before you came in? Or did you look at the players and say "we can 
play this style of rugby" and then tried to keep that up if you see what I mean?  
JM: I have a preferred style of rugby that I like to see but you can't come in and force that on 
a, on a side because you might, you might just not have the players, you might have no talent 
in the backs and a load of big forwards and you're like "oh we gotta play to our strengths" so 
it, I would imagine that I have had an influence on that in the way that we train, some of the 
skills that we put umm emphasis on, but it has suited the players that we've had and, and the 
pitch is a big influence on that as well, so you don't, you know come out on that pitch and 
play a narrow game, it attracts the players in so with the, some of the guys we've recruited 
are, you know few off the 7s circuit who are friends of friends who've looked at that and gone 
"I'd love to play on that pitch" and, you know the forwards that we get in tend to be ones that 
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are a little bit fitter cause, capable to run a bit more on the pitch so umm so I think, I guess it's 
a combination of, I certainly haven't come in and gone "we're gunna play this way" come in 
and say "these are some of my philosophies, some of the things I'd like to see, let's build 
around that and see where it takes us" I think, I think actually that probably has a bigger 
effect on us because when you're out there and you're training the balls not wet and muddy, 
it's not you know, it just means you, you adapt to play a certain style really so, yeah  
Researcher: Can you think of any times maybe where you got the selection wrong? And you 
looked back and you think "well I selected him on this when actually I probably shouldn't 
have given what happened"  
JM: Umm the, the ones I look back on are...I wouldn't say I was wrong on it because I'm, I 
still don't know where I sit with it but the ones that have been the hardest have been, we've 
got a prop that, think he's 40 years old odd, never been a first team regular but he's been at 
every training session, never misses a training session, played a bit at the start of the season, 
solid enough but not spectacular and it's maybe decisions where, where we bought back end 
of the season a couple of guys that maybe hadn't earn their stripes in training or played, who'd 
been a couple that had gone away from the club and come back that we've, through injury put 
straight back in just because we've kind of looked at it and gone "we should really be picking 
him, but long-term he's not really part of our plans and that's..." I don't think it was the wrong 
selection but it, it does sit with me a little bit of like, is that the right thing to do? Because 
really he should be rewarded but then, I guess because of his age and the fact that he's not 
outstanding warrants that, we'd, we're almost better to bring the guy in who'd gone away to 
bring him in and get him reengaged so we have him for next season and hopefully enjoying 
it, so that, that plays a part, and then other decisions where I've got it wrong...trying to think 
if there's anyone I've actually picked that I think was wrong...yeah there's, there's a couple, 
probably had a few, generally seems to be some of the older guys that are umm one guy 
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who's been a first team player here for sort of the last 10, 12 years umm but is probably 
dropping off a little bit in terms of commitment, we bought him back to sit on the bench 
when we needed him and actually he wasn't very good, his attitude wasn't great, I probably 
thought after that, we should have looked at someone else, it would have been better to put a 
youngster in there or someone less experienced, we would have got more out of that, they'd 
have been a better learning process for that player or umm and we've done that a couple of 
times, couple of times we've just thrown in, I've thrown in guys on the bench that just aren't 
good enough but, but actually thinking about it well it might keep them at the club for the 
next five, six years because they go "there is an opportunity for me here" or, you know or go, 
I think we took a young scrum half down to [opposition team name] and [opposition team 
name] on the 2nd of January because we were just completely short on players umm and 
although he knows he not a first team quality player, his dad came and watched, you know 
he's really proud of what he done, like he'd grown up playing at the club so actually that was 
probably a nicer outcome that just calling up some guy that hadn't been training that had 
maybe played a bit of first team before and probably a better player and gone "come have this 
game" so, did that and the bigger ones, the ones where I've got it wrong more often would be 
just umm positional selections, so we've maybe had the right players on the pitch but we've 
shifted them into, into different positions to do different things and it's maybe not worked as 
effectively umm I think of a couple of times we had a winger, he plays at [university name] 
umm fantastic player, he's big, he's physical, thought OK we're struggling in, in the midfield 
at the moment, let's put him in at 12 umm and he was woeful, couldn't tackle a fly, and you're 
like well you're big, you're fast, it shouldn't be an issue in theory, and that didn't work and 
that, that made us struggle, so it was then possibly just making poor positional selections, 
most of those however came on days where, where the selection was the, we didn't have 
choice, where we had a lack of choice so within that 75% we're maybe missing two or three 
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players, I don't think we had many instances where I would say we had good availability and 
we've made some wrong decisions, I think we could always justify what we did whether it 
would be that guy deserves an opportunity because he's been working hard and effort, you 
know, the points where we could make changes because maybe the game was less important 
or didn't mean as much umm yeah I think I'm, I actually think we've done reasonably well at 
it and I think we've got it spot on, it's probably helped again by the fact that our pool of 
players are, for where I'd like us to be, relatively small, so therefore, you know there's not 40 
players knocking on your door that you could go "right, within a couple of months he could 
be a first team player" you know we are probably looking at, we've used around 56 players 
this year, had a look at 56 players umm second half of the season that was probably closer to 
35, which I thinks probably a good place to be umm but realistically we've probably got a 
pool of 30 players that you look at and go, at the moment, they're in and around first team 
quality, and that makes it all easier because it doesn't take a lot, it takes a couple of injuries 
and a couple of unavailability’s and there's, there's your squad plus, plus three or four so 
umm yeah   
Researcher: So this being your first season with these guys, do you think coming in that 
helped or hindered in any way your team selection? The way that you went about selecting 
teams?  
JM: Yeah I think umm I think it was a good thing because I think...I think people initially 
wanted to see where I was going with selection so they sort of listened and would, then would 
pipe in when they needed to but actually they kind of listened to what it was and I guess they 
were getting a feel for how I would take process and how I would judge players umm I think 
I, and I think I worked quite hard to involve the others in that process as well so very much 
umm you know I pretty much let my forwards coach pick our forwards, you know he works 
with them more than I do, and go "right what do you wanna see?" And then as that goes 
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through we might have a chat about one or two players and play devils advocate, you know, 
it might be "well what about him here?" Even if you don't believe it, just to get a bit of 
justification, a bit of thought provoking, so I think we've, the process that we've come up with 
I think it's been helpful coming in with a blank slate, I think, and I, I think coming in, and, 
probably doesn't sound like it's very clear but in my head you know I do, I do try and stick to 
some values, it's not always, you've been doing this for a year you know there's a lot of grey 
areas but actually, you know, I'm not looking to select out and out our best 18 players 
because, hopefully we will get to that but it's not "he's better than him, he starts" it's, you 
know that's not where we're looking to so it's, I think I've stuck to my values quite well, I 
think I've made the process quite open so people can feed it, but, whist maintaining the sort of 
well, feed in but ultimately if I'm not comfortable with that decision we'll go with what I'm 
thinking of and, I'll go "apologies but this needs to be on me because I'm accountable at the 
end of it really" umm so, it's been, I think it's, yeah it's been nice coming into it the start umm 
and this being my second club where I've coached umm it's been a lot easier having learnt 
from those previous experiences so I'll go in and go "right, well..." I think once you, if you go 
in and you're not very clear of what you want in terms of selection, other people can railroad 
you quite a lot, or they can have too much of an influence or, you know you start, once you 
start picking on one thing, it's hard to then change that because the message to the players is 
different, so you're coming in clear, going "right what did I like about where I was last time? 
And what would I maybe change?" I could come in and go "right this is, this is the way 
selections gunna work, off we go" umm and so one of those things was that we had, you 
know I invited the first team captain to come sit in, I got challenged going "players have 
never sat in on this" but they're a really important thing because we might go "let's pick this 
player" and he goes "none of the players get on with that guy", could be, you know or it could 
be actually well, our captains our prop so he might go "ok he is a good second row but in the 
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scrummage I don't feel anything, there's no power there so actually I'd rather have him there 
as a player myself" so you get those little insights into it and I think that's been valuable as 
well because then, you know as a coach you see certain things but they might give you a 
different opinion that helps and ultimately you want the players to be happy and confident 
with what’s been selected so, but I think...think you got to a point where I don't get 
challenged an awful lot and I'm not much of a bully so I don't think, I don't think it's because 
of that, hopefully it's because generally we're making, just making good decisions, I guess as 
you go through the season teams pick themselves a bit more anyway where they can because 
you go "well the guys are playing well" especially for us this year you know the guys have 
been playing well so just becomes easy really, there's not much to dispute, if people are 
playing poorly you can go "well he's not playing very well, he should be in" or, it becomes a 
bit more subjective I think so  
Researcher: So through the season actually if they're playing well it's almost, if they finish 
well in the shirt type thing they're gunna  
JM: It's hard to change teams when you're winning, it's difficult so, and it makes 
conversations even harder because they're going "well we're winning games" and then for 
you to go "OK but you're maybe not playing as well as you could" is quite harsh so it does 
become harder and if you've got a team that's winning and winning consistently then, then 
why change a winning team really? If you can, you know you might make a few tweaks 
every now and again but umm but yeah it does, I think it does become harder when you're 
winning, when you're losing umm as I said people drop out so they'll be more, more 
opportunities anyway and you know there's got to be a reason why you're losing games so 
you can always justify, go "we think this person will help us to, to get back onto winning 
form" or whatever it may be so  
286 
 
Researcher: Well I guess finishing fifth then you must have been pretty successful through 
the season so actually I guess, was there actually much change when you were successful? 
Do you remember looking back  
JM: No so we, we only lost one game at home umm we won away games when the weather 
was hard, the ground was hard, we started losing as soon as the rain came in, it put us off, just 
cause we, I don't know we didn't adapt very well off this pitch and we don't have the, the 
different types of players that we maybe could bring in, like a bigger second row or you know 
another ball carrying prop or a kicker uhh a 10 that's slightly more, got slightly bigger boot 
on him that can find touch, we didn't have those options so it was, I'm trying to think, 
we...second half of the season we didn't make many changes at all, only the ones really where 
it was enforced, you know someone was away, injury, trying to think if there was any other 
reason  
Researcher: And was that because you were successful?  
JM: Yeah I think, like I say people don't wanna lose their spot by making themselves 
unavailable and we don't wanna make any changes because we were playing good rugby, the 
first half of the season, I wouldn't say the changes were made cause we were losing, basically 
because I was still learning who the players were, you know and there were, trying to think of 
examples of things, so umm you know we had a flanker that came back in the middle of 
October because he'd been away travelling in Argentina so he comes back in, month or two to 
get himself fit and then it's like "oh OK he's actually possibly a better option than what we've 
got there" or, or what was more the case was we probably had...six, six or seven players 
across our back five that were all capable, so, you know, generally actually we had to do a 
little bit of rotation, I think someone got an injury so that went down a little bit umm and then 
actually you're at a point where, well, they might be rotating between the first team, starting 
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team and the bench but actually same players every week so you just do a little bit of rotation 
because there wasn't a lot of difference or effect on the team by them changing around, so, 
yeah you know it's, I would imagine if we went through...when we lost, we knew it wasn't, it 
wasn't cause people were playing poorly, it was because we needed more time to coach 
different things and, and generally that team needed to learn to play a different way away 
from home, and our away performances did get better so it was just having a bit of patience 
with them, I imagine next season, you know, if we went through a losing streak then we 
might have to, you just ask that question, you go "what is the reason that we're losing? Is it 
because these guys can't do it? Or is it, you know, is that person not performing? Or is it just 
a slightly wider issue that, OK, they play, that same team plays very well at home, just need 
to play, do some things differently" so  
Researcher: So it's the nature of the loss almost?  
JM: Yeah definitely, definitely, it's not just the fact that you lose, you have to look at it, 
sometimes, sometimes it's not the players fault, sometimes you go well actually you know we 
do just need a good two months of training on certain things that will get us to a point where 
we're hopefully we will be able to win away from home but, which is where we got to really 
and, and the age of the players makes a difference as well cause quite a lot of our players are 
young, or certainly in key decision making positions, so actually they in time will learn to 
play, play different styles of rugby umm and so try and stick with them and you go well 
"what does it do", some of your decisions are based on "what will it do to that players 
development?" Actually we, let's just persevere with him for a few weeks and hopefully see 
some improved performances cause dropping him might just dent confidence or, you know 
it's actually, if you've got a 30 year old fly half, potentially not a lot more learning for him to 
do or he's less, less receptive to learning potentially so, you know there's, there's hundreds of 
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factors and it's, it's I guess it's being smart enough or, or knowledgeable enough as a group to 
pick which ones are actually important at the time, yeah  
Researcher: OK, important in what way? In  
JM: Well based on the different circumstances so, you know, we might be looking at...that 
example that we just said is if we're losing away from home, we could go in and go "well he's 
not playing very well" but actually the solution to the problem might be that actually we're 
not, we're not playing the right kind of rugby in those conditions to allow him to play well, it 
might not necessarily be his fault, or it might be a winger uhh in wet conditions that hasn't 
looked very effective and he goes "well, we need to teach, it's our fault cause we need to 
teach him to go and look for ball in wet conditions cause it's probably not gunna get all the 
way through to the hands, to the wing to him so he can show what he can do, or it might be 
that we, we need to kick to different areas of the pitch for him so that he can become part of 
the game, then it's, I think on most things I would always first try and look internally, so I'd 
go "is it something we can change? Is he playing poorly because of something we're doing?" 
Or is it, you know if you feel you're doing everything you can, then actually you go "well 
yeah he's just off form" you know there's been a couple of guys that have been like that this 
season that one of our centres, yeah just wasn't, had a few games in a row where he wasn't 
particularly, he's not an out and out, he's not head and shoulders above in terms of first team, 
he's a good player when he's in there, but he, you know there's three or four of them that 
you'd go "OK they could all get into that mix" so he just wasn't, he had a couple of bad games 
and then I think you could see it sort of affecting his confidence so it's like "well, I'm just 
gunna put you down into the 2s for a few weeks where you get some slightly easier games, 
go score a few tries" you know and that's all it takes sometimes, just a couple of weeks with 
slightly easier rugby and he's looking confident again and you see that in training then you're 
like "OK great" then you're sort of back in, in the discussions for, for first team, yeah  
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Researcher: It's that managing the players essentially as well  
JM: Absolutely, it's looking at the psychological elements, you know looking at them going 
"right well" yeah and maybe having that conversation so before selecting or, cause what we 
do is we meet on Tuesday night and do a general selection, with a few question marks, so it's 
like, yeah OK so...we go, we might stick with that person but we're gunna have a 
conversation with him so sometimes form might be because they got something going on at 
home, but yeah there has been a couple instances where you know one of the guys has gone 
"yeah my...you know my parents are going through, just about to split up" etc. so it's 
affecting, you know it's not necessarily him feeling bad about that, you know he's old enough 
to sort of appreciate it but he's got younger brothers and sisters that he's having to look after 
through the process so it's then deflecting away from his focus on his game so it's like well 
"you know you train when you can, don't worry if you're not here, if you wanna make 
yourself available for a game, great, but if not you just take your time and we're here for you 
and when you're ready to be 100% back in, there's the space for you" so it's, yeah there's an 
awful lot, lot of variables umm some of it's just talking with people I think as well, trying not 
to keep it all to myself because otherwise I think I would make bad decisions but having 
enough people to go, you know sometimes you go "I don't think he's playing well" and 
actually someone goes "well why don't you have a quick chat with him? See what's going 
on?" You know "how's your rugby going?" "Oh I don't think I'm playing that well" "OK 
why's that?" And then all of a sudden you go, you know "I don't think I play very well with 
this person inside me here" or, so you're making, you know it's...knowledge is power isn't it? 
You know and then you can make more effective decisions, and then hopefully your 
selections will be more correct than not, so  
Researcher: Well I mean can you think of anything else over the season that would have 
affected or impacted the, the selection of the team at all?  
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JM: Yeah I think umm the other, the other major one has been, so we have uhh me and 
[assistant coach name] are first team coaches so obviously I head it up and he's the forwards 
coach and then we have [second team coach name] and [second team coach name] who look 
after the second team, now they, they very much wanted, being coaches rather than just 
helpers, they wanna coach a team of players, so they've wanted to coach a team of players, 
now what that means is they want to be successful in their own right, which is absolutely 
fine, I'd be surprised any coach that didn't, but that hasn't necessarily fitted in with when 
we've wanted to use the second team to develop players long-term, so sometimes I've maybe 
made decisions in selection which have allowed, maybe weakened us or maybe not allowed 
us to have the player that we wanted, particularly in terms of bench players, it's not 
necessarily starting players but, you know, your replacement back, it might just be actually 
well "I tell you what, we'll, we won't drop him, we'll keep him because it gives you a stronger 
player this week and", and it keeps them on your side otherwise you kind of, otherwise you're 
just taking their best players from them every week and it becomes and a bit demoralising so 
although I never, I've never sort of said to them that that's sometimes what I'm doing, 
sometimes just take it on the chin and go "well actually, it does them a favour, they'll have a 
stronger team, they'll be happier with it" and this guy we're gunna keep, he's probably not 
gunna let me down, it's probably not that much of a difference, I'll just swallow it at this point 
and go "OK well you guys have them" and try and keep them happier but admittedly those 
uhh both of them are potentially moving on as coaches just because, well one of them's got 
some work changes going on, the other one just became frustrated that a lot of the second 
team players didn't train so as a coach he felt he was just managing a squad on a Saturday as 
opposed to coaching, so you know we looked, hopefully that will give me an opportunity 
next year to bring some people in involve, and almost mould them in what we want, so next 
year we can maybe have a slightly younger 2nd team and go "do you know what? They might 
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lose a load of games but in two, three years’ time, the majority of them could be ready to 
push for 1st team" and then actually we're in a stronger place, so, so that, that's probably the 
other factor is the rest of the coaching team and trying to think how that affects them so, yeah  
Researcher: So it was almost like, you almost had two clubs, or two teams, as opposed to a 
whole sort of team of we'll put them down there to develop them, come back up, there's was, 
you wanted to do that but there was maybe less of it  
JM: Yeah definitely I mean ideally I wanna get to a point where actually I have quite a lot of 
control over the second team selection as well and certainly more feedback on players 
coming, coming back through umm so that we have more flow, the challenge is that then, the 
more players you have to select from, the more difficult conversations you have to have with 
people when you drop them, or difficult conversations with players about why they're not 
being pushed up, and then you've got to somehow keep those players interested in sticking 
around so, yeah, but that, that played a big part in trying to, just occasionally, it wasn't every 
week but you know probably once a month at least where we we're like "OK well, see if we 
just keep hold of that player, [second team coach name]'ll be happier and they'll have a, you 
know they'll have a better team"  
Researcher: And that was more with the bench?  
JM: Yeah I think if we wanted, if a player was good enough to start, I don't think we'd 
compromise on that, we'd go "he's gunna start" but you know I think it was more, because 
sometimes there was progression going from second team, the natural progression is right 
you've played the second team, we'll try and get you onto the first team bench and then give 
you game time, see if you go in there umm cause in theory if someone pulls out of the 
starting team you've got three players, one of those should start, the gap becomes there, rather 
than that, it doesn't always work out like that but that's ideally the natural progression and 
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then sort of the same back down potentially umm but yeah, I don't, I don't know if that's pie 
in the sky that we'd ever get to some of these ideals but I guess time will tell, so  
[Unrelated conversation]  
JM: It just, I was thinking about it coming over and just going "OK what did we talk 
about before? OK and then it's" I don't think I ever really think about how many, as soon as 
you start talking about something, you think "oh there's this factor to take it, then this factor, 
oh and then sometimes we made decisions because of that" it's like, I don't know how we 
cope [laughs]  
[Unrelated conversation]  
JM: It's very psychological in terms of, you know the motivations of the coach as well as the 






Example Raw Data and Coding from Data Analysis in Chapter 4 
Table D1 
An example of the raw data which formed the cues included in the appearance cues theme 
(contained within in the player cues category) 
Cue  Original quote 
  Physical appearance 
Size   
  “Big second row” 
  “He’s a big boy” 
  “Big lad” 
  “You wanna a fly boy and you want a hard bastard” 
  “I’d like to have that [a fast winger and a big winger] make up in the team” 
  “I like that way [a fast winger and a big winger]” 
  “Personally I like playing with a big winger and a speedy winger” 
  “I like the big winger to be a little bit quick as well” 
  “Biggest” 
  “Some guys were very big and powerful but if they weren't, you could see their head wasn't in it, the way they 
move around the pitch” 
  “Not physically very developed” 
  “Scrawny” 
  “One was substantially larger than the other, you know 6'2 and about 17 and a half stone, and by instinct I 
always put him in” 
  “The other guy, who was much smaller” 
  “They were changing, they were developing physically at that, some of them were hitting growth spurts” 
  “Size” 
  “Who's a similar build” 
  “We only had under 17s, we had no older lads to bolster them, no larger lads, so they were always on the small 
side, so I may have leaned towards some of the bigger lads in less familiar positions” 
  “Size can be a comfort blanket on selection” 
  “Size can be a comfort blanket for selection, if you're unsure, the safer option is the bigger lad” 
  “Looks like a scrum half, small” 
  “You can be fooled by the look of a player, not just size” 
  “He's big” 
  “You're big” 
Athleticism   
  “Athleticism” 
  “He's more athletic he gets round the field better, he's less, less of a...hard rucking, mauling type player but more 
dynamic so again so I moved selection that way” 
  “Very athletic” 
  “We have put in a kid into the A team squad that is very able or a really good athlete” 
Young face   
  “Very young in the face” 




  “When you first looked at him you thought “nah, nah”” 
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Cue  Original quote 
  Physical appearance 
  “I remember those instances where I picked people for how they looked” 
  “They look like a player” 
  “The look of a player” 
  “He looked like a 10” 
  “Poise” 
  Age 
Age   
  “Younger” 
  “48 years old” 
  “If a guy is coming in who's older, you've then got to think about well which guy is not playing?” 
  “There are key positions you have to have obviously, you know, if a, if a 52-year-old front row was available 
and we're struggling of course you've got to play your front row” 
  “We only had under 17s, we had no older lads to bolster them, no larger lads, so they were always on the small 
side, so I may have leaned towards some of the bigger lads in less familiar positions” 
  “He's 40 years old” 
  “His age” 
  “Older guys” 
  “The age of the players makes a difference as well cause quite a lot of our players are young” 
  “If you've got a 30 year old fly half, potentially not a lot more learning for him to do or he's less, less receptive 
to learning” 
Under 18   
  “Everyone’s like “whoa, but that lads under 18!”” 
  “We made sure all the 18s played” 






Example Transcripts from Case Study Interviews from Chapter 5 
Head Coach 
Researcher: Alright well, same as last time really, start with, describe the processes you went 
through then this season when you were selecting teams?  
HC: Selecting teams umm like we said umm all those times back, do you need to record this 
or are you recording?  
Researcher: Yeah, yeah it's already started  
HC: Umm yeah basically umm again, you know, some of the guys I already knew, OK, as the 
umm the start of the season we had the new guys come in umm didn't really know them so 
everyone got a clean slate, and that's the one thing that myself, I've always done, you know 
especially the colt level, you know clean slate, just cause you were really good this year, 
doesn't necessarily mean you automatically get a starting place umm so basically we looked 
at training umm we had three friendlies before the season started proper, league umm looked 
at players and we could start then putting people in to positions as in we know, OK, those 
four of the back rowers out of that eight are really what we think are gunna be in and around 
our league side, cause we only had one team in the league in the end, at the start I remember 
when we were speaking we were having two but we only ended up having one because we 
didn't have enough players, we only 33 players. But some of the mind-set changed because 
within about two weeks  training starting we got two players come in, both again, back 
rowers, one called umm [player name] who is a Fijian and he threw a thing up in the air umm 
and also another lad who joined us called [player name], again tough, uncompromising lad, 
so then we were like "bloody hell, that back row ain't gunna be what we think it is" I'm using 
the back row because that's always the hardest thing to pick whenever I've coached umm then 
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[player name] who was our captain unfortunately had a concussion which continued 
throughout the season, he came back, he got hit again, he then did the protocol, came back 
and [tat] we had to, so we had to really look at things but umm mainly in was all about you 
know what they do in training, their attitude and how they are within the, the general, you 
know, scheme of things, what we wanted was a cohesive unit within the whole thing, so we 
know that there's no I'm Billy big bollocks, you know, this lad here, take [player name] for 
example umm I don't know if you already know but he won players player and coaches 
player this year so, but [player name], no airs on graces, he would come and play in a B 
fixture, in a friendly if we needed him to and he was quite happy, he would say "[coach 
name] I'll go on the bench, it's fine, can I, can I help you guys run the line out?" And, and on 
the Thursday, you know, cause we always used to have our team runs with everyone who was 
playing on a Sunday, you know, and everybody else if you're not, even if you was A squad, A 
league game, you'd help out and [player name] then took it upon himself to, you know help 
the guys out, especially when we went on our under 17s cup run, he really worked with them 
because they're, the under 17s, because it's so mix and match, when we did have these cup 
games, with the under 18s cup game it didn't really matter because you just played your best 
side, if it was 18s or 17s, but with the 17s we were a bit buggered because you have to play, 
and they haven't played that much together so we had to do a lot more training umm extra 
sessions now and again just, and [player name] always used to come along so that was what I 
like, you know, and throughout the season, you know, [player name] besides being the best 
player, he also didn't have any airs and graces and help everybody out, and that's, if we're 
looking at a player that you want throughout your team, not just one person, that's the sort of 
player, quite happy to help the other guys to bring them on, you know, and, and it helps you 
know with the selection and everything like that. Front row we were a little bit stuffed with in 
the end, you know, we had two very good hookers umm [player name] and [player name] and 
297 
 
the props, we had four props basically, we had [player name], [player name], [player name] 
and [player name]. Now [player name] and [player name] were always in the A, you know, 
the league team, and it was always between [player name] and [player name], so sometimes 
and, you know, a couple of times I had to go up to [player name], say to him "look you 
haven't made it this time" and, and it's a fag paper, he just, you know, the one thing was his 
scrummaging was better but he didn't get round the park, and he's not a big lad, he's not fat, 
he's not a fat prop, but he just wasn't making himself known on the pitch, see, further now we 
look the, the analysis you've done and you've sent us, you, from your analysis actually cost a 
player his place in the team, but for us it was perfect, and that was a lad called [player name], 
big second row, basically three times in a row we picked him on previous, right, because 
[forwards coach name] would champion him because he was one of his original lads, whereas 
I would be "I'm not too sure" and I'd always have a back-up, and then your analysis came in 
in the [opposition team name] game and then the [opposition team name] game, and basically 
he carried once in each game, and made two tackles, and then the lad I brought on, called 
[player name], we played him on back row for 30 minutes, carried five times and made seven 
tackles, ish, roughly, so basically look, I just went [tap, tap] "there you go" cause he could 
also play second row, so it was like, do you see what I mean? So from my point of view that 
analysis that you brought in helped me out no end, and I can see how it helps, well of course 
it helps in the pro game, for definite, by then it definitely then got me thinking more "hang 
on, what's he doing?" And it also then twisted it with [player name] and [player name], 
although [player name] was a better scrummager, [player name] would carry more and I then 
used your information and showed [player name] "there you go, that's what you did when you 
played, that game that you started and you did it, that's what [player name] did" and it looked 
at it and he went "right, so I've got to carry more ball?" "Yeah, put yourself in a position to 
carry, you know, your tackling’s fine, your tackling’s up on his, but I need somebody to carry 
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ball, not just scrummage" I said "if I want somebody to scrummage I'll just go and get a fat 
lad from off the street and put him in there" and he was like "OK" he went off, trained, 
trained, trained, came back and, and was doing it yeah so it's, the whole thing through the 
season from the start, in my eyes, I've changed because I've had the information, whereas I 
hadn't had it, as you could imagine, I guess that's another thing that you're looking at, you 
know, when you've got the information, does your, do you think differently? And I've got to 
say yes, because then, rightly or wrongly, because I'd seen them two games where [player 
name] had done fuck all, completely changed my outlook to him, whereas I used to be like 
[forwards coach name] "yeah, he's doing, he's a big boy" you know, actually, what does he 
do?   
Researcher: So what do you think you based that on before the stats then?  
HC: Oh previous, previous form, I think, thinking he was better than what he is because I 
didn't have the information in black and white in front of me, because I, you, you, you know 
sometimes you look at a game and you think "oh he played brilliantly" but then you see the 
stats and you think "actually, he didn't" you know, three missed tackles, OK, he had eight 
tackles, four of them were missed, that's shocking innit? Let’s by fair, if he had missed one, 
yeah fair enough, maybe two, but then you'd be talking about it, so yeah, it really, yeah it 
helped me, I thought it was brilliant to be fair, especially when it come to the big games, we 
just, we had uhh lots of conversations about selection after  
Researcher: What after the stats came through?  
HC: Yeah for the following game yeah  
Researcher: How did it change then the dynamic then of that group of coaches?  
HC: Didn't, oh the coaches itself umm [forwards coach name] was still adamant he wanted 
his guys, because you gotta remember [forwards coach name] and [backs coach name] have 
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been with these guys all the way through, whereas me being on the outside kinda thing, it 
didn't matter, I was just like "do you know what? It's there in black and white". [Backs coach 
name], I don't know what he said to you but he knew what I was going on about, he knew, he 
wasn't silly, he knew that I was making a sound, I was being a sound ball but I was also 
saying "look, it's there, we need to change it, we've got the information, let's bloody use it" 
you know, and it was like some of the back three, some of them, the same again, but it's, 
[assistant coach name] was, me and [assistant coach name] whenever we've coached we've 
only ever been one or two players out per 22, we're that in tune with it, well we've coached 
for 8 years together so umm but towards the end me and [backs coach name] were getting a 
bit more in tune and like I was getting to understand a bit more about the backs through him, 
you know I'm not gunna lie I'm a forwards coach you know, I know how to coach the backs 
but to me it's like "all right girls off you go" you know "paint your nails and I'll see you later" 
you know but it helped for me definitely within the forwards because the backs really picked 
themselves, if they were fit, they'd picked themselves, do you know what I mean? Umm if 
one of them was injured then we, we knew we had back up but they did pick themselves 
umm forwards was a lot harder, and that's where your analysis and your stats helped, but 
yeah it did change the dynamic of the coaches in a way as we didn't agree all the time, 
whereas before we did, but as it went on, I became more, I'll be honest I was reliant on your 
stuff, on top of what I was seeing in training, on top of what I was seeing in the game with 
my own eyes, if I had, if it was a case of "right, OK, it's between these two, let’s have a look" 
and then we'd, we'd find them, "OK, [player name]" and mainly a lot of it was sometimes 
down for the subs, you know who can be the most effective off the bench? "OK let’s have a 
look at what last time Matt did his stats, OK, [player name]’s there, OK, he played 20 
minutes against [opposition team name] uhh lets have a look" because you came to the 
[opposition team name] game didn't you?   
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Researcher: Yeah  
HC: Yeah "let’s have a look at the stats then, right [player name] was on for 20 minutes, he 
made six tackles" I think I remember it, it was eight tackles, he missed two, made six, carried 
twice, the lad that was on before him had made four tackles, missed two, carried once, in six, 
in like fifty minutes do you know what I mean? So to me that was like "OK, you get to start 
next time" and everyone's like "whoa, but that lads under 18!" "Yeah but look at the stats" 
"oh but, you know, some of the, they might have brought on their weaker players" they didn't 
because they hardly made any subs, and neither did we because we had four players that 
didn't get on, so it was, in that respect it got a lot of peoples, you know, juices flowing and for 
me now, whatever I go into I'm gunna try and get somebody to be there to analyse the games, 
you know and I'll be honest, you know even if it's me getting someone to videoing it and then 
just looking you know, OK it's gunna be hard work but just, you know or again what you've 
done, get in touch with the local universities and say "is anybody doing any of the analysis 
work?" You know, like yours, or there's all different ways of doing this so you know and just 
say "look, does anybody wanna do it for experience?" Cause it's, honestly it is so informative 
and the way, now I don't know what will happen in the end when you go through everything 
and I think my views have changed over the season, but is it because I've become more 
reliant on that than what I've seen?  
Researcher: What do you think you were reliant, so where you were reliant  
HC: I think I was reliant on, more what the kid was like at training umm how, like I said to 
you before, I always found myself, I was like trying to be their friend, you know, wanna be 
personable, if they wanna come and talk to me they, they can, you know, "let’s have a chat, if 
you wanna, if you don't like the decision come and talk to me and I'll explain it" umm 
whereas now, whereas before I had to really, really think, you know think "have I done that 
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the right way?" "Yeah OK this is the reason" now, when we're playing a game, if the 
following time there was a big game, didn't really use it for like the friendlies and all that, but 
those stats we definitely used for all the league games, league games and the under 18 cup 
games, it was like "there you go, bang, it's there" I remember one kid came up "why I don’t 
understand?" I said "OK fair enough, you played for the As, duh, duh, duh, duh, there you go, 
that's what you did" and they're like "oh but I'm sure I did more than that" I said "look mate, 
there's the criteria" he said "oh I made more tackles than that" I said "nah, you made 14 
tackles, you missed eight of them, you carried three times...passes, how many passes did you 
do?" "Well I'm a 7" "Yeah and? That’s showing me, that you kept taking the ball in when you 
coulda probably, maybe passed" you know, and I used a lot of it for the wingers as well, to 
see what they were doing, if a winger only did one carry he didn't do fuck all, sorry, 
basically, do you know what I mean? He's doing any, he's not coming off his wing, you 
know, if we're in a game like umm and one of them was against [opposition team name], you 
know umm [player name] was playing, didn't come off his wing, [player name] came off his 
wing, scored two stunning tries, one of them I remember he, he came in, behind the full back, 
cut a line and absolutely destroyed, and him and [player name] did that little [passing noise] 
you know which is a great try when you see it, when I saw it on the video, you know and it's, 
yeah, I can see why in the pro game it's a lot easier for them to select players, when you think 
as a fan "why aren't he playing? He's brilliant" and then you look, and then you think "well 
hang on, I've had my mind changed from certain players" it was only those, I'll be honest it 
only probably about three or four, you know, but it got me thinking, you know "actually what 
does he do? Why are we picking him? Is it because of, he's the old guard? Or is it because he 
actually deserves to be there?" So, yeah  
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Researcher: So for the, you were saying then you didn't necessarily use it for some of the 
friendlies and things like that so the game type depended on what you used, but what sort of 
stuff, what sort of process were you going with the friendly games?  
HC: Friendlies, in the end I'll be honest, it was whoever hasn’t, say for instance we had a, an 
A league game, or an A, you know an A game, couple, basically everyone, we'd send all the 
umm Teamer out and say "right, who's available? Umm preference will be going to the guys 
that didn't play or were on the bench so please make yourselves available" long and short of 
it, I used to send a message out on our WhatsApp group "guys for the ones that didn't play 
umm that are not in this side, you will be needed for next week, I don't wanna hear any 
bullshit excuses" yeah umm I've got to go to see my granny’s aunties dog, or, you know that 
kind of stuff, you know, "make yourselves available, if you don't, don't bloody complain 
when you ain't picked" because we've got A game, B game, A game...so  
Researcher: So it was a way of, of essentially the kids that aren't getting the rugby for one 
reason or another, it's sort of bringing them in and giving them games  
HC: Getting them games, yeah, it all, we run a squad, I think in the end we ended up with 36, 
which I don't think's bad for a colt, that's under 18, that's bloody good, cause I remember with 
a couple, with [assistant coach name]'s son umm we were running a squad of 21, that's it, if 
you rocked up you played, we were still very good, well we were very good at 15s and 16s 
but once we got 17s and 18s, we were a very small side, we were quick and compact but we 
were small, that was the problem, but as it progressed we got better and better, but, yeah it 
was uhh for the friendlies it was mainly whoever was available and then we'd just bring in if 
some of the A boys, you know the, were available yeah they played, that's where [player 
name] comes into it where sometimes I'd have to say to [player name] "[player name] look, 
we've only got two second row, can you come and bench and be the second row cover?" And 
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he'd be like "yeah, it's fine" and then you'd turn up "[head coach name] don't worry if I only 
get 10 minutes, just give me a, if you can just give me a decent 15 minutes, you know even if 
you put me on after half time and take me off 20, 15, 20 minutes later" he said "just so I can" 
and he said "and I'll just go balls out" he said "and just make a nuisance of myself and then 
pull me off" so yeah  
Researcher: So you mentioned, [player name] was one of them and there was another back 
row as well  
HC: [player name] yeah  
Researcher: What sort of things then took them from sort of the new kid to actually we might 
wanna start them  
HC: Well they're both, they were both under 17s so they're both the younger age group, now 
[player name] rocked up and he had a bit of a reputation because he was this ex-[professional 
team name] academy and all that rubbish, anyone can get into [professional team name] 
academy, I don't mean that horribly, you play a decent level at county, you down there and 
you pay your £190 you get into the [professional team name] academy because you get all the 
stash, alright umm he rocked up and to start with I thought "ah he ain't that good" he had 
hands like feet, alright, but over the ball and his tackle rate was frickin’ immense, in training 
he would knock seven bells out of people, you know, [player name], another thing about 
[player name] turned up, very quiet boy, just rocked up pre-season, didn't know anybody, just 
rocked in, walked in, came straight up to the coaches "hi my names [player name], I used to 
play at [opposition team name], wanna give it a go here, I play back row, I know you got a 
good back row but I'm planning to make sure I get there or thereabouts by the end of the 
season" shook us by the hand, he said, and that was it, didn't really hear much, boo to a 
goose, he just put his down, got on with his work, but he is what I would class as an enforcer, 
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one of those gnarly bastards that were old school, he was old school but in a new lads body, 
you know, not dirty but just hard, and as he picked, you know he's not flash by any stretch of 
the imagination but when the chips are down and you're on your five metre line defending 
phase after phase after phase, you want him in your side because he'll, he'll get smashed, stop 
the tackle, back up, move across, he's got the brains to, bang, bang, and that's, and as the 
season progressed I remember round about November-ish, both of the boys spoke to me 
separately, said you know "this is the crack, what" and I'll said "well, you gotta just keep 
going, your chance will come" I said "I had this last year with [player name], [player name] 
and [player name] " I said "they all came to me in October, November, [head coach name] we 
wanna play for the A team" I said "right that's good, move them out the way then, play and 
train as hard as you can, make me turn round and say..." I said "cause at the end of the day 
the others will give me their input but I'm the one who picks it so if we lose it's my fault" so, 
and [player name] to be fair, towards the end of the season, he was, the only reason he would 
probably not start in an A game, i.e., the, the cup or the league, under 18s cup sorry, would be 
because we would wanna go a certain way with having two fast 6 and 7s which is [player 
name] umm [player name] umm because, because [player name], you've got him for 50 
minutes, and he'll just run, run, run, but then he's gassed, he's done, he's fitness is gone, he's 
done, you get somebody else on, but then if we're enough in front that's when you bring on 
someone like [player name] because he's an out and out 6, great in the line out, whereas 
[player name]’s not, same with umm [player name], now those boys, when it came to the 
under 17s cup, were immense, best 6 and 7 partnership I've seen for a long time, you know, 
[player name] would do his charging off and, you know his uhh his elaborate stuff with the, 
you know running with the ball, you know lot of running, whereas [player name] would just 
do the dirty, dog, dog fighting stuff at the breakdown, and they complemented each other, so 
they, they did, they made us think you know and towards the end of the season, you know, 
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OK the [opposition team name] game was different because we made sure all the 18s played, 
with some of the 17s, but yeah, they, they, they were a credit to themselves and actually a 
credit to the club in the end because the club are in a stronger position next year and they're 
gunna have two very good, well very good 6 and a very good 7, to start but then I know in the 
under 16s coming up, they're gunna have competition again but that's what you want  
Researcher: Yeah, were there any players that, so I guess [player name], [player name] fits 
into this a little, were there any players that you didn't think they were gunna do anything that 
season, you hadn't really given it a thought, and then all of a sudden something happened  
HC: Yeah, yeah, well [player name], [player name] in a way umm another lad called [player 
name], very shy, he's a back umm played wing or full back and me and [backs coach name], I 
don't know if [backs coach name] said this to you, well me and [backs coach name] were like 
looking at him and we took him to the 7s and he was alright, and then I was thinking, I said to 
[backs coach name] "we needed a 10" cause [player name] was injured or whatever, we didn't 
have a backup 10 basically because [player name], who played 10 in the cup final, where you 
saw at [place name], he umm was at school, he's at [school name], "oh what's it fuck, we need 
at 10" he said "give [player name] a go " I said "nah" he said "nah give him a go" and he 
played, he didn't want to, but he did it and he uhh did very, very well and literally, you know 
you look at it and you think "shitting hell" you know he just kept going forward and forward 
and, you know he played one week, then he'd be out and then, he was always one of those 
lads that, when you first looked at him you thought "nah, nah" but my opinion of him grew 
because he basically took one for the team, didn't wanna play at 10, but actually when he 
started playing there he was actually pretty good, you know maybe not really for the standard 
of the, the A league, the top division umm but definitely you know within a friendly, etc., 
etc., he was definitely, and he, and you could see the confidence in him grew, do you know 
what I mean? As, as the time went along and umm yeah he was definitely a surprise umm 
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there was a couple of surprises that went the other way, yeah there was a couple of surprises 
that went the other way. One was a lad called [player name], who was an under 17, we had 
him in umm he played in the under 17s cup last year when he was a 16 and we, me and 
[assistant coach name] and [forwards coach name] were like "fuck, he's the nuts" umm 
unfortunately he didn't get a lot of time, he didn't get to play a lot because just didn't really 
show it in the end, and then he finally tells me for two months of the season to go that he can 
play hooker, so he started getting a few more games and we developed him that way but he 
went back. And the other one was [player name], I gotta keep saying it, and uhh you know he 
was living on reputation, and he was found out, and he knew he was found out...so, but he 
didn't do nothing about it, you know whereas, you know if I'd have said that to say [player 
name], [player name], [player name] who captained the under 17s, if I would have said "look, 
this is the crack, you need to do this, you know, instead of carrying once, twice, I need you to 
carry four times within the game and get over the gain line, you know even if it's just a metre, 
get over the gain line, you know give me something" but, you know and they woulda done, 
whereas [player name] was just like [whistles]. But yeah they were the only couple that I'd 
say that, yeah, that were a little bit of, disappointment’s the wrong word umm a surprise that 
they didn't kick on, you know especially [player name], I thought he'd a kicked on and proved 
me wrong that why I was picking somebody else but it didn't work like that unfortunately  
Researcher: Fair enough, do you, so you sort of briefly mentioned then, something I didn't 
realise but this, the idea that the under 18s, because they're the year older, do you think that 
gives them sort of a, a status over the other 17s, of "I'm the under 18 so I should be picked"  
HC: Well, I, I think from certain coaches yeah that might be, whereas me it's not, I think it 
was to start with [player name], and I've admitted that, but then once the stats started coming 
in it was like "nah man, off you come", he was still, he was still the better option on the 
bench than anybody else and a second row cover but he couldn't start the second row 
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anymore, so that's when [player name] went in with [player name], you remember, he looks 
like Bart Simpson, big lad, big ball carrier, you know hard as nails, and umm yeah it was, that 
definitely, yeah without a doubt, I keep going back to [player name], I feel sorry for the boy 
but  
Researcher: Nah it's alright, yeah, that was something that I didn't realise that that was that, 
sort of, I guess that would depend, like you were saying you have clean slates, I don't know 
whether the other coaches didn't have that because it sounds like there was, you and [assistant 
coach name] that didn't necessarily have the long relationship that [backs coach name] and 
[forwards coach name] did  
HC: Yeah, I mean the others did, yeah, [forwards coach name] and [backs coach name] did 
yeah, but then the backs, like I said the backs really picked themselves you know and the 
backs, there wasn't much...there wasn't a lot of difference, there's not a lot of difference with 
any of them but you, we all knew who the top 15 were, it was just that, it was always the 
second row that caused the most conflict in the, I wanted to change [player name] a lot 
earlier, but [backs coach name] and [forwards coach name] were both "no let’s keep going" 
"oh OK" so I sort of listened to them when maybe I should of said you know "fuck this, I'm 
doing it my way" but you know you have your other coaches and that's the whole point of it, 
you know you gotta have constructive umm conversations about it, and sometimes you've got 
to let it go to get the information to then say "up yours" kinda thing, in a, in a, in a sporting 
way, do you know what I mean? Umm and I think that was the thing you know and, I dunno 
it's weird you know sometimes you do look at it and you think "ah did I do that because of 
that? Or not? But..." well you'll hear from my thing, I'm always like, you know, chatting 
away and you'll hear a lot of [forwards coach name], you know because that was the whole 
point, you know [forwards coach name] was there he was bringing the plays and all that 
down from the first team because he's the team manager, that was the point of it you know, 
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you know and I'd be back and, you know, say a few things, let [forwards coach name] crack 
them, yeah that's fine, you know, the boys knew who the final say came down to, which was 
the main thing, so  
Researcher: Did you ever override them? Did you ever sort of say "right, no"  
HC: Yeah, couple of times  
Researcher: Why, why were you picking one player when they were picking another then? 
Why do you think that was?  
HC: Because...  
Researcher: Apart from [player name] I suppose because that was obviously, we've spoken 
about that  
HC: Yeah that was umm because they had history  
Researcher: So it's history again was it?  
HC: Yep, yep, it was history, so, it was back row, I did a very contra decision, controversial 
decision and I dropped [player name] once, because he wasn't producing, this was in a 
friendly but he didn't produce in a friendly and then we had a big, two friendlies on the trot, 
when he should have done because the level of opposition we were playing, he should've just 
carved it up, but he didn't, he coasted, so I dropped him to the bench, and they couldn't 
believe I did it, I brought in [player name], and he couldn't believe I'd done it either, so  
Researcher: And did it, did he come back from that? Did he come back and  
HC: Yeah he come back from it, he come back from it and then he realised, I just took him to 
one side and said "mate, you don't just save yourself for the fucking big games, if you're 
playing, you play balls out like you would in a big A league game, big 18s cup game, you'd 
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do the same" I said "those two games you played" I said "I might as well put my son on the 
pitch" and he looked at me and "what do you mean?" I said "you coasted, you did the bare 
minimum" "no I didn't" I said "you did, where were your usual bullocking runs?" You know 
he's a, he's a great one for catching off umm a kick off or getting the tip off from somebody 
who's caught it, from a tip off and charging up, you know, he's quick, he's a big boy but he's 
quick you know his head goes back and he's, you know, straight back and he's pumping his 
arms so yeah he was one, that was one, that was the only one, they couldn't believe I did it, 
but it gave us, but when I did it, when he did come on in a league game when it was one that 
you didn't, I don't think did, it was the one that you missed  
Researcher: The one where I went to the wrong bloody ground  
HC: Yeah, my fault as well  
Researcher: No that was my fault that one  
HC: The umm yeah, he came on with 20 minutes to go, we were, and he basically tore it up, 
and afterwards I said "what does that feel like?" he goes "what you mean?" I said, he goes 
"well I was pissed off I weren't starting" I said "good, so when you play a friendly what are 
you gunna do?" He said "I'm gunna play the same as I played today" "there you go, that's 
what you gotta do"  
Researcher: So do you think selection then is a motivation tool?  
HC: Yeah, yeah because a lot, some of the lads, a lot of them it's about, it's cred, about being 
in that league team, whereas others, they're just like "yeah whatever". Some of them think 
they should be in it but, if they deep down they look at themselves, they know that, no come 
on, do you know what I mean? Whereas sometimes it's hard, you know sometimes it, you 
know sometimes it wasn't, but like definitely, I keep saying it but it did help with those, 
having those stats because we could come back to check on something  
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Researcher: It does sound that then, a lot of the thinking, like you were saying, you sort of, 
you knew your 15 really, if they were all fit you knew  
HC: At the start of the season I knew yeah but as the season went on things cropped in you 
know, new players, you know the younger guys were coming through, other guys improved 
umm I've got to be honest, towards the end of the season, most positions it wouldn't have 
mattered who we put in, so to me that's a good thing because at the beginning of the season 
we would have, if we woulda had 40 players we could have picked an A and a B side quite 
easily, but towards the end of the season I'd say three quarters of the team, let’s think, two 
thirds of the team you could slot with somebody and it wouldn't make blind bit of difference, 
because they know what we're doing, they know the plays, they know, you know, they're that 
sort of same player, I don't know if that's a good or a bad thing because it's sort of like 
strangling the uhh flair and the maverickness, I don't know if that's a word, of the player but 
for definite it was umm it proved to us that we brought kids along, you know boys along, you 
know we made them better players from what we were doing, so  
Researcher: Right, cause it does sound that, like you were saying as you went through the 
season its, its, the big things that were changing your mind were performances, so there were 
game performances, performances in training, it wasn't necessarily, so say at the beginning of 
the season you might say "well this kids 6 foot 5, he's clearly gotta be on the pitch, he's huge" 
whereas actually those sorts of thinking, that  
HC: Oh yeah that thinking went out the window umm to an extent because you looked at it 
and you think "OK let's see what he's doing in the game, what did he do last game, we got 
information on? Well he did nothing" so, you know, "what about this? What did he do? Well 
he's doing well in training, he's putting the effort in, he's helping the others out, he's", you 
know, so yeah it did, it did change the dynamic, well changed the dynamic of how I thought 
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umm not too sure about the rest of them but, you know [back coach name] only ever really 
needed to worry about the backs, if he, I never picked the backs, I'll be honest there, I knew 
what I thought I'd have, but it was always, the last say really on the backs came down to 
[back coach name], cause he give, you know, or he would give me his preference, we'd talk 
about it, you know I'd give him my view of what I thought, he would then counter argue or 
not, you know, and then we'd, you know we'd sort of agree to disagree in sometimes but not 
in a bad way, just looking at it you know, and like he'd be like "do you know what, it 
wouldn't matter if you put him A or B in the wing position because they're both the same 
player" he said "just don't have them both of the pitch at the same time, either wing because 
they're both too similar" because you wanna, you wanna a fly boy and you want a hard 
bastard, who's gunna punch through the centres if he needs to and come through the 12 and 
13 channel, that's how we play, we always used to have a fly by and a brute force, an 
ignorance winger, still gotta be pace, so I don't know if you knew, noticed towards the end of 
the games is we moved [player name] from full back to wing and put [player name] to wing, 
to full back sorry, the older lad went to full back and one because [player name] had hands 
like feet and in a full back that ain't a bloody good, but you'll know from your stats for the 
weekend uhh for a, like we had a game umm one of the league games umm but yeah we was 
umm you know but the backs definitely it was, a lot to do with [back coach name], you know, 
and the thing is with [back coach name], like me I think he, after a few months of the season, 
he was like "do you know what? We gotta re-look at it and just do it on game stats, also 
training, you know who's listening" it's hard with backs training because they never frickin’ 
well turn up training do they? It's always the bloody forwards, we used to get 22 forwards 
and four backs  
Researcher: That's because it rains  
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HC: Well exactly mate, exactly, you know the Nancy, the fly boys they don't wanna know if 
it's cold and wet, but you know in that respect yeah, that's how we worked it  
Researcher: Well can you think of anything else over the season that you sort of, bits of 
information that maybe you used or affected team selection in any way?  
HC: Hmm I think I didn't use umm my friendships with the players as much as I would have 
done in the past umm because if they weren't doing the business and we had the proof of it 
from you umm it was like, you know "nah sorry, just cause you're, that ain't how it's gunna 
work" you know, I had to do it to [player name], [forward coach name]'s boy, there was a 
couple of games he was awful, I had to drop him, alright it was a friendly but it was a 
prestigious friendly, he thought he was gunna start and I had to drop him, you know "why are 
you dropping me?" I said "I'm not dropping you I'm putting you on the bench" "well that's 
dropping me" I said "it's not, it's putting you on the bench" "well there's only two bloody 
scrum half’s [head coach name]" he said, I said "well if you wanna look at it dropping, so 
why am I doing it?" "Because I had two shit games" "there you go, so why are you asking me 
then?" He said "oh" I said "look", [player name] also works for me, and I was like, you know 
"you know what you gotta do, you're a better player than what, what you've been doing, get 
your finger out" and he did, fair play to him, he, he, but...there's nothing else I would say 
more than that you know umm don't get me wrong the analysis as I said to you earlier is 
definitely doing me a, well it's the information at a button innit? So it's, it's good, you know 
and we can look at it and think "shit, that's good" yeah that really helps so  
Researcher: You mentioned there with the two wingers there, you were saying you like a fast 
one and a bit of a brute, did you decide that that's what we like because of the players that 
you had? Or did you think "I like a quick guy and a big guy, let’s get, right he's quick and 
he's big" do you see what I mean?  
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HC: Umm yeah, I see what you mean yeah, I dunno, the thing with that is, yeah I like, I'd like 
to have that make up in the team, you know, I think if you look at most teams you have that 
umm you know take Wasps for example, they always have a big winger, but then they have 
Christian Wade, you know and I like, I like that way umm with the thing of, you also need 
then to have a decent full back because the quicker winger with the nimble feet may not 
necessarily be as good in defence, so you need to have that, so there is that, and sometimes 
umm I dunno, we did play a couple of times, I remember playing once when we had just 
three wingers that had never, no [player name], no [player name], no [player name], who 
were the normal starting 18, and we had to play three wingers all on the, you know two 
wingers and one full back, I think we, and when we did, actually no sorry we had a winger at 
full back, a winger on the wing, and then we had to put a flanker on the wing called [player 
name], this was in a friendly game, in the second half because we had injuries and this, that 
and the other, and uhh [player name] in 10 minutes scored a hat trick, and he was a flanker, 
so basically that then changed our mind, we had him then, when he used to, he used to get 
selected then for certain games because he could cover both flank and wing, you know, so it 
worked, it did work in that respect you know umm yeah I dunno, it's it was a weird one, but I 
like, personally I like playing with a big winger and a speedy winger, I like the big winger to 
be a little bit quick as well but, you know, depending on how we're gunna play and if we're 
gunna bring him in between 12 and 13 or 13 and umm 10 and 12, you know depends on 
which way you wanna play, I'd rather have, if you haven't got a big full back but you've got a 
big winger, I'd rather bring the winger through and the full back can just cover, and then you 
can see if you can punch it up the middle, bit, bit George North esc, but just not with two big 
brutes like Cuthbert and North, more like Cuthbert, more like North and Williams or 
something like that, so  








Researcher: Simple to start off, describe the process that you went through this season when 
you were selecting a team  
FC: Right umm I think...in the past umm [backs coach name], who you've met, [backs coach 
name] and I brought [player name]'s lot through from under, under 7s, under 7s yeah, so all 
the way through, my background is I've been here man and boy, so 40 years of stuff, I first 
played for [club name] when I was 15 umm and then through that I was club captain, first 
team, all sorts, and then I coached county under 17s, and then I was with the colts for a long, 
long time, like [professional player name], who played for [professional team name] when 
they won the European Cup, he was one of my colts, so umm and I'm still in contact with 
them, so my wife and I have been to probably about a dozen weddings of lads who, who I 
coached as colts, so, yeah I've been here man and boy and then through [player name]'s age 
group coming up to colts, there's no way [backs coach name] and I wanted to stop and just 
hand over to [head coach name] and umm you see a lot of the sessions actually that, if I was 
here then [head coach name] would let me take and umm because I'm also managing the first, 
I coach the second team, but I couldn’t be here every Tuesday and Thursday, but we had a 
fantastic season because I really put the pressure on that if they didn't train, they didn't play, 
and I put, I put the captain in the thirds and all sorts so umm and then I couldn't continue with 
that, because I couldn't, if I couldn't be here on a Tuesday or Thursday through work, we can 
cover each other in the colts but the seconds there wasn’t, effectively you can't keep missing 
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stuff, so that's why I do what I do with the first team because if I'm not here on a Thursday I 
can still manage match day stuff on a Saturday, so a lot of the stuff that we do in pre-season 
and stuff, I, like skills I would've taken directly from what [first team coach name] does, from 
Thursday, to take it down to colts umm our line out calls are the same, our defensive calls, 
our feet and in is exactly the same as the first team use, so we have a commonality, so the last 
game of the season, [player name], [player name], [player name] and [player name] played in 
the first team, so for me that was a very proud moment, you know, one, my son but secondly 
four other, four of the colts playing up there, so umm yeah so when it comes to selection it's a 
bit of a, by committee umm and when we got to player of the year, [player name] got, we 
knew [player name] had players' player, so [assistant coach name] is like being this nice, 
generous bloke saying "well if [player name] 's got that, then somebody else should get 
coaches' player" and I said "well that's bullshit, in my opinion, my opinion is that if you're the 
best player, you get it" and he said "yeah but so and so has played for the first team, so and so 
played, [player name] and played these games for the second team, he's played, my son was 
in county, was it South West under 20s squad, [player name] played for the South West under 
18s" I said "well that's immaterial to me, what we're picking is the, the best colt out there this 
season, both on and off the pitch but what he does for the colts, not what he does for the first 
team or what he does for South West, it's the colts" so I argued that point fairly forcibly and 
the others backed me up and umm and [player name] got both, I said "we're not dealing with 
under 14s where you're sharing out awards or trying to be fair to everybody, we're 
recognising those who are the best players, life's competitive", but when it comes to the 
others, we would all, if it came to South West cup or league games, then we would pick 
strongest pack, and you might have a discussion on one back rower over the other back row 
or, or whatever umm but what it did do is reinforce your, your stats you did at [opposition 
team name], I mean I don't know if you know, [opposition team name] is a nemesis for us, we 
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had never beaten them through, until that game you came to watch, so for, for me and [backs 
coach name], not so big for [backs coach name] uhh for [head coach name] and [assistant 
coach name], but for [backs coach name] and I and those lads, at that age group, the older age 
group, that was massive, so last year when we came up to the colts, or when we came, bought 
my lot as under 17s in, you could go out there now and they'd be one group over there and 
one group over there, and one group would be the 17s and one would be the 18s, and they 
thought that umm and [head coach name] said the year before "oh yeah you're, the 18s will be 
the A team and the 17s will be the B team" I said "that's bollocks, absolute bollocks" so I 
went to see [director of rugby name] and I said, [director of rugby name], and I said "you 
need to have a say here as DOR on what's happening" and he said "no, if 15 of the 17s are the 
best players, they will play as the A team" which is how it should be in my opinion, so [head 
coach name] took that and then umm so for the league games we picked the strongest squads, 
and last year we had this, still had this us and them, and by the end of the year there were 
probably eight or nine of the younger lads were in the, were in the, were in the A team and 
they were South West champions last year, so umm and, and they got on alright, the club 
dinner at the end, they were all in there together, that's what we made a major mistake not 
inviting you to that because you could've observed them together actually, and then this year, 
I said to the older ones "we don't want what happened last year, happening this year, so it's up 
to you older ones to welcome this lot in" and they played together at school anyway, so this 
year we never, ever had an us and them, it was one big bunch, and then we picked on merit, 
and the stats you produced at umm against [opposition team name] resulted in us dropping 
[player name] for a game afterwards cause he, we noticed he was, he was just not putting the 
work in, and I had, I had my reservations about, always being in position at the edge of a 
ruck, but why is always on the edge of a ruck? Why is he not hitting rucks? So it, we did use 
it, we did use it in that respect but ultimately, if it, if I was running the colts, at some stage 
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somebody has to say "right I'm making the decision, this is what it is" ultimately when it was 
the 17s cup run, or the 18s cup run, we knew who we were picking really, and there would be 
a healthy debate about it, and it would be based on some things, some things, like [player 
name], we were gunna play my son, there, [player name] who's 15, but he's in [professional 
team name] academy, we were gunna play, we played him, I had to sign a parent disclaimer 
for him to play against umm the Irish team we played who are under 19s, and he played 10 
and controlled the game, so we were gunna bring uhh in fact some of the games where 
[player name] played, [player name] is now at [school name] academy, I'll play him ahead of 
him any time, and that's not nepotism, that's, cause [player name]'s calm and controls the 
game, and out there in that game against [opposition team name], in the national cup, [player 
name] had another one of those games where he went AWOL, and I, for me it was our 
leaders, there's a core leadership group in that team, they didn't lead, including my son at, 
well [player name] had to go to 10 which didn't help, but those guys went off plot yet again 
and we, I guess that's one of the frustrations of the season, because they were quite capable of 
going all the way to the final, and [opposition team name] got the final...so that, yeah 
frustrating, so in terms of the, much of the selection would come down to whether they 
trained, definitely, and we definitely dropped people because they weren't at training umm 
[player name], the big, black lad who come up and play late on, early in the season him and I 
had a, not a nose to nose but I said "everybody for two years has been blowing smoke up 
your backside, you're massively overweight, you're out of condition, yes you're a big ball 
barrier but for like five minutes, and then you, you're lazy" anyway, he threw the toys out the 
pram uhh and went to [opposition team name], and, but he never actually played, although he 
told everybody he was, but he was never registered for them or anything, and then he came 
back, and I said "are you coming back and gunna be, act the big I am? Because that won't 
work" and to his credit he's, he's gone to [college name] this year, he's lost a shed load of 
318 
 
weight, you know he's a lovely, lovely lad, he's just had a difficult background, but I've had 
loads of them who've had difficult backgrounds and you can normally turn them round and 
point them in the right direction, I think that’s as much as uhh, the umm satisfaction of doing 
it as, as the actual rugby, you know, I mean like [player name]'s got four lads coming over 
tonight and one of them I call him my community aid project, because he's always, he's just, a 
lovely lad but he's just stupid at times, and [player name], one of these lads, he's a gymnast, 
only been playing rugby a couple of years, he's a massive potential, his dad has never been to 
see him play, lives six miles away from him, and never comes to watch him play, so, like 
tonight he, [player name] said he's got eight or ten of them coming for a BBQ, and he said 
umm "[player name], but [player name] can't come because he can't, he can't get home 
tomorrow" I said "I'll take him home" his dad won't even come and pick him up, so it's not all 
just about, it's about what they put in as well for each other, I mean his lot are an outstanding 
group of mates, well so are [player name]'s lot umm so umm I don't know if I'm going off on 
a tangent here  
Researcher: No it's alright, so you were saying training's quite important then when it comes 
into  
FC: Yeah if they, they continue to miss training, and we always have this argument with 
public school boys, the captain last year was at umm...[opposition team name], trying to think 
of the public school up there, and umm he would swan up and then be captain on a Sunday, 
and I said "how can we have our captain, who's never at a team run? You know never at a 
team run" so in the summer I said if he's not there before the league games then he can't, he 
can't play, and his dad got, was the team admin guy, got upset by it but in the end we said 
"well what are we trying to do then? Are we gunna pick a team of the best players who never 
train?" Cause that's not what it's about either, it's about, and you can't, can't have a driving 
maul or a line-out, you know we put a, an awful lot of work into our line out, last year in the 
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national 17s, [region name], or the national semi-final, we won 14 out of 15 clean line outs, 
because we'd put work into it, so we had a turn of ball and [player name] ballsed it up, but 
then also, I think sometimes we're a bit soft, we played [player name] because he's our 10, 
where maybe we should've probably brought [player name] up or somebody up, and then we 
brought [player name] in, but he's at [school name] school and they won't release him, so you 
have those policies, so we say well they're club member, he's done all the pre-season, he's 
gone off to school, is that his fault? Do we want him to play at [club name]? Yes we do, so 
you have to give them some encouragement to, to come and play, you know, so it, it, I dunno 
it's a balancing, but what we also do as well, with this lot, is we, a lot of people think that 
when they come up from 17s and they get into a bigger squad, that they're gunna get less 
rugby, but they actually, the weaker boys actually got more rugby, so [player name] who 
played on the wing, he would never have got that many games had it just been an age group 
team because you wouldn't have had as many matches, and then it would just be league 
games and you'll play your, obviously, your strongest side, I mean we, the last game of the 
season we played, well the last colts game was at umm a league match and we went over to 
play [opposition team name], was it a league match? Can't remember, think it was a league 
match, and uhh we should've slaughtered them, and we picked...a team just of 18s, cause it 
was their last game ever an age group, so the emotional side says "yeah great" what we 
should've done was go out there with the best team, spank them, and then put on, so we 
finished with a team of 18 years olds, and we agreed afterwards we all messed up on that one, 
cause we should a won the game, that was the ultimate aim of the day and umm so they felt 
pretty let down as that, we did get another game for them to finish off with, but umm it's 
always difficult, you know, you'll have parents who think little [player name] is fantastic, I'm 
probably harder on [player name] at training than anybody, my son and, you know, he doesn't 
get any favours as a result, but if I'm not at training, and [player name] will say "ah waste of 
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time last night, cause you weren't there, cause everybody's pissing about" so...it's umm 
sometimes you've gotta give them a bit of stick and other times you haven't you know, but 
same with this lot, the first team guys, you know, you know when the bus is, needs to be 
cleaned, they clean the bus, cause we've had it with umm we have a coach from [football 
team name], from [bus company name], and they also do [football team name] football club, 
and we have a contact that our bus has to be of a certain standard, and they turned up on 
uhh...they turned up with one bus one day and it was [football team name] football clubs 
execs bus, so it's like tables all the way down it, I mean we have the four tables on our bus 
and stuff but this had Sky Sports and all sorts, and then the driver said "you have to 
understand, this is not to be, you're not allowed to drink on this bus" and I said "you have to 
understand it's in our contract that we can drink on the bus, but the bus will be left clean and 
tidy when we finish"  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: So when you're explaining to little Johnny why, and if they have been dropped and 
they're right on the edge, we, before we announced to team to anybody, [head coach name] 
and I, or whoever it is, will take them aside and explain why, what's happened, before we 
announce it, because the worst thing is being in the huddle and then being told, it's like first 
team boys are always told beforehand, so, that when they come to training they're not, you 
know, they know they've got, they're not selected or they're on the bench, so it's in, so they've 
accepted that fact hopefully before they come, because the first team boys get one, one fee for 
playing and one fee on the bench so it can hit the pocket as well you see  
Researcher: Yeah, yeah, so then the, those standards then that you hold for sort of just 
generally being at the club, does that then transfer into team selection? There are these 
standards where players have to meet to be able to then be selected?  
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FC: Well I think if somebody was continually late, and they're always some people 
continually late, we'll say "right you're not starting now, right you're on the bench, so and so's 
starting because you're late, and when you're late you let everybody down" my [player name] 
is umm applying for university, and he has had issues with umm focusing on certain things, 
or time, attention span and, planning things so we've had him checked out and they, he's, and 
they think he's like not dyslexic but there's dyslexic things in there, so process and planning, 
so sometimes he will umm when he, last game of the season he's picked, and my, time 
keeping is probably one of the most important things to me, like I was shitting myself tonight 
because I thought I was gunna be late, I said to [player name] "if Matt can here on time from 
London then I'm sure as hell need to be on time from [place name]" and I got a gas bottle for 
this barby and I thought "I'll just check that regulator" and they've given me the wrong gas 
bottle so I, that's why I was in a bit of a tits, so he knows how important time keeping is to 
me, and nobody wants to stress when you're having a team meeting "where is he?" And he 
was late for the team meeting, driving from [place name], five miles away, so when we say to 
them, you know, "get your, get stuff done the night before, get a process of planning so you're 
not stressed out, where are my, where are my extra-long studs?" when it's wet or something, 
plan, so that you're not stressed so all you got to do is think about the game, I think that's why 
it works for the first term cause they come in, I'm in here about three, four hours before kick-
off on a Saturday, so when they come in the changing room is everything's done, everything 
is done, so they have, they don't want for anything, but all it does is all they, their only excuse 
then is to focus on the game, so when, if kids are particularly late because their dad can't be 
arsed or they can't be arsed then we would, we would say "well you're not starting today" 
what else? ...umm we, we've never had a discipline issue with [player name]'s lot, we've 
never had it where we've had to say, I don't think we've had a sending, have we had a sending 
off? Well [player name] in that game, he got sent off at the end of the game when he levelled 
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somebody but the guy had hit him first, and we called him not so hard [player name] because, 
[player name], [player name], the hooker, [player name], he's umm five A star A-level 
student, so is [player name] the centre but he's in danger of going too much into himself, he's 
so serious about everything, and umm...[player name] will, [player name] will write after 
training "what did you think to my passing off my left hand?" Or something "well [player 
name] I'm watching 30 other lad’s mates, not just your passing off your left hand" and he's 
almost, I would say [player name] is, [player name], my [player name] and [player name] are 
natural footballers because they've been down here since they were babies, so they've always 
had a ball in their hands and they've both got great kicking skills, they both pass off both 
hands, they both kick off both feet, and they're good at all other sports, [player name] is 
almost, to me, almost manufactured, does that sound right? It's like it's umm not robotic 
movements but stuff he's learnt, yeah, he's learnt, not what he's, so that's why he tackles like a 
train, cause all he's gotta do is hit a target, but if you gotta, say, use a, put a little chip in over 
the top or something then that takes him out, [player name] is...umm play, play, play, and 
sometimes you just say, that's why we play that rugby league in training, sometimes and then 
you say "go" or "turnover" and so they just play what they see, rather than playing by 
numbers, yeah, I mean the first team have three phases, and normally after three phases, if we 
can get past three phases you can start getting defences disorganised, and then spot the 
mismatches, and some of our lads will do that, and that's why they'll play national league 
rugby, some of them will only play social rugby from now on, because they won't, they're not 
capable of that step up, and I guess you call it playing intelligence, you know we say if we 
get a turnover, what we're trying to do in that, most of these games, is if we get a ball, [player 
name] just wants to take the first pass off the scrum half and run, and I say "your first job is 
to lift in the line out, scrum at scrum time, and hit rucks, your second" our back row, like 
[player name] is the best ball carrier we've got, I said "when we're coming round the corner 
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[player name] is our natural one to give it to because he's out best ball carrier, and then what 
we, in that game we got trapped into this one out, bang, and all they did was chop us and got 
over the ball, and so I said at half time "stop doing this, either we bang somebody up the 
middle, wider, and then we get round the corner and we stretch them, or we got two, we tip 
on and we start running at spaces, not continually at faces" and that's, the good ones can 
switch to that, and the, the not so abled players can't see it, like [player name] the black lad, 
when he comes round the corner, he doesn't even know he's doing it, he runs awesome lines 
and awesome timing, and he will be, if he goes to university and gets coached properly he 
will be awesome, but he's a late developer, [player name] the captain, we miss him because 
he's your old fashioned number 8, put a foot on the ball and control a game, and we had, we 
lost him long term with concussion, which was a massive loss, so I don't know what will be 
the result of him long term, but you see the, [player name] just got released from 
[professional team name], and we had his exit interview last week and umm he supports 
[professional team name] so he said "shall I wear my [professional team name] kit?"  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: Anyway, [player name], the scrum half, he got most, we gave him most improved player, 
and at the start of the season I said "do you know why [player name] starts ahead of you?" 
And he said "cause he's better" and I said "why, why is he better?" He said "oh he runs 
harder, he's a better kicker and umm he's a better passer" and I said "well I agree with all of 
those" I said "but do you know what makes him a better rugby player at the moment for me?" 
He said "what?" I said "cause he talks non-stop, and you don't talk at all, so our project for 
this season on you is gunna be box kicking, speeding up your pass, getting the ball away from 
the break down quicker, and number one priority is you are gunna bloody talk" cause he's 
quite a quiet guy but by the end of the season he's gobbing away at all the big boys, you 
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know, all the older ones and that for me is like a massive, massive improvement, cause, have 
you ever had the opportunity to watch a premiership side train? How loud is that?  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: So there's all, so it's really difficult just around selection, why would you pick somebody 
ahead of, if somebody would say "yeah he's a better talker" they would get picked for that as 
well...cause we want, I dunno you want leaders out there, so if you got 15 brilliant rugby 
players and no body speaks you're stuffed  
Researcher: Yeah, yeah would that be something then, if someone maybe wasn't, their 
passing maybe wasn't quite as good or they're tackling wasn’t maybe quite as good but 
they're talking, their leadership was well up there, that sort of trade off, would that ever 
happen at all?  
FC: Yeah I think it would, well it happens in first team, [first team player name] our first 
team fly half umm his sister lives with [first team player name] so I better not let him hear, 
but [first team player name] 's wonderfully talented, massively overweight, wonderfully 
talented, and if he's got [first team player name] standing next to him, he can be awesome, 
game against [opposition team name] at the end of the season, [first team player name] didn’t 
play, and [first team coach name] said to me "this is gunna go tits up because [first team 
player name] hasn’t got anybody in his ear telling him what to do" and we played Spaniard, 
the Spanish guy, and because there's no communication, especially in D, like [first team 
player name] will take the line-up and [first team player name] will talk non-stop, very quiet 
person, doesn't say an awful lot in the changing room, when he has to, everybody listens, but 
when he's leading the defence it makes such a difference  
[Unrelated conversation]  
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FC: And I guess in back rows you want a balance, so you want, you want a big ball carrier, 
you need another line out person, so if we played [player name] and [player name] and some 
of, and then we had, well the issue with umm you know umm [player name], who did his 
knee?  
Researcher: Uhh oh yes, yeah  
FC: Well I argued not to play him in the [opposition team name] game, or one of the things I 
argued against him was, because he's had four yellow cards for ill-discipline, not fighting, 
just stupid, late, you know, late, or repeatedly offside, and, and you can't afford to be 
continuing without players on the pitch, so that would come into it  
Researcher: OK, so discipline on the pitch, giving stuff away  
FC: Yeah I mean we, we haven't got an issue with, where somebodies gunna turn around and 
chin somebody, I mean some sides, or, [player name]'s age group, well I can you this once, I 
do [player name]'s age group as well  
[Interruption]  
FC: Yeah they lost one game, they lost to [opposition team name], an interception at the end 
of the game, and umm as I left, I was going over to [opposition team name], I said "I want 
him off the pitch" and that was the flanker  
[Interruption]  
FC: So I said "I want him off the pitch" and [player name]'s going to me "get, get him off" 
now we'd been to, and I never, I've never had this with [player name]'s age group, all the way 
through, because I think we've always ruled with a bit of an fist, rod, fist of iron, but we have, 
like a good, big crack, but we don't, you know, when [player name]’s lot, when you blow the 
whistle with [player name]'s lot, they run to the whistle, [player name]'s lot is like, they're all 
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talking and chatting and I said "just concentrate for an hour, then we can go" cause I don't 
believe in two hour sessions, I think it's...and umm this lad was over at [opposition team 
name], [opposition team name], and we played a league match, and uhh we put him in off the 
bench, and this was a game, we had two, he's a body builder, power lifter, and he's very 
arrogant, and his dad will never say "[player name], you know, wind your neck in" or 
anything, and umm if you don't pick him he sulks, he's like this in changing room, I said 
"[player name] if you wanna come next door and discuss it I'm perfectly happy to, but that's 
the team we picked, the three of us" so they'd say "[forwards coach name] why have you 
picked this" country community project, I call him [player name], I said "because [player 
name]’s the only one in the back row who actually chop tackles and gets over the ball" I said 
"[player name] got a big" we've got a big umm ball carrier but he's, he's not very aggressive, 
and I said "so" I took him off in one game, I said "you're not going, you can go back on at 
half time, but unless you show me some aggression and you wanna work for the team, it's not 
just about you ball carrying" but he came on in the second half and he was like, cause he was 
brilliant, but that's exactly the reaction I was trying to get off him and umm anyway [player 
name] and this guy’s [player name] are very alike, they both wanna carry, they hand off, and 
they don't, they don't wanna do the dirty work, so, so have a mix and [opposition team name] 
were unbeaten all season until we went over there, anyway so we put [player name] on at half 
time, and umm then he started, the referee gave a umm decision which he didn't agree with, 
and then started off mouthing off to this ref, who was their, one of their coaches, but we'd all 
agreed it, and I have to say he did a great job in this game, and [opposition team name] 
coaches were great, there was no agro on the pitch until [player name] got on there and 
started all this posturing and stuff, so I took him back off, and he's like "what are you doing?" 
And I said "I can't have this [player name]" I said "I've been a member of this club for 40 
years and I" I said "it takes two seconds to lose our reputation cause of acts from you guys so 
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you're, you're off" so we get to training the next week and I sat them all down and I said 
"boys I refuse to have our clubs name besmirched by actions like we saw last week" I said 
"there are always gunna be reactions where you don’t agree" and I said umm but when he 
starts going off, I said "when you've got your team mates asking for you to be taken off the 
pitch, because they're not enjoying it, they're embarrassed, so it's can't happen" so the 
following week umm...there was another incident and yet again, oh it was out here, and umm 
the following week, and we put him on the bench and he's like [player name], the other guy, 
is a [professional team name] with [player name], and we played [player name], but he's at 
school with him and they're sometimes buddies, and they're like, cause we didn't start him 
he's like, making faces in the changing room, and I said "[player name] we've been through 
this before, you know the issues that go around this, it's a whole mixture" so we went out 
there, I left and I'd asked for him to be taken off but yet again he was in trouble there, 
mouthing off at the ref and threatening to send him off and everything, so the following 
week, read the riot act again, and I was, had to take [player name] to umm [region name] 
training so I couldn’t go to [opposition team name], so this coach, this dad on the touch line 
was running the touch and typical Sunday morning gets chatting about what he did last night 
with somebody and missed whether this guy put his, did or did not put his foot in touch, so 
they reckon he might have put his foot in touch but [club name] won the game and yet again 
[player name] went up to the touch judge and he's like this in his face, posturing and 
everything else, so they rang me and [other coach name] said "do you know what? I'm not 
sure I wanna carry on coaching if this is what we have to deal with" so I said "well I've been 
here years, I know what to do, tell him to turn up to the club in a shirt and tie and we're gunna 
have a formal club disciplinary" I said, and when we done it, we suspended him then to the 
end of the season, so he missed a 10s tournament and the last game, and they said "can he 
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come training? We'll do it afterwards" I said "no, do it before training, he's banned, he's not" 
we have to set an example to these lads, two lads were warned as to future conduct  
[Unrelated conversation]  
Researcher: So I guess it's the, so would it be then the sort of behaviour, and the attitude, is it 
sort of the mixture of  
FC: If they come to training, I'm trying to think who's, who's, who'd play despite him being 
an arse and there aren't any...you know we've had it with [player name]'s lot where, I 
remember my dad died eight years ago   
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: So they have like a contempt for those people, so I think they get pushed away, cause we 
had 50 odd boys at [player name]’s age group at one stage...so umm yeah and then they 
whittle away because they realise it's too, it gets more and more physical every year umm 
they have other interests, they find girls, they find, some of them, some of, we’ve had it 
where some of them say "I'm not doing, I'm not playing this year cause I'm concentrating on 
my A-levels" which I find is the biggest crock going you know, [player name], [player name] 
will get five A stars, [player name] will get five A stars, [player name] will get five A stars, 
you know we've had it where [player name], somebody was put on there "sorry I can't come 
because I've got too much homework to do" the following week [player name] will say "it's 
all about prioritising your time" he said "and on a Thursday night your priority mate is here, 
not school work, get your life, get your time sorted out, you're letting everybody in the squad 
down" and it's much better when it comes from them then when it comes from us, but I just, I 
think everybody who's, who's focussed enough on their A levels can get what they deserve, 
and they shouldn't give up everything else just for it, you know  
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Researcher: Yeah, you mentioned before though, with the back row, you were talking about 
combinations, does that mean that when you're coming to select you're not necessarily 
picking 15 individuals, you're picking sort of pods of combinations going through  
FC: Yeah, I mean if you've got some, if you’ve got somebody in, in the centres for instance, I 
just don't want two bangers, so I'd rather have a ball player that can set up a banger, or, you 
know, probably [player name] was, it's hard to pick out him but he, in the big games he's been 
dreadful, I went and watch [player name] play for [county name] under 20s and [player 
name], yet again, total capitulations, so how, like what [school name] see in him I really don't 
know umm so yeah, and if you've got, you can't just have a, obviously the biggest pack 
you've got just with big lumps, you know [player name] was in the As and then he lost all his 
confidence, his parents split up everything, I spent an awful lot of time on him, awful lot of 
time and umm he came up to me at the end of the season and said "you've been like my 
second dad" and I drive, and I would drive him hard on, he said "am I ready for first team 
yet?" I said "no you're not" but he got on at the end of the season, but he knows the work he's 
got to do to, to keep up with the likes of [first team player name] and [first team player 
name]’s and stuff and that's put on size at the moment, but he will get eighteen games at 
[professional team name] this year, they've told me that, so then if you've got [player name], 
he like a rangy, but he's not a 7, he is a 6, you know he's more covering blind side, making 
big hits, getting round the pitch and doing hard work, where umm [player name] is more of a 
ball carrier, I'm not sure where you define [player name] in arcitypal positions in the back 
row, because we've never had an out and out, over the ball 7, but [player name], and [player 
name]'s your mauler, you know, line outs that would come down, that was [player name]'s, 
and we missed that desperately, we missed that somebody to actually control it, [player 
name] is a bit of a, not a loose cannon, well [player name] was our very strong mauler, good 
line out guy, then he seemed to lose his mojo a bit this year umm where [player name] got 
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improved more and more, and then we played [player name], cause he's just all youthful 
aggression you know, [player name] is always gunna start at hooker, one because he never 
loses scrums, he's as strong as an ox, and umm his line outs are so good, and umm where we 
started messing around with line outs this year is when he started losing, his numbers weren't 
looking so good, but the big games, you know and we go to default ball, then he was always 
gunna hit them, and then [player name]...there's a big debate because I liked [player name]  
because he works hard, that he works very hard, and [player name]'s a big unit but he's 
fragile, so often he didn't, he came off because he just, he was knackered or, but he's probably 
got the pushiest parent out of the whole lot, and then [player name], I put [player name] out 
there before, he's had two scrums and I've taken him off, and he said "what's up?" And I said 
"well if you don't wanna scrummage it's pretty pointless having you out there" and then I put 
him on at half time and he's destroyed them so, but, but [player name] isn't very intelligent, 
that's uhh...he's not very intelligent  
Researcher: How would you rate that then in the selection then, the sort of intelligence of 
players?  
FC: Well as they get older, and if you see the systems written on the wall, that playing 
intelligence, I don’t know how you define it, but if you can't grasp it, you're, you're stuffed, 
cause you have to know, we will have pre-defined patterns of play, and every team will have 
at a decent level and that, that isn't really to say right not many teams score off first phase 
ball, because defences are so good, so you've got to disorganise those denseness, so we will, 
our, our umm...analysis on a Thursday night will be, other teams line out, what was their 
plays off, shift drive on a maul or whatever, so, and if you can't understand that, I mean [first 
team player name], I don't know if you saw [first team player name], the one who's calling 
the line outs all the time, the yellow scrum cap, I mean he’s off to [professional team name] 
now, but he would sit there doing the analysis work on the line out and then he's picking them 
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off at will in games because he knows, doesn’t necessarily know their calls but he knows how 
they set up in their line out, and then he knows whether it’s a faint to the front or whatever, 
and he keeps nicking balls, and that's because he's done his homework and he's intelligent, 
but, and [player name] would be like that if he was a forward, but he thinks too much in my 
opinion  
Researcher: Yeah I've heard that [player name]'s uhh  
FC: I mean he’s sending YouTube videos out on, on humility and stuff and I said "mate you 
need to like just chew a few relax pills or something" because he will, he'll have a bloody 
nervous breakdown the way he's going, he, he's predicted these five a stars, he's got a place at 
[university name], not to, not because he wants to be a sport scientist, but he just wants to 
find out more about his body to improve him as a rugby player, I mean he's, he's, and he's in 
danger of going too far  
Researcher: Yeah well he contacted me, yeah he wanted the uhh the uhh footage, over the 
year, I assume to probably look at himself and figure out what's going on  
FC: Yeah but it's almost, he told me, he's been round my house and umm they went to the 
open [national team name] training session, [player name], [player name] and him went, and 
umm I said "well you might as well stay at our house after training" cause they're going up on 
a Friday, and I said "what time are you going?" and he said "well it starts and 10 so we'll 
leave at half 6" and I said "mate it's round the M25, even if it's busy it's only to the M3, up 
the 316, you're there" they were in Tesco’s at 8 o'clock, and he said to the boys the night 
before, he said to [player name] "oh I meditate for half an hour every day" and [player name] 
said "what if you get interrupted then?" "Well I start again" and it's just like, the boys almost 
rip the piss out of him to be honest because it's almost too much  
Researcher: Like a robot almost  
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FC: Yeah, and it's like, he said "take care of the process" I said "mate rugby is a game of 
process, it's also a game of emotion, you can't take the emotion out of it" I mean in there 
sometimes you just got to say, you know, parents and everything else, it's who you're playing 
for, you're not playing for me or [head coach name] or [assistant coach name] or anybody 
else, it's you, go out there and play for a gang of mates, and then sometimes they, I mean after 
a few years of it you run out of things to say I guess but, even in a first team game on a 
Saturday, there's still that emotion there, some are, some are pretty cool and calm, but there's 
still before they go out there they're...but you know some of them, it's like we dropped [first 
team player name], like if you look at it and you, if you have the video on every week as well 
you see people falling off tackles in the outside channel time after time, and you say we have 
leaked so many tackles through there, then, that'll definitely make a difference, because [first 
team coach name] will say something "oh so and so worked hard" and he said, and I said 
"well I don't think he did" and he said "check the video again, see his tackle count" and I 
watched the video and you're going "yeah fair play" and it's sometimes the unseen work they 
do  
Researcher: Yeah, yeah, so performance, past performances, is that have, a big impact  
FC: Yeah definitely, I mean if someone has one bad game I wouldn't throw them out for that 
uhh if [player name] had a nightmare because his girlfriend blew him out the night before or 
something that hasn't happened, but we wouldn't suddenly say "right get him off", you might 
take him off that day but you wouldn't  
Researcher: Wouldn't drop him for the following week  
FC: No, he's our best player, he's our best player, I mean people have shockers for England 
don't they? And they, they stick with him, same with cricket I guess, you know Compton, he's 
had three, well he got some runs this week, but he must think "shit I've got probably got one 
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more match" but then they're not gunna drop him after the first two failures, because they 
know he's a class, that's why they picked him in the first place...I mean we, we have huge, 
our, [first team coach name] will ring me on a, well Tuesday and I said "who are you thinking 
of?" And he's going with so and so, so I say "well justify so and so" he doesn't have to justify 
it to me because he's, it's his job, but umm and he'll say "why do you question that?" You 
know and it makes a difference I think where some of the injured players, the first team boys, 
you never see them when they're not, when they're injured, [first team player name], if you 
going to [opposition team name], [first team player name] would be here on a Saturday 
jumping on that bus with you, you know and that to me shows a level of...that they wanna, 
it's, it's not just because they're getting a pay check  
Researcher: And, would that have a bearing, do you reckon that influences selection in any 
sort of way, these kids that are sort of  
FC: I think some of them will, maybe play when they're injured, when they shouldn't be, I 
mean we are very, very strict on, I mean concussion has been obviously the, the buzz word 
this year, but [physio name], and that's, that's where it helps with me in the first team, because 
I can ring [physio name] on a Tuesday and say "I've got four boys who need looking at that" 
and they're beginning to get seen properly, if they go to the doc, if their parents take them to 
the doctors which is a total waste of time, so I can bring her down here and she does, like 
[player name]'s had concussion this year and she said umm shine a little thing in his eyes and 
she said "I'm not doing anymore umm there's no way you're doing anything, not even 
exercise at school, I don't even want you running the water out on a Saturday" and then she 
would, the following week she'll check him and start the return to play protocols, so we're 
very, and that, and we're very, very strict on it umm so we've never pressurised anybody to 
play when they're injured, [player name] missed a game with his thumb umm then he went 
and played for [county name], for [county name] with it strapped up and he had to come off 
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after twenty minutes, yeah and umm they still selected him on what they had seen, but 
umm...you know I think...I don't know how you measure a person’s work rate but if they're 
not, if they seem to be standing around all the time, like [first team player name] there, he 
was [country name] county prop at the end of last season, toured [country name] and stuff 
with them, and he was playing for [opposition team name] in National one, he's a [club name] 
boy, and then this season he's umm he's, to me he's not conditioned enough, and now, you 
can see now they're working already, because they'll come down and train before we start 
touch, so umm yeah conditioning will definitely be a big factor, and we'll also pick, with the 
first team, if we're going to [opposition team name], we know what we're gunna get, we're 
gunna get a very hostile crowd, we're gunna get a massive pack of forward who are wanna 
kick the shit out of us, so there's no point in going down there and just taking fancy Dan’s 
because you've got people, people who will stand up, first team have got two very different 
scrum halves, I don't know if you saw the county final on Sunday, [first team player name], 
the first team scrum half played for [opposition team name], and then we have [first team 
player name] who's salt of the earth but he's in [place name] in [town name], well [first team 
player name], rough part, he's hard as nails, but salt of the earth, I, I love the guy to pieces, 
but [first team player name] is also the heart and the, the soul of the bus, so he's always up, 
I've never seen [first team player name] down in the dumps, so he's pretty important to us, so 
[first team coach name] would say "well it's [first team player name] or so and so on the 
bench" and I said "well you gotta take [first team coach  name]" and he said "why?" I said " 
we've got a six hour bus trip to [opposition team name] mate" he said "yeah good point, I'll 
go with [first team player name]" so, that's not gunna make the difference if it's a wide 
difference in, in ability, but if it's one who's, generates something to the team bus as well I 
think it makes, it does make a difference because you need that, you can't have people sat 
there with head phones on cause you've got no atmosphere on the bus you know, some will 
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sit down the front and shut themselves away, some will sleep the whole way, [first team 
player name] sleeps everywhere, he's like a cat, and some just talk non-stop  
Researcher: So if those, if the abilities are the same then, you then start looking elsewhere 
and  
FC: Yeah I think you would, I think reliability and...somebody calls off on a Thursday night 
and they're not doing the team run on the Thursday, they will not play on the Saturday unless 
there's a very special case, in fact if he's that pissed off he may bin them out of the squad 
completely...but then you see, if you've got [first team player name] our first team, who was 
our first team hooker the year before last, but he can also prop, so we would probably take 
another, maybe another hooker and a prop and [first team player name], so he can cover, and 
he does cover both, and that's when you'll mix and matching in your selection, and then you 
say well "if, if umm if we take [first team player name] on the bench" sometimes we're only 
allowed five on the bench, so sometimes we'll take a four one split, because [first team player 
name] effectively can play everywhere in the backs, that's a massive factor  
Researcher: Oh right so the utility of players as well  
FC: Yeah and therefore it gets a massive pack, I mean when we first started, two, two years 
ago, they brought in this new thing when it was ten interchanged in the game, and [first team 
coach  name], [first team coach  name] was switching and swapping like it was going out of 
fashion, I think we've learnt that doesn't work, so he might swap the props over a bit more 
before half time but very rarely does he change a scrum half just for sakes, so umm that 
definitely bear, has a bearing, and whether a back row boy is a line out guy or not, if you've 
got three heavy guys or, and they're not line out specialists, that will probably effect the mix 
on the, on the bench as well, cause [first team player name], we've got [first team player 
name], an Irish guy, he plays second row but he also plays back row boy, so that gives us a 
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balance, and then [first team player name], who was [professional team name] players of the 
year, he came last year, and he was, big reputation, nice guy, but didn't really do much, not a 
big, heavy ball carrier, and from then he's, he's  
[Interruption]  
FC: And then uhh...we put him in the second row in a game where we had no other second 
rows, and we played [opposition team name] who are second in the league, hadn't lost for 
ages, and we had, hadn't won for ages and we beat them, and it was just all out aggression, 
getting off the line and smashing them, and we denied them the ball, and he was a star part of 
it, well he was virtually a fixture the rest of the season then, so it's almost we found him by 
accident in a different position...and then I guess, you know, you got to have some leaders in 
the side, we've signed [first team player name], from [opposition team name], and he's six 
foot six, six seven, played full time for quite a few years, hard as nails, so he'll take on every 
enforcer that the other side have and stuff, and you need one, you know in our side we always 
knew that [player name] could take anybody, European kick box champion and, but 
wonderfully disciplined on the pitch, I've never seen him have a fight on the pitch, but he 
always let people knew that they better not mess with him  
Researcher: Yeah, fair enough  
FC: So I don't know if I've answered what you need  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: We had a guy come from [opposition team name], had a big reputation, scored 30 odd 
tries in the [opposition team name] team before they all went tits up there with the finances, 
he came here and he wasn't particularly great but god he had the biggest ego, and in the end I 
went to [director of rugby name], to uhh [previous director of rugby name] who was the DOR 
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before, I said "you've gotta get this guy out of here, he's just poisonous" yeah and we kicked 
him, we got rid of him  
Researcher: See that's the thing, on paper, he probably would have been straight, straight in 
the squad, but  
FC: Great player, and also when you're bringing players in from outside, you have a big call 
umm like with [player name] when he had been out injured for a while and we went to 
[opposition team name], and [assistant coach name] is saying "oh you've gotta play [player 
name], you gotta play [player name], he's terrific, [player name] hasn't played for three 
weeks" I said "who's the best player we've got, and he's, when he's fit, who's the best player? 
Who's the captain of the side?" And he said "well [player name] is" I said "[player name] has 
to play" and [player name] played and was outstanding, and, so, I see it at first team level, 
they're used to it because it's semi pro rugby but in the first team we'd have [first team player 
name], who was our player of the season, who was a 6, [first team coach name] said "oh 
we're a big short this week I'm bring up [first team player name] from [professional team 
name]" who's a starting player in the [league name], [first team player name] plays and says 
"why are you playing me when you've got [first team player name] here? That's just fucking 
crazy" they're horse meat these championship players  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: So it is about, you know, also if somebody has been injured a long time or, but we had 
one lad, he was at umm he left [opposition team name] rugby club because they didn't 
understand him, and he's at [school name] school, always late for training and his mums quite 
precious...and umm she came up to me and she said "I want to know why when my son was 
at [professional team name], why he's not starting for [club name]?" I said "because in our 
opinion" I said "the pocket rocket, [player name] is here all the time, he's got a better pass, 
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he's quicker, he's intelligent, and he doesn't give me a load of shit every Wednesday night" 
anyway he came, we played a league game out there, against [opposition team name], or 
[opposition team name] who were a good side, and I went round and he was sulking away 
and I said umm "we're probably gunna put you on at half time so get ready" anyway before 
half time, I saw his mum taking him away and saying "come on we're not waiting if they're 
not gunna play you" so the boys just ripped the piss, because they don't want him here, so it, 
cause it effects them, and they're, they're close you know  
[Interruption]  
[Unrelated conversation]  
Researcher: I mean can you think of anything else that would of impacted the way you 
selected your team this year?  
FC: ...no if somebody was continually not available and then says, when it's a big game then 
"yeah I'm available" then we'd probably take that into consideration and, and not pick them, I 
mean, I think we've, we've been more than fair to the weaker ones, I mean [head coach 
name]'s frustration was that we would play in, some days we played [player name] umm and 
[player name] and [player name] in the seconds, which meant they're not allowed to play a 
full game on a Sunday, we went to [opposition team name] and we we're losing by about 20-
odd points and we chucked [player name] on, and he changed the game on its head and umm 
[head coach name] was saying "well that's what we should be doing" and I said "well at the 
end of the season nobody really remembers who won that league" so we gotta say are we 
developing these lads as rugby players? Stretching them? What you don't wanna do though is 
chuck them in against [opposition team name] seconds and you put eight colts in there and 
they're cannon fooder, but I think we've managed that, next year the colts are gunna be part of 
the senior club rather than the oldest juniors if that makes sense?  
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[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: Yeah I guess there's a bit of that as well  
Researcher: OK, in what sense?  
FC: Well if they really piss you off all the time  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: I reckon mentality is a good one, if you've got a kid who just rolls over if they're getting, 
if you're getting pumped, you know, I mean we don't get pumped but, you want kids who've 
got a bit of spike about them, a bit of balls about them I think as well  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: I mean we, we didn't pick [player name] last year in the uhh colts cup run because he 
couldn't defend his 10 channel, so [player name] could defend better as it was so he was, 
probably cost us the game because he generally had a shit game  
[Unrelated conversation]  
FC: I guess that affects it, if somebody won't listen to that, then you're gunna say, you know, 
"you can't play to our patterns and if we're playing a press and you can't get off the line, then 
we'll pick somebody who wants to get off the line"  
Researcher: OK, so somebody who can play the way you wanna play?  
FC: Yeah, you know and you've always gotta trust that person inside because if he goes up 
and then if we're going up and out and we're drifting, and we're trying to use that touch line, 
and somebody’s saying "I've got him, I've got him, I've got him" then you can go up, you can 
drift out there, but you're not hearing it, and that comes back to that communication again, 




Example Raw Data and Coding from Data Analysis in Chapter 5 
Table E1 
An example of the raw data which formed the cues included in the situational cues theme 
(contained within in the player cues category) 
Cue  Original quote 
  Availability 
Fit   
  “When he’s fit” 
  “Fit” 
Injured   
  “Concussion” 
  “Injured” 
  “Max was injured” 
  “We had some injuries” 
  “Injuries” 
  “We had to change it because of an injury” 
  “Injury” 
  “Injury” 
  “Injury” 
  “Obviously injuries” 
  “Amount of injuries” 
  “Injury” 
  “For the friendlies it was mainly whoever was available” 
Availability   
  “Available” 
  “We put the best team that was available out” 
  “Made himself available every weekend” 
  “If that player’s available, that player will play” 
  “Unless they were unfit...unable to play for any reason” 
  “Availability” 








  “If there’s two people who are very similar and the fly half is turning up every week and is there on a Thursday”  
  “Attendance to training” 
  “If you got a kid who’s trained every week and is…a boarder line case you’d say “right boy, he’s trained every 
week…tick in the box”” 
  “Whether they trained, definitely, and we definitely dropped people because they weren’t at training” 
  “Continue to miss training” 
  “[for] the…B team game, where someone hasn’t turned up to training” 
  “I think we do reward people who turn up to training” 











  “I need to give these seven guys a game” 
  “Or is it…do we need to give everyone a game?” 
  “There’s a load of guys who haven’t played for three weeks” 
  “Whether there’s anyone we gotta fit in because they haven’t played for a few weeks” 
  “There were kids who haven’t played for two or three weeks” 
  “These guys haven’t played for three [weeks]” 
  “There were some people who hadn’t played for three or four weeks” 
  “Friendlies, in the end I’ll be honest, it was whoever hasn’t [played recently]” 
  “Preference will be going to the guys that didn’t play or were on the bench” 
  “The ones that didn’t play umm that are not in this side” 
  He’s our 10 
He’s our 10   
  “We played Max because he’s our 10” 
 
 
